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WAR'S   NEW  WEAPONS 


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•IS 

WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

An  Expert  Analysis  in  Plain  Language  of  the 

Weapons  and  Methods  Used  in  the 

Present  Great  War 


By 
BARON  HROLF  VON  DEWITZ 

WITH   INTRODUCTORY  PREFACE  BY 
HUDSON   MAXIM 

ILL  US  TEA  TED 


NEW  YORK 

DODD,  MEAD  AND  COMPANY 

1915 


Copyright,  1915,  by 
DODD,  MEAD  AND  COMPANY 


PREFACE 

There  are  two  national  crimes  of  equal  enor- 
mity— the  one  that  of  military  aggression,  and 
the  other  that  of  unpreparedness  in  respect  of 
the  necessary  safeguards  against  aggression  to 
protect  the  property  and  homes  and  families  of 
those  who  depend  on  us  and  trust  us  to  safe- 
guard them. 

One  after  another  of  the  surrounding  nations 
will  likely  be  drawn  into  the  war  before  it  is 
over.  After  the  present  belligerents  have  set- 
tled their  scores  with  the  sword,  there  will  be 
other  scores  to  be  settled  between  the  victors 
and  the  neutral  nations.  Differences  between 
the  warring  and  the  neutral  powers — differ- 
ences which,  in  time  of  peace,  might  produce 
very  strained  relations  or  precipitate  war — may 
now  be  lightly  passed  over  as  mere  discourt- 
esies. But  after  the  war,  some  of  the  acts  of 
the  neutrals  that  at  present  seem  quite  insig- 
nificant may  be  magnified  to  advantage  as  casus 
belli.  It  is  my  opinion  that,  whichever  side 
wins,  the  United  States  will  likely  have  to  fight 
the  winner  within  a  short  time  after  the  war 
is  over,  for  neither  the  Germans  nor  the  Allies, 
in  the  heat  of  passion  that  now  dominates  them, 
will  feel  in  a  mood  to  forgive  some  of  the  things 
which  we  may  feel  compelled  to  do  in  the  main- 


325752 


vi  :  PBEFACE 

tenance  of  our  neutrality.  In  short,  the  things 
which  we  may  be  led  to  do  to  avoid  being  em- 
broiled in  the  present  war  may  serve  to  embroil 
us  with  the  victors,  unless  the  war  should  end 
in  a  draw. 

It  is  now  such  an  old,  old,  threadbare  story, 
that  it  no  longer  needs  repetition  that  our 
standing  army  is  a  mere  corporal's  guard;  that 
our  militia  could  stand  before  a  trained  army 
just  about  as  long  as  a  small  boy  could  stand 
before  a  John  L.  Sullivan,  while  our  navy  is 
absolutely  inadequate  to  defend  our  coast  cities 
or  to  secure  the  country  against  invasion. 

Our  army  and  navy  men,  who  have  been 
educated  in  these  things,  and  who  ought  to 
know,  tell  us  that  our  position  is  pathetically 
defenceless.  They  tell  us  that,  should  our  navy 
be  destroyed  or  evaded,  and  an  army  of  only  a 
hundred  thousand  men,  equipped  with  all  of 
the  arms  and  paraphernalia  of  modern  warfare, 
be  landed  on  our  coast,  that  army  could  go  any- 
where it  should  see  fit,  live  off  the  country, 
capture  our  big  cities,  and  hold  us  up  for  ransom 
in  spite  of  all  that  we  could  do. 

These  good  authorities  tell  us  that  we  have 
not  men  enough  to  man  the  few  guns  that  we 
have;  that  we  could  not  put  more  than  thirty 
thousand  trained  men  in  the  field  within  the 
first  month;  while,  should  the  invading  nation 
need  more  men,  it  would  have  some  millions  in 
its  standing  army  from  which  to  draw.    Any  of 


PREFACE  vii 

the  great  powers  could  spare  a  few  hundred 
thousand,  or  a  million  men,  if  need  be,  for  the 
conquest  of  the  United  States. 

Take  a  map  of  the  United  States  and  a  pair 
of  compasses  and  strike  a  circle,  with  a  radius 
of  a  hundred  and  sixty  miles  around  Peekskill, 
New  York,  as  the  centre,  and  in  that  circle  will 
be  found  ninety  per  cent,  of  the  arms  and  am- 
munition works,  military  stores,  smokeless  pow- 
der works,  torpedo  works,  torpedo-boat  works, 
arms  and  armament  works,  of  the  entire  coun- 
try, together  with  the  principal  coal  fields  of 
Pennsylvania.  Within  this  circle  will  be  in- 
cluded not  only  New  York,  but  also  the  city  of 
Boston  on  the  East,  and  the  city  of  Philadelphia 
on  the  West,  and  all  cities  between.  What  an 
enticement  for  invasion !  What  a  prize  for  the 
invader ! 

The  conquest  of  this  area  will  not  be  a  work 
of  months,  or  of  years,  but  only  of  a  few  days, 
and  the  thing  will  be  done  before  we  shall  have 
time  to  mobilise  the  available  fighting  forces  we 
have,  much  less  to  enlist  and  train  and  arm  a 
citizen  soldiery. 

This  vital  area  is  the  solar  plexus  of  Uncle 
Sam,  and  an  army  of  a  hundred  thousand 
trained  men  landed  on  our  Atlantic  seaboard 
will  be  able  to  capture  this  entire  area  and  sub- 
due the  populace  as  easily  as  the  police  force 
of  New  York  can  subdue  a  rioting  mob. 

The  enemy  may  annex  the  captured  territory, 


viii  PREFACE 

just  as  Belgium  has  been  annexed  by  Germany, 
and  then,  not  only  will  we  all  be  taxed  to  sup- 
port the  war,  but  also  we  shall  be  conscripted 
to  fight  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy  against  our 
own  people,  and  we  shall  all  be  put  to  work  with 
an  exceeding  busy-ness  operating  our  smoke- 
less powder  factories,  our  gun  factories,  our 
ammunition  works,  to  turn  out  war  materials 
for  the  enemy. 

This  is  an  age  of  mechanics,  an  age  wherein 
man-made  mechanism  more  and  more  replaces 
hand  work.  Everywhere  in  our  industries  of 
peace,  we  have  seen  labour-saving  machinery  re- 
place the  labour  of  human  hands. 

To-day,  all  the  men  in  the  world  could  not  do 
by  hand  all  of  the  world's  ploughing  and  sowing 
and  reaping  and  carrying  of  the  world's  food  to 
market;  and  all  the  women  in  the  world  could 
not  to-day  do  the  world's  sewing  without  the 
sewing-machine,  and  all  the  men  in  the  world 
and  all  the  women  in  the  world  combined  could 
not  to-day  do  a  tenth  of  the  world 's  writing  with- 
out the  typewriter  and  type-setting  and  printing 
machinery.  One  of  the  giant  dredges  that  have 
been  ladling  out  of  the  Panama  Canal  the  vast 
landslides  can  do  the  pick  and  shovel  and  wheel- 
barrow work  of  a  thousand  men. 

Everywhere,  in  everything  we  do,  and  in 
everything  done  for  us,  we  find  human  hands 
now  mainly  engaged  in  guiding  the  work  of 
labour-saving  machinery. 


PREFACE  ix 

The  people  of  the  United  States  of  America 
have  been  able  to  develop  their  enormous  re- 
sources and  keep  abreast  of  the  world's  indus- 
trial progress  mainly  by  the  invention  of  labour- 
saving  machinery  under  the  protection  of  our 
patent  law. 

In  our  competition  with  other  nations  for  the 
markets  of  the  world,  no  one  thinks  of  referring 
to  the  prowess  of  our  unskilled  citizen  soldiers 
of  industry  unsupported  by  machinery,  but  all 
reliance  is  placed  upon  our  multiform  labour- 
saving  machinery,  and  our  skilled  labour  behind 
that  machinery. 

With  these  pregnant  facts  before  us,  it  is 
strange  that  it  should  not  be  very  plain  to  every 
one  that  what  is  true  of  labour-saving  ma- 
chinery in  peace  is  likewise  true  in  war.  It  is 
very  strange  indeed  that  there  should  be  intel- 
ligent men  and  women  among  us  unable  to  see 
and  to  understand  that  labour-saving  machinery 
and  labour  skilled  in  its  use  are  as  applicable 
and  as  indispensable  to  successful  warfare  as 
to  peaceful  industry.  Furthermore,  labour- 
saving  machinery  in  war  is  life-saving  ma- 
chinery. The  rapid-fire  gun  is  the  greatest  life- 
saving  instrument  in  the  world. 

These  persons  do  not  seem  to  appreciate  that 
war  is  an  industry.  As  a  matter  of  stern  fact, 
war  is  and  has  always  been  the  biggest  and  the 
most  vital  industry  of  mankind,  and  in  no  other 
industry  is  labour-saving  machinery  so  import- 


x  PREFACE 

ant  and  so  vital,  and  in  no  other  industry  does  so 
much  depend  upon  the  skill  of  the  labour  operat- 
ing the  machinery. 

We  are  the  slaves  of  belief,  and  we  love  our 
chains.  Although  our  faith  may  be  false,  we 
hate  the  hand  that  tries  to  free  us.  The  people 
of  this  country  have  a  great  false  faith  in  the 
fighting  qualities  of  their  citizen  soldiery,  im- 
provised in  time  of  war.  They  point  proudly  to 
the  War  of  the  Revolution  and  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion  to  prove  how  our  volunteer  soldiers 
can  fight.  They  overlook  the  fact  that  fighting 
then  was  mostly  done  by  hand;  that  now  it  is 
mostly  done  by  machinery  and  that  it  is 
just  as  foolish  and  absurd  to  think  of  taking  un- 
trained men  off  the  farm  to  operate  the  guns 
and  machinery  of  war  as  it  would  be  to  try  to 
operate  the  factories  with  them  where  the  guns 
and  machinery  are  made. 

It  takes  as  long  to-day  to  convert  a  farmer 
into  a  skilled  soldier  as  it  does  to  convert  him 
into  a  skilled  mechanic. 

A  citizen  soldiery  without  years  of  training  in 
the  discipline  and  weapons  and  mechanism  of 
modern  warfare  is  only  a  mob,  as  easily  scat- 
tered by  a  few  real  soldiers  as  chaff  by  a  whirl- 
wind. 

We,  like  a  lamb  rampant  believing  itself  to 
be  a  lion,  have  been  bestriding  the  world  with 
big  arrogance,  and  have  flaunted  our  Monroe 
Doctrine  before  the  eyes  of  all  the  nations,  bliss- 


PREFACE  xi 

fully  unaware  of  the  fact  that  we  have  compara- 
tively no  more  fighting  potentiality  to  protect 
our  Monroe  Doctrine,  should  there  be  a  coali- 
tion of  any  two  nations  against  us,  than  a  pet 
pup  would  have  to  force  obedience  in  a  den  of 
tigers. 

Therefore,  I  gladly  hail  the  present  work  of 
Baron  von  Dewitz  as  a  book  which  deals  ably 
with  the  ever  transcending  strategic  uses  of 
War's  New  Weapons. 

There  are  no  subjects  at  the  present  time 
more  deserving  serious  attention  and  examina- 
tion by  all  thinking  persons  than  the  subjects 
treated  in  this  volume. 

Baron  von  Dewitz,  a  subject  of  Denmark, 
very  naturally  views  the  present  European  con- 
flict with  the  eyes  of  a  neutral.  He  has  en- 
deavoured to  present  facts  as  he  has  found  them, 
and  without  paxtialityy-and  his  handling  of  the 
specfalisecT  branches  of  modern  warfare  and 
weapons  is  that  of  a  military  expert. 

He  is  somewhat  of  a  poet,  however,  and  fills 
the  mind  with  creepy  imaginings  about  night- 
hawking  air-craft.  His  considerable  actual  per- 
sonal experience  with  air-craft  enables  him  to 
speak  with  a  very  authoritative  fancy,  even 
when  he  is  poetical. 

Baron  von  Dewitz  has  a  masterful  knowledge 
of  military  tactics  and  the  philosophy  of  war- 
fare. His  descriptions  in  interesting  detail  of 
the  use  of  wireless  telegraphy  on  the  airship  and 


ti* 


xii  PREFACE 

on  the  battlefield  show  an  intimate  knowledge  of 
this  most  valuable  arm  of  naval  and  military 
service.  His  talk  on  the  submarine  and  its  op- 
eration, and  his  enlightening  descriptions  of  the 
other  weapons  of  warfare,  make  one  burn  the 
after-midnight  oil,  finally  to  lay  the  book  down 
with  reluctance  in  the  wee  hours  of  the  morning. 
Baron  von  Dewitz  is  deserving  of  the  deep 
gratitude  of  the  American  people,  for  by  this 
book  he  makes  a  strong  appeal  to  their  needed 
realisation  of  the  significance  of  modern  war 
machinery,  and  the  imperative  necessity  of 
drilling  and  educating  a  dependable  army  for 
its  use,  both  to  fore-fend  ourselves  against  war, 
and,  in  the  event  of  war,  to  save  us  from  hu- 
miliation and  defeat. 

Hudson  Maxim. 

New  York,  March,  1915. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 

Pkeface  by  Hudson  Maxim 
I    Aircraft 
II    Automobile  Artillery 

III  The  Submarine    . 

IV  The  Capital  Ship 
V    The  Turret  Fort 

VI    The  Wireless  Signal 
VII    The  Fountain  Pen     . 
VIII    The  Super-Commissariat 
IX    Super-Strategy    . 
Epilogue 


v 
1 

49 
86 
127 
179 
200 
222 
242 
261 
290 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

Marine  Zeppelin  of  the  "  Hansa  "  type;  and  a 
Seott-Dewitz  bomb-dropping  apparatus  at- 
tached to  a  military  aeroplane  .       .     Frontispiece 

PACING 
PAGE 

French  Zouaves  repelling  a  German  air  raid  by 
means  of  an  anti-aerial  field  gun     ...       18 

The  "  Eye  in  the  Sky."  The  latest  type  of 
French  military  "  avion  "  and  an  automobile 
aeroplane  "  hospital  " 38 

The  Belgian  S.  A.  V.  A.  turret  automobile       .       52 

The  "  Terrible  German  42-centimetre  cannon  " 
exposed 66 

The  Belgian  ' '  Minerva  ' '  model  is  a  ' '  success- 
ful type  of  armoured  scout  "      .       .       .       .  *    80 

The  latest  type  of  British  submarine,  class 
"D  " .       .102 

"  Friedrich  der  Grosse,"  a  typical  example  of 
German  super-dreadnaught  construction       .     134 

The  latest  model  of  Krupp  5.9-inch  quick-fire 
naval  gun  as  installed  on  the  German  super- 
dreadnaughts 166 

A  Belgian  battery  of  howitzers  on  the  firing-line 
in  Flanders 180 

A  French  "  Battleship  on  Wheels  "    .       .       .     188' 

XV 


xvi  ILLUSTKATIONS 

PACING 

PAGE 

How  a  French  turret  fort  looks  after  facing  the 
fire  of  German  42-centimetre  artillery  .         .196 

German  Kronprinz  inspecting  a  field  telephone     , 
outfit 212 

The  motor  kitchen  of  the  German  Kronprinz    .     244 

Austrian  field  kitchens 256 

The  Kaiser  and  His  Staff  studying  War  Maps   .     278 


WAR'S   NEW  WEAPONS 


CHAPTER  I 
AIRCRAFT 

An  Aerial  Night  Attack 

The  good  city  has  closed  its  solid,  stony  coun- 
tenance in  peaceful  sleep.  A  round,  chubby 
moon,  riding  behind  curtains  of  cloud,  peeks 
down  with  the  mien  of  a  patriarch  upon  the 
empty  streets  and  large,  open  squares,  where 
no  one  is  afoot,  and  upon  the  broad  river  that 
flows  unrippled  and  blinking  through  the  city's 
many  arched  bridges. 

Here  and  there  a  tall,  menacing  spire  conse- 
crates the  crowding  roofs  with  a  finger  of 
sombre  shadow.  Is  it  chance  or  heaven  that 
joins  two  long  shadow- fingers  in  a  huge  cross 
over  the  heart  of  the  city!  In  the  centre 
thrones  a  lordly  pile  gathering  under  its  dome 
the  prayers  of  holy  men  and  prostrated  multi- 
tudes. 

There  are  no  lights  anywhere.  There  is  no 
motion.  The  city  lies  lifeless  with  the  aspect 
of  having  been  deserted.  From  the  woodlands 
on  its  borders  comes  sigh  upon  sigh  as  the  rising 
breeze  rustles  through  the  leafage.  The  sound 
of  it  rises  and  dies  away  in  scarcely  audible 


2  WAIi'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

cadence  like  the  breathing  of  some  vast,  multi- 
tudinous sleeper  stirring  uneasily  in  his  dreams. 

A  flight  of  cranes  and  storks  passes  over  the 
housetops  dragging  a  iveird,  jagged  shadow — 
birds  of  passage  headed  wrong  and  out  of  sea- 
son. As  they  speed  over  the  outer  forts  a  pale 
shaft  of  light  pierces  the  fluttering  flock — the 
ever  vigilant  eye  of  a  garrison  ever  appre- 
hensive of  the  enemy. 

The  big  clock  under  the  cathedral  dome  tolls 
off  the  second  hour  past  midnight.  Stillness 
broods  once  more  over  the  rapt  city.  But  for 
the  slow-breathing  moorlands  there  is  no  sound. 

A  large  cloud  curtain  obscures  the  moon.  Out 
of  its  folds  glides  a  long,  ghostly  object.  At 
first  it  moves  with  the  cloud,  but  presently  it 
breaks  away  and  ranges  forward  with  uncanny 
speed.  Issuing  from  the  clouds  it  seems  to  be 
of  the  clouds,  so  gauzy  and  ethereal  does  it  look. 
Nearer  and  nearer  does  it  move,  noiselessly  in- 
creasing its  speed  in  a  huge,  sweeping  curve,  its 
long,  sleek  sides  and  tapering  points  resembling 
the  shape  of  a  monstrous  shark!  Of  a  sudden 
it  reels  out  a  dark  object  trailing  on  a  thread 
and  sails  across  the  city.  Something  drops 
hissing  and  screaming  through  space.  A  vi- 
cious knife-edge  of  smoke  points  downward.  A 
lurid  flash  shoots  upward.  Then  a  thunderous 
roar  as  of  an  earthquake  blasts  the  air  and  sends 
echoes  tumbling  in  muffled  rumblings.    Again 


AIRCRAFT  3 

a  hiss,  a  flash  and  a  thwiderclap,  and  again  and 
again  before  the  searchlights  on  the  bastions 
can  concentrate  on  that  most  dreaded  enemy  of 
modern  warfare,  the  aerial  dreadnaught. 

In  a  twinkle  the  slumbering  city  is  on  its  feet. 
The  long  pencils  of  its  searching  eyes  flood  the 
night  in  a  brilliant  glare.  The  rapid-fire  artil- 
lery on  the  forts  crashes  away,  streaking  the 
night  with  screaming  shells  that  explode  with  a 
wicked,  lurid  spurt  of  fire.  From  a  thousand 
different  posts,  where  sharpshooters  have  been 
stationed  throughout  the  city,  the  rifles  of  in- 
fantry squads  pop  away  like  bundles  of  fire- 
crackers, holing  the  air  with  swarms  of  hum- 
ming bullets. 

Windows  are  thrown  open  everywhere  and  as 
quickly  slammed.  Crowds  of  people  surge  out 
upon  the  streets,  only  to  be  driven  back  under 
roof  by  the  infantry  pickets.  The  searchlights 
do  not  seem  to  avail  against  the  blue-goggled 
crew  of  the  aerial  monster  that  soars  above 
gun-range  planting  heavy,  explosive  bombs  at 
will  of  its  daring  commander.  The  shells  of 
the  rapid  artillery  rend  the  air  in  vain.  The 
bullets  of  thirty  thousand  pickets,  firing  inces- 
santly, are  also  spent  m  vain,  never  reaching  the 
aerial  cruiser  that  vanishes  as  quickly  as  it 
came. 

And  in  a  ghostly  shower  of  lead  and  steel 
these  missiles  fall  back  upon  the  pickets,  crash- 


A  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

ing  through  glass  and  tile,  plumping  Mo  the 
blinking  river,  drumming  a  fiendish  tattoo  on 
the  solid,  stony  countenance,  heroically  scarred, 
of  the  good  city. 


Aircraft  Has  Eliminated  Surprise 
Tactics 

The  great  surprise  of  aircraft  in  the  present 
war  is  that  it  eliminates  surprise.  The  public 
does  not  appear  to  understand  the  changed  con- 
ditions of  warfare  that  make  this  possible. 
Fed  on  daring  exhibition  tricks  and  keyed  up 
to  a  point  of  idiotic  expectancy  by  newspaper 
writers  with  a  taste  for  prophetic  pronuncia- 
mento  rather  than  for  facts,  the  public  has 
evinced  mostly  disappointment,  whereas  mili- 
tary men  have  shown  enthusiastic  approba- 
tion. 

There  have  been  plenty  of  epoch-making 
events  on  the  aerial  frontiers  of  this  war,  but 
incompetent  correspondents,  unable  to  grasp 
the  nature  of  their  significance,  have  reported 
them  incompetently.  The  public  has  been 
cheated  of  its  right  to  be  properly  informed  on 
aerial  tactics  in  warfare. 

Not  only  has  the  air  scout  reduced  the  proud- 
est cavalry  to  second  place  in  the  matter  of 
reconnoissance,  but  he  even  prepares  the  way 

5 


6  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

for  it.  In  addition,  he  precedes  and  picks  the; 
terrain  for  the  armoured  motor-car  squadrons 
which  an  invading  force  deploys  in  advance  of 
the  cavalry.  He  does  this  work  so  efficiently 
that  scouting  reports,  which  formerly  required 
days  by  the  speediest  cavalry,  are  now  delivered 
in  a  few  hours  and  in  a  much  more  thorough 
and  detailed  manner.  If  this  were  all  the  air 
scout  had  accomplished  on  the  firing-line,  any 
military  commander  would  commend  his  reten- 
tion for  the  mere  speeding  up  of  tactical  in- 
telligence. 

But  this  is  by  no  means  all.  Air  scouting  is 
indispensable  in  many  other  directions.  For 
"close-in"  reconnoissance  over  the  fighting 
lines,  marking  changing  positions,  intrench- 
ments  and  reinforcements,  and  for  extended 
reconnoissance,  especially  on  the  wings  of  the 
army  to  guard  against  turning  movements,  the 
air  scout  is  doing  a  work  of  paramount  impor- 
tance to  the  commander  where  cavalry  could 
not  follow. 

For  swift  courier  service,  where  galloping 
hussars  were  formerly  employed,  the  air  scout 
is  now  used.  For  aiding  in  obtaining  the  range 
for  the  artillery,  and  continually  correcting  the 


AIRCRAFT  7 

same  to  insure  accuracy  of  fire,  the  air  scout  is 
invaluable.  For  spotting  the  enemy's  artillery, 
which  is  usually  masked,  and  dropping  smoke 
bombs  or  tinsel  signals  indicating  the  position 
and  simultaneously  aiding  in  establishing  the 
range,  only  the  air  scout  can  get  results.  For 
detecting  the  enemy's  line  of  communication 
and  raiding  it  by  bomb  attacks,  and  even  for 
transporting  explosives  and  detonating  rail- 
roads and  bridges,  the  air  scout  shows  up 
bravely.  In  fact,  the  work  he  has  done,  and  is 
doing,  in  this  war,  on  all  these  points  is  of  a 
character  so  remarkably  thorough  and  efficient 
that  he  has  influenced  measurably  the  strategy 
of  opposing  commanders  and  compelled  tactics 
that  were  never  tried  before. 

The  present  war  has  amply  shown  that  the 
tactical  deployment  of  a  modern  army  is  more 
absolute  than  relative ;  that  is,  once  the  forma- 
tion of  the  battle-line  has  been  decided  upon  it 
is  there  to  stay,  and  though  it  is  subject  to  re- 
arrangement this  requires  much  more  time  now- 
adays than  formerly.  The  battle  front  on  the 
Franco-Belgian  borders  has  ranged  from  150 
to  more  than  200  miles  in  length,  with  little  less  J 
than  3,000,000  men  strung  out  in  opposing  lines. 


8  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

It  is  evident  that  such  tremendously  extended 
formations  cannot  be  quickly  changed  in  the 
main  plan — though  changes  in  detail  are  effected 
with  much  greater  dispatch  than  formerly — 
and  therefore  it  has  become  vitally  necessary  to 
plan  the  disposition  of  the  battle-line  with  hith- 
erto unknown  care  and  sagacity  in  advance  of 
actual  fighting. 

This  necessity  has  increased  the  task  of  the 
commander-in-chief  to  a  point  where  the  science 
of  conducting  warfare  on  land  is  beginning  to 
resemble  naval  warfare.  Instead  of  being  more 
or  less  in  the  dark  as  to  the  forces  opposing 
him,  as  in  the  days  when  scouting  was  done  by 
cavalry  only,  the  commanders  in  this  war  know 
exactly  what  forces  they  are  facing,  the  same 
as  a  naval  commander  knows  by  observation 
the  kind  and  number  of  vessels  he  is  likely  to 
engage. 

And  thus  it  comes  about  that  on  the  modern 
battle  fronts  where  opposing  forces  know  each 
other's  strength  and  disposition  at  all  times, 
the  same  as  in  a  naval  battle,  it  has  become 
practically  impossible  to  execute  movements  in- 
tended to  ambush  or  surprise  any  considerable 
division  of  an  army.     What  is  the  practical 


AIRCRAFT  9 

cause  of  this  momentous  change  in  field  tac- 
tics? If  it  is  not  due  to  the  "eye  in  the  sky," 
what  is  it? 

By  the  medium  of  air  scouts  the  commanders 
in  this  war  have  not  only  been  able  to  accelerate 
tactical  operation  in  detail,  but  they  have  been 
kept  a  jour  constantly  on  the  strength,  position 
and  movements  of  opposing  forces,  and  by  vir- 
tue of  the  exact  information  thus  reported  they 
have  been  enabled  to  dispose  enormous  masses 
of  troops  over  huge  areas  with  greater  and 
closer  application  of  scientific  strategy  than 
ever  before  in  the  military  history  of  the 
world. 

Three  months'  fighting  has  shown  that  it  is 
not  so  much  actual  superiority  of  numbers  that 
counts  as  the  ability  to  oppose  the  enemy  in 
the  decisive  encounters  with  forces  superior 
not  only  in  number  but  in  quality.  Owing  to 
scouting  facilities  being  practically  equal  on 
either  side,  concentration  of  large  bodies  of 
troops  is  immediately  detected  if  undertaken 
in  daytime  and  as  certainly  counteracted. 
Forced  marching  under  cover  of  night,  then, 
and  motor  transport  of  troops  to  some  extent, 
have  become  the  only  means  whereby  a  com- 


10  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

mander  can  move  upon  the  enemy  at  break  of 
dawn  with  superior  forces. 

The  very  fact  that  the  Germans  appear  to 
possess  a  higher  degree  of  "nocturnal"  mo- 
bility, and  are  trained  to  execute  this  manoeuvre 
in  large  units,  is  what  gave  them  the  initial  ad- 
vantage, more  than  any  other  factor,  and  en- 
abled them  to  drive  the  Allied  armies  before 
them  almost  to  the  gates  of  Paris. 

The  air  scout  also  affects  the  method  whereby 
field  commanders  execute  their  final  orders. 
The  risk  assumed  by  possible  misjudgment  is 
so  great,  owing  to  the  extended  firing-line,  that 
no  commander  would  venture  to  make  a  deci- 
sion until  all  the  air  scouts  assigned  to  his  divi- 
sion have  filed  satisfactory  reports.  If  the  re- 
ports do  not  tally,  or  if  more  definite  and  de- 
tailed observation  is  necessary,  the  modern 
commander  chooses  to  wait  rather  than  guess 
his  way  through,  and  he  can  afford  to  wait,  for 
the  air  scout  makes  waiting,  in  an  emergency, 
only  a  matter  of  minutes  where  cavalry  would 
consume  hours.  This  is  particularly  so  in  tacti- 
cal reconnoitring  when  the  hostile  forces  are, 
in  most  cases,  not  marching  on  the  roads  but 
are  concentrated  in  trenches  or  deploying  either 


AIRCRAFT  11 

to  form  new  lines  or  to  occupy  new  positions 
prepared  for  them  during  the  night.  These 
last-minute  changes  and  eleventh-hour  disposi- 
tions on  the  enemy's  part  are  what  the  com- 
mander is  desirous  of  knowing  above  any- 
thing else.  It  is  a  matter  of  minutes.  His  air 
scouts  bring  him  the  facts  and  necessarily  with 
considerable  personal  risk,  for  in  tactical  rec- 
onnoitring the  air  scout  cannot  locate  and  esti- 
mate the  half-hidden  troops  except  by  getting 
down  close  somewhat  within  range  of  rifle-fire. 
True,  a  machine  or  two  is  often  lost  in  a  ven- 
turesome errand  of  this  sort,  but  the  loss  is 
small  compared  to  what  the  disaster  would  be 
if  there  were  no  aeroplanes  and  squadrons  of 
cavalry  were  to  wade  in  and  try  to  find  an  enemy 
who  is  waiting  for  them  in  trenches  with  rifles ! 
One  single  ' i  eye  in  the  sky  ■ f  can  observe  the 
formation  of  an  entire  army  corps  more  ac- 
curately and  with  less  risk,  and  in  much  shorter 
time,  than  a  whole  squadron  of  cavalry.  It 
must  not  be  assumed,  however,  that  I  am  in 
favour  of  diminishing  the  cavalry;  on  the  con- 
trary, I  believe,  the  present  war  will  compel  an 
increase  in  the  cavalry  arm  generally.  There 
is  plenty  of  evidence  that  aerial  reconnoitring 


12  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

is  much  more  effective  when  supported  by 
cavalry  than  when  independently  conducted. 
The  air  scout  is  better  fitted  to  observe  than 
the  cavalry,  but  the  latter  is  better  equipped  to 
take  quick  advantage  of  his  observation  than 
any  other  arm,  and  particularly  in  the  impor- 
tant and  difficult  screening  movements  on  which 
the  main  force  of  modern  armies  is  forced  to 
rely  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  formerly. 
So  far  as  actual  field  experience  in  this  war 
would  seem  to  indicate,  the  most  decisive  results 
have  occurred  wherever  air  scouts  have  oper- 
ated in  conjunction  with  cavalry  assisted  by 
mixed  cycle  corps  of  motor  and  leg-propelled 
vehicles.  In  other  words,  maximum  results  are 
best  obtainable  when  the  most  mobile  sections 
of  an  army  can  be  made  to  combine  and  concen- 
trate on  reconnoissance  duty  requiring  extreme 
rapidity  backed  by  the  instantaneous  offerte 
of  sabre  and  rifle.  The  "eye  in  the  sky"  for 
discovering  and  observing  a  hidden  enemy,  the 
"mounted"  sabre  for  outflanking  him  and 
pushing  home  an  attack  over  ground  where  only 
horses  are  efficient,  and  the  "motor-infantry" 
for  deploying  a  flying  wedge  over  the  highways 
— this  seems  to  be  the  ideal  combination  for 


AIRCRAFT  13 

reconnoissance  requirements  in  the  present  war. 
The  Germans  appear  to  have  made  use  of  it 
liberally  in  their  premier  advance,  when  men 
succumbed  to  machines  and  too  strenuous  push- 
ing had  the  effect  of  a  serious  reaction,  which 
served  to  help  the  Allied  resistance. 

When  it  comes  to  actual  fighting  the  per- 
formance of  the  air  scout  has  disappointed  only 
the  laity  who  have  been  led  to  suppose  that 
bomb-dropping  aircraft  would  somehow  sup- 
plant the  artillery  or  at  least  supplement  it. 
Aerial  bomb-dropping  is  still  in  the  experi- 
mental stage,  despite  certain  notable  advances, 
and  no  military  man  expects  much  from  it  ex- 
cept as  a  destructive  auxiliary  against  hostile 
aircraft  bases  and  the  like.  Here  and  there  a 
lucky  shot  has  caused  not  inconsiderable  dam- 
age, but  until  more  accurate  means  of  placing 
explosive  bombs  have  been  adapted  to  present 
types  of  aircraft  their  offensive  strength  will 
remain  negligible.  This  also  applies  to  the 
Zeppelin  dirigibles.  Although  these  craft  can 
carry  large  stores  of  heavy,  explosive  bombs, 
they  do  not  seem  to  be  able  to  hit  a  target 
properly,  even  when  the  target  is  as  large  as 
the  vital  spots  in  the  cities  that  have  been  bom- 


\J 


14  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

barded.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  Zeppelin  is  the  only  type  of 
craft  which  is  adequately  equipped  to  fight  its 
logical  and  immediate  enemy — the  aeroplane, 
whereas  the  latter  has  no  effective  means  of 
attack  against  the  Zeppelin  except  the  very  un- 
certain factor  of  surprise,  and  then  only  by 
concerted  action. 

But  the  crowning  achievement  of  aircraft  in 
this  war  is  that  while  three  million  trained 
troops  have  been  locked  in  a  death  struggle  for 
months  halfway  across  Western  Europe,  it  is 
due  to  the  superb  reconnoissance  of  air  scouts 
that  not  a  single  instance  of  ambush  or  flank- 
ing turn  of  consequence  has  taken  place ! 

What  the  Zeppelins  Have  Done 

Why  have  not  the  Zeppelins  done  more?  is 
the  popular  cry.  Why  don't  they  sink  the 
Franco-British  fleet,  why  don't  they  bombard 
naval  and  military  bases;  if  they  are  what  is 
claimed  for  them,  why  don't  they  do  something 
worth  while? 

Indeed,  the  Zeppelins  have  been  active  inter- 
mittently, only  the  Germans  have  not  thought 


AIRCRAFT  15 

it  necessary  to  report  their  secret  operations 
for  the  entertainment  of  newspaper  readers. 
Under  cover  of  night  Zeppelins  have  pre- 
ceded every  important  move  en  masse  of  the 
German  armies.  At  early  dawn  they  have  ob- 
served the  movements  of  the  Allied  armies 
without  themselves  being  observed.  They  have 
sailed  around  the  rear  of  the  Allies  and  long 
distances  beyond  the  rear,  noting  the  oncoming 
of  reinforcements,  the  ever-changing  position 
of  the  various  lines  of  communication,  the  prep- 
arations made  for  the  defence  of  a  line  of  forts, 
the  manning  of  intrenched  camps,  the  location 
of  commissariat  bases,  etc.  They  have  reported 
what  they  have  seen  by  their  own  long-distance 
wireless,  and  they  have  returned  to  their 
hangars  loaded  with  fresh  detail  information 
accurately  mapped  out  and  ready  for  use. 

Invisible  and  noiseless,  these  huge,  swift  noc- 
turnal birds  of  the  German  forces  have  placed 
their  commanders  in  a  position  to  know  almost 
as  much  about  the  enemy's  doings  in  the  main  y^ 
as  the  enemy  himself  under  conditions  when 
aeroplanes  would  have  been  detected  cmd  prob- 
ably destroyed.  It  must  be  remembered  that  a 
Zeppelin  can  well  afford  the  time  necessary  to 


16  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

ambush  itself  successfully  in  the  clouds  if  only 
for  the  chance  of  an  occasional  peep  through 
the  rifts.  Similarly,  a  Zeppelin  can  hover  in 
fog  and  mist  and  wait  till  it  clears,  when  it 
rises/  aloft  together  with  the  mist,  completing 
observations  as  it  rises,  so  that  its  blue-gray 
contours  are  not  visibly  revealed  against  the 
overhanging  vapours.  One  notable  difference 
between  aeroplane  scouting  and  Zeppelin 
reconnoissance  is  that  the  latter  is  more  thor- 
ough and  remains  undetected  in  most  instances 
while  the  former  invariably  betrays  its  pres- 
ence. There  is  a  decided  advantage  in  being 
able  to  collect  information  when  the  enemy  does 
not  realise  that  his  plans  have  been  read,  and 
there  is  little  danger  of  his  changing  plans  in 
this  event. 

We  are  in  the  habit  of  discussing  Zeppelins 
unmindful,  or  perhaps  unaware,  that  there  are 
at  least  two  classes  of  this  craft  with  points  of 
divergence  which  may  be  cause  for  surprise  to 
the  laity.  Whenever  Zeppelins  have  been  re- 
ferred to  in  print  during  the  past,  the  designa- 
tion is  applied  to  the  old,  and  now  partly  obso- 
lete, type  of  aerostat  with  which  the  public  is 
generally  familiar.    A  small  complement  of  this 


AIRCRAFT  17 

craft  were  told  off  for  service  on  the  French 
frontier  and  in  attendance  upoii  the  Baltic  and 
North  Sea  fleets  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
Whatever  reports  have  seen  print  up  to  this 
writing  have  related  almost  wholly  to  the  ex- 
ploits of  the  Pre-Zeppelins. 

As  to  the  latest  improved  type — the  Super- 
Zeppelins  of  the  German  aerial  fleet — it  must 
be  stated  that  they  are  not  included  in  the  offi- 
cial lists  nor  are  they  gazetted  in  even  the  mili- 
tary archives  of  Germany.  In  common  with 
the  motor-driven  siege  mortars  and  the  field 
howitzers,  both  of  enormous  calibre,  and  the 
new  naval  artillery  now  being  installed  on  the 
battleships,  they  belong  to  the  secret  armaments 
which  Germany  has  succeeded  in  preparing 
during  times  of  peace  for  warlike  emergencies 
of  the  present  calibre.  Only  a  few  special  offi- 
cers of  the  German  General  Staff  know  any- 
thing about  the  Super-Zeppelins,  outside  the 
working  crews  and  the  aeronautic  architects,  and 
these  men  are  specially  sworn  in  and  vigilantly 
watched  to  insure  complete  and  permanent 
secrecy.  By  dint  of  diligent  spy  work,  how- 
ever, certain  interesting  particulars  are  now 
available,  but  I  am  not  prepared  to  vouch  for 


18  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

their  accuracy,  though  they  are  more  than  plau- 
sible and  well  worth  printing. 

The  Super-Zeppelins  are  supposed  to  be  an 
improvement  on  the  latest  known  type  desig- 
nated "L  III,"  which  displaces  no  less  than 
32,000  cubic  metres  and  is  capable  of  maintain- 
ing an  average  cruising  speed  of  fully  63  miles 
per  hour  on  extended  expeditions  of  upward  of 
one  and  a  half  day's  duration.  Against  this 
remarkable  record  the  Super-Zeppelins  will 
show  an  improvement  of  at  least  5  miles  in 
speed  and  12  hours  additional  staying  power. 
What  this  would  mean  can  be  gleaned  from  the 
performances  of  the  "L  III,"  officially  attested 
to,  which  covered  1,300  miles  in  36  hours  in  a 
circumnavigation  of  Germany's  strategic  bor- 
ders, keeping  the  while  in  constant  rapport 
by  wireless  with  its  b&se  at  Friedrichshafen, 
at  distances  sometimes  approaching  500  miles ! 
The  "L  III"  can  illuminate  any  target  on  land 
or  sea  with  its  40,000  candlepower  searchlight 
from  an  altitude  of  4,600  feet,  or  just  barely  be- 
yond the  effective  range  of  aerial  cannon.  This 
~  margin  is  improved  in  the  Super-Zeppelins, 
which  can  place  fully  a  thousand  feet  of 
"safety"  space  between  their  keel  and  the  ver- 


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AIRCRAFT  19 

tical  range  of  aerial  artillery;  and  while  thus 
hovering  they  can  reveal  any  target  below  with 
searchlights  and  discharge  bombs.  The  latter 
are  also  a  distinct  advance  upon  the  known 
type  such  as  were  tried  out  on  the  city  of 
Antwerp.  Instead  of  being  mere  capsules 
containing  explosives  the  bombs  of  the  Super- 
Zeppelin  will  be  armoured  projectiles  capable 
of  penetrating  the  deck  of  the  strongest  bat- 
tleship or  the  concrete  base  of  a  fortifica- 
tion. They  will  be  exploded  not  on  con- 
tact like  the  present  form  of  bombs  but  after 
penetration,  on  the  delayed-action  principle.  In 
other  words,  the  explosion  will  not  have  the  ef- 
fect of  a  grenade,  which  seldom  causes  real 
havoc  except  among  massed  troops,  but  it  will 
have  the  character  of  a  detonating  mine.  A 
well-placed  shot  detonating  in  the  concrete  of 
a  fort,  after  penetrating  the  same,  entirely 
aside  from  the  personal  damage  it  may  do,  will 
wreck  the  range-finding  apparatus  and  prevent 
the  fort  from  aiming  its  cannon  correctly.  A 
projectile  bomb  of  this  type  would  have  no  diffi- 
culty in  piercing  the  armoured  deck  of  a  Super-  jl^uJu^ 
dreadnaught.  As  little  as  50  pounds  of  dyna- 
mite— to  mention  the  least  destructive  of  mod- 


20  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

ern  explosives — detonating  in  the  vitals  of  a 
battleship,  from  a  vertical  aim,  will  cause  a  good 
deal  more  havoc  aboardship  than  a  heavy  naval 
shell  piercing  the  side  armour  horizontally. 
Bombs  weighing  120  pounds  have  been  dropped 
by  Pre-Zeppelins.  The  new  projectile  for 
Super-Zeppelins  will  be  considerably  heavier, 
and  as  many  as  ten  will  be  carried  in  the  maga- 
zine of  each  craft,  or  more  than  double  the 
ammunition  needed  to  destroy  a  battleship,  as- 
suming there  would  be  at  least  one  bull's-eye 
for  every  miss.  The  Germans  have  secretly 
experimented  with  aerial  range-finders  for  more 
than  two  years.  Owing  to  the  war  privilege  of 
utilising  the  patent  files  ad  libitum  they  have 
now  in  their  possession  at  least  one  method  of 
launching  bombs,  personally  known  to  the 
writer,  which  should  enable  them  to  hit  a  battle- 
ship at  will,  and,  in  fact,  a  very  much  smaller 
target. 

Where  the  "L  III"  craft  mounts  machine 
guns  in  the  gondola  and  atop  the  gas  envelope, 
the  Super-Zeppelins  will  have  special  rapid 
artillery  of  superior  range  and  protected 
against  rifle-fire  by  shield-barbettes.  Even  the 
envelope  is  tinted  a  vague  blue-gray  similar  to 


AIRCRAFT  21 

the  field-uniforms  of  the  German  troops,  which 
makes  detection  an  exceedingly  difficult  task. 
Moreover,  the  drums  contained  in  the  various         • 
chambers  of  the  envelope  are  filled  with  ajre-  f/\  ■- 
cently  perfected  kind  of  gas  said  not  to  explode 


even  by  contact  with  exploding  shells.  The 
fabric  used  for  the  drums  has  improved  elastic 
and  adhesive  qualities,  so  that  any  ordinary  rent 
or  tear  will  partially  heal  of  itself.  The  gas 
feed  is  arranged  so  that  quite  a  number  of 
drums  would  have  to  suffer  leakage  before  the 
loss  of  buoyancy  would  be  serious  and  compel 
the  vessel  to  rely  on  her  engines  entirely  for 
impetus  sufficient  to  steer  her  out  of  hostile 
range. 

It  is  authoritatively  admitted  that  the  secretly 
made  Super-Zeppelins,  of  which  Germany  is 
credited  with  upward  of  a  dozen,  are  being 
especially  fitted  for  an  attack  not  only  on 
British  bases  but  directly  against  the  British 
navy.  It  is  to  be  doubted,  however,  if  Germany 
could  produce  such  a  squadron  entire  in  time  to 
deliver  a  decisive  blow  despite  her  far-reaching 
secret  advance  preparations.  Nevertheless, 
even  if  we  grant  this  point  it  is  apparent  to 
any  military  mind  that  even  a  single  Super- 


• 


22  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

Zeppelin  skilfully  handled  stands  a  first-class 
chance  against  a  fleet  of  battleships  in  blockade 
formation.  And  if  we  go  even  still  further  and 
grant,  for  argument's  sake,  that  the  aerial 
dreadnaught  will  not  succeed  in  sinking  a  naval 
dreadnaught,  even  the  most  prejudiced  mind 
must  admit  that  the  offensive  activity  of  such 
craft  in  the  act  of  dropping  bombs  on  hostile 
naval  vessels  will  be  a  harassing  factor  of 
conspicuous  aid  to  simultaneous  action  of  the 
German  torpedo  and  submarine  flotillas.  While 
the  experimental  factor  looms  large  in  these 
aspects,  sound  judgment  would  take  into  account 
such  practical  possibilities  as  momentarily 
choking  the  gunners  on  naval  vessels  by  drop- 
ping gaseous  bombs  to  windward  of  their  posi- 
tion. By  such  tactics  it  would  not  even  be  neces- 
sary to  hit  the  ships  so  long  as  a  series  of 
bombs  could  be  exploded  on  the  windward  side, 
for  the  fumes  of  the  gases  would  be  prodigious 
enough  to  penetrate  the  turrets  and  barbettes 
and  nauseate  or  choke  the  gunners.  Even  if 
the  effect  would  be  only  that  of  inducing  a  vig- 
orous sneezing  on  the  part  of  the  crew  the 
advantage  thus  gained  might  be  a  decisive 
factor,  for  even  the  most  adept  of  gun  captains 


AIRCRAFT  23 

could  not  be  expected  to  adjust  his  sights  to  the 
range  given  when  convulsed  by  fits  of  suffoca- 
tion or  nausea !  We  must  not  forget  that  entire 
gun  crews  have  been  asphyxiated  instantly  by 
the  explosion  of  gaseous  charges,  during  several 
artillery  encounters  in  this  war,  and  if  troops 
can  be  choked  to  death  by  horizontal  fire,  sail- 
ors can  at  least  be  set  sneezing  by  vertical  fire ! 

One  reason  why  the  Zeppelins  have  not  as 
yet  taken  the  offensive  against  the  Allies'  armed 
defence  may  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  Ger- 
mans thought  it  more  expedient  to  acquire  some 
practical  experience  in  the  handling  of  these 
novel  craft  over  hostile  ground  before  actually 
engaging  hostile  positions  armed  for  repelling 
them.  There  are  quite  a  few  things  which  the 
Zeppelin  pilots  must  learn  that  can  only  be 
learned  in  actual  hostile  encounter  under  war 
conditions.  Before  the  pilots  have  gathered  a 
certain  amount  of  experience  in  these  respects 
they  might  be  led  to  assume  greater  risks  than 
the  vulnerability  of  their  craft  would  warrant, 
and  the  loss  of  a  Super-Zeppelin,  entirely  aside 
from  its  high  cost,  would  be  too  serious  to  gam- 
ble against  guesswork  tactics. 

A  single  item  should  suffice  to  explain  the 


24  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

situation :  in  the  matter  of  target  practice,  both 
horizontally  with  machine  guns  and  vertically 
with  bomb-dropping  apparatus,  the  Zeppelin 
commanders  have  little  to  learn,  and  in  ma- 
noeuvring against  the  elements  their  pilots  are 
quite  sufficiently  trained. 

It  is  in  the  plan  of  attack  and  in  the  plan  of 
retreat  that  practical  experience  is  most  ur- 
gently wanted.  Not  that  the  Zeppelin  pilots 
have  no  such  plans,  but  it  is  not  known  to  what 
extent  these  plans,  which  have  been  worked  out 
to  cover  every  conceivable  exigency  on  the 
aerial  fighting  line,  are  useful  or  whether  actual 
war  experience  would  disclose  means  of  im- 
proving them.  The  pilots  of  aerial  dread- 
naughts  have  yet  to  learn  the  best  method  of  ap- 
proaching an  enemy  ready  for  them  with  squads 
of  aeroplanes  and  aerial  cannon,  and  they  must 
also  learn  the  best  way  to  retreat  under  fire.  In 
attacking,  should  the  ship  rise  to  its  highest 
altitude  and  take  up  a  hovering  position  in  the 
sky  while  aiming  its  bombs,  or  should  the  ap- 
proach be  made  on  the  lowest  altitude  dictated 
by  safety  and  the  bomb-dropping  conducted 
while  the  craft  is  travelling  full  speed  in  an 
ellipse  over  its  target? 


AIRCRAFT  25 

In  conducting  a  retreat  from  hostile  rifle 
and  cannon  fire,  is  it  better  for  the  ship  to 
take  its  chances  on  rising  vertically  to  its  maxi- 
mum altitude  or  would  it  be  preferable  to  go 
full  speed  ahead  on  the  horizontal  while  grad- 
ually climbing  to  greater  heights?  These  are 
questions  which  only  actual  fighting  can  deter- 
mine with  the  weight  of  finality. 

The  temptation  of  the  Zeppelin  pilot  will  al- 
ways be  to  seek  the  lowest  safe  altitude  to  in- 
sure accuracy  of  observation  and  aim,  but  this 
very  tendency  is  what  makes  the  Zeppelin  a 
target  for  attack,  if  not  by  aerial  guns,  then  by 
hostile  aircraft. 

In  fighting  the  latter  a  flock  of  aeroplanes 
would  never  have  to  encounter  an  attack  by  a 
Zeppelin,  as  an  attempt  of  this  sort  by  the  latter 
would  cause  it  to  be  surrounded  by  some  of  the  ' 
aeroplanes  even  if  it  could  shoot  down  a  few  of 
them  before  this  would  happen.  The  Zeppelin's 
only  recourse  would  lie  in  flight  under  full 
speed,  keeping  always  a  few  hundred  feet  alti- 
tude power  in  reserve  for  a  sudden  dash  sky- 
ward. While  thus  flying  before  its  enemies  the 
Zeppelin  would  have  the  immense  advantage  of 
being  able  to  direct  a  murderous  and  continu- 


26  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

cms  fire  from  its  machine  gun  batteries — that  is, 
from  a  solid,  steady  platform — against  its  pur- 
suers before  the  latter,  in  most  cases,  could 
deliver  effective  fire,  since  the  platform  from 
which  they  would  shoot  is  one  that  is  subject  to 
violent  vibration  and  is  never  quite  steady  for  a 
moment. 

War  Beacons  That  Steer  the  "Eye  in  the 
Air" 

A  circumstance  which  has  tended  to  give  Ger- 
many's dirigible  fleets  the  advantage  of  unusual 
mobility  and  security  of  base  is  an  excellent 
system  of  aeronautic  signal  lights  and  beacons. 
Between  its  eastern  and  western  frontiers  Ger- 
many has  a  network  of  beacon  stations  that 
enable  her  sky  pilots  to  steer  a  straight  course 
at  night  and  proceed  undetected  to  the  point  of 
reconnoissance  without  exposing  themselves  to 
observation.  Germany  has  more  than  a  score 
of  such  beacon  stations,  by  means  of  which  she 
can  move  her  entire  aerial  corps  at  all  points  of 
the  compass,  or  transfer  them  from  one  frontier 
to  another  in  a  few  hours.  France  has  entirely 
neglected  this  very  important  branch  of  military 
aeronautics.    The  first  German  experiments  in 


AIECEAFT  27 

this  field  proved  that  a  searchlight  throwing  a 
cone  of  light  upward  could  not  be  seen  at  long 
distances,  contrary  to  expectation.  Neither  did 
the  plan  to  identify  the  beacons  by  means  of 
coloured  slides  work  out  well,  as  it  was  found 
that  light  projected  by  them  suffered  by  absorp- 
tion. For  marking  the  landing-places  and  the 
aerodromes  or  hangars  coloured  lights  were 
found  to  be  very  practical,  however.  The 
eventual  result  of  these  and  similar  field  ex- 
periments was  that  the  German  flying  corps 
succeeded  in  evolving  a  first-class  working  sys- 
tem of  beacons  with  landing  lights  of  use  for 
both  military  and  naval  aircraft.  The  search- 
light plan  was  discarded  and  beacons  were 
erected  resembling  the  lighthouses  in  use  for 
marine  navigation.  These  beacons  are  of  three 
kinds :  to  wit,  the  flash,  the  fixed  and  the  revolv- 
ing light,  but  instead  of  operating  upon  the 
horizon  as  in  lighthouse  practice,  the  aerial 
beacons  operate  vertically  upon  the  atmos- 
phere of  the  sky.  In  a  class  by  themselves  are 
what  the  Germans  call  the  Morse  beacons,  thus 
named  because  they  are  constructed  to  trans- 
late into  perpendicular  flashes  the  dots  and 
dashes  of  the  Morse  telegraphic  code.     Thus, 


28  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

the  Morse  beacon  known  to  German  mili- 
tary aeronauts  as  "Mark  45"  reports  its 
position  by  short  and  long  flashes  as  follows: 
xxxx  xxxxx  o  xxxx  xxxxx.  The  type  of  land- 
ing lights  finally  agreed  upon  as  the  most  de- 
sirable are  embedded  in  the  ground  and  pro- 
tected by  a  huge  glass  cover,  very  thick  and 
strong,  on  which  aircraft  land  directly  and  are 
brought  to  a  full  stop.  The  arrangement ,  of 
the  lights  also  very  cleverly  serves  in  signalling 
the  aviator  the  direction  of  the  wind  while 
effecting  a  landing.  In  the  centre  of  the  landing 
base  is  a  large  square  white  light.  Some  dis- 
tance from  this  centre,  about  75  yards,  are  four 
red  lights  designating  the  points  of  the  com- 
pass— N.  E.  W.  S.  A  weather-vane  is  connected 
electrically  to  these  lights,  so  that  should  the 
wind  blow  N.W.  the  north  and  west  red  lights 
burn  in  addition  to  the  white  base  light  in  the 
centre.  Should  the  wind  turn  the  vane  around 
to  S.W.,  the  lights  signalling  N.W.  are  auto- 
matically doused  and  only  the  red  lights  south 
and  west  would  show.  In  case  the  wind  dies 
down  to  a  dead  calm,  no  red  lights  are  visible, 
and  only  the  white  light  in  the  centre  shows. 
By  these  very  simple  and  positive  means  the 


AIRCRAFT  29 

German  pilot,  whenever  compelled  to  fly  at 
night,  is  at  all  times  able,  on  picking  up  a  beacon, 
to  tell  exactly  where  he  is  and  how  he  should 
steer  to  make  a  clean  landing  in  case  he  wishes 
to  descend.  The  largest  aeronautic  light  in 
Germany  is  the  Weimar  beacon,  which  has  no 
less  than  27,200,000  candlepower  behind  its  huge 
revolving  flashlight  situated  atop  of  the  mili- 
tary aerodrome.  The  tallest  light,  that  is  the 
light  placed  at  the  greatest  altitude,  is  the 
Grosser  Feldberg  on  the  Taunus  range,  which 
projects  a  fixed  shaft  of  light  of  800,000  candle- 
power  from  a  crag  situated  over  2,800  feet  above 
sea-level. 

Protecting  Airship  Bases 

In  this  branch  of  military  aeronautics  the 
Allies  have  made  the  mistake  of  depending  en- 
tirely on  the  searchlight.  Experiments  con- 
ducted in  Germany  have  proved  quite  conclu- 
sively that  nothing  is  easier  to  avoid  during 
nocturnal  reconnoissance  than  the  vague  pen- 
cils of  a  searchlight  battery.  Their  penetrative 
efficiency  is  a  known  factor,  and  the  only  pre- 
caution necessary  is  to  fly  above  the  altitude 


30  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

they  command.  Moreover,  they  aid  hostile  air- 
craft after  the  manner  of  beacons  whereby  to 
steer,  and  at  the  break  of  dawn,  when  recon- 
noissance  becomes  most  effective  aboard  a 
dirigible  having  selected  her  position  to  this 
end  under  cover  of  night,  the  searchlight  is, 
of  course,  useless.  The  French  army,  while 
based  on  the  barrier  forts  between  Toul  and 
Belfort,  was  treated  to  a  pretty  severe  lesson 
in  this  regard  when  a  French  dirigible,  an- 
nounced in  advance  by  wireless,  could  not  be 
picked  up  by  the  multitudinous  shafts  from  the 
searchlights  on  the  forts. 

The  German  plan  of  protecting  aerial  bases 
is  thorough  and  practical.  The  main  defence  is 
stationed  on  elevated  points  commanding  the 
base  in  a  wide  circle  and  equipped  with  special 
aerial  Krupp  cannon  and  machine  guns.  This 
artillery  is  supported  by  powerful  searchlights, 
which  makes  it  possible  to  pick  out  hostile  air- 
craft and  simultaneously  blind  them  as  soon  as 
they  get  within  bomb-dropping  range.  In  other 
words,  the  aerial  base  is  protected  by  a  zone  of 
rapid  artillery  fire  issuing  from  bastions  dis- 
tributed over  a  wide  area,  and  at  a  commensu- 
rate altitude,  so  that  any  hostile  object  entering 


AIRCRAFT  31 

this  zone  will  be  subject  to  cross-fire.  In  cases 
where  the  aerial  base  contains  an  aerodrome, 
the  dirigible  within  leaves  its  housing  at  night- 
fall, and  takes  up  a  position  at  an  altitude  sup- 
posedly greater  than  that  which  hostile  aircraft 
must  steer  to  make  an  attack  on  the  aerodrome 
effective.  Between  the  dirigible  hovering  noise- 
lessly and  unseen  in  the  clouds  beyond  range, 
but  capable  of  picking  up  any  intruder  with  its 
searchlights  and  focusing  rapid  fire  on  it,  and 
the  terrestrial  bastions  blazing  away  from  be- 
low, hostile  aircraft  would  not  have  much 
chance  to  do  any  real  damage  before  they  would 
suffer  annihilation  themselves. 

Those  who  wonder  why  France,  reputed  to 
have  the  most  numerous  and  efficient  air  fleet  in 
the  world,  has  not  shown  any  noteworthy  dis- 
position to  raid  German  aerial  bases,  especially 
at  night,  will  realise  the  hazards  involved. 
So  much  more  can  be  accomplished  by  skilful 
reconnoissance,  at  least  during  the  commence- 
ment of  hostilities,  than  by  destructive  tactics 
that  neither  the  Germans  nor  the  Allies  have 
been  quite  willing  to  risk  their  aerial  equipment 
on  sanguinary  knight-errantry  of  this  sort. 


32  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 


Aeronautic  Auxiliaries 

The  very  latest  development  in  aeronautic 
auxiliaries  includes  motor  war  transports  for 
aeroplanes,  and  motor  field-repair  shops  for  the 
same.  While  France  and  Germany  have  made 
creditable  progress  in  this  line,  it  has  remained 
for  Russia  to  produce  these  auxiliaries  in  units 
comprising  motor-trucks  pulling  aeroplane 
trailers  supported  by  motor-driven  aeronautic 
field-repair  shops.  The  duty  of  the  motor-truck 
is  threefold.  It  must  pull  the  trailers  contain- 
ing the  aeroplanes,  it  must  carry  and  quarter 
the  officers  attached  to  the  aero  squadron,  and 
it  must  serve  as  a  lazaret  for  them  on  the  field. 
Each  of  these  two-ton  motor-trucks  is  com- 
pletely equipped  for  this  triple  duty,  which  en- 
ables an  entire  aero  division  to  proceed,  at  a 
good  rate  of  speed,  to  its  base  with  machines 
and  men  and  repair  facilities  in  one  compact 
unit.  The  trailers  are  so  constructed  that  the 
aeroplanes  can  be  loaded  merely  by  folding  or 
detaching  the  planes.  The  repair-shop  is 
mounted  on  a  three  and  a  half -ton  chassis  pro- 
pelled by  a  thirty-horsepower  engine,  and  its 


AIRCRAFT  33 

machinery  is  intended  for  manual  as  well  as 
electrical  operation.  The  equipment  is  very 
practical  and  includes  every  necessary  imple- 
ment from  anvil  and  smithy  to  lathe,  miller  and 
carpentry  tools.  For  rapidly  repairing  aero- 
planes as  well  as  automobiles  on  the  firing-line, 
such  a  repair  shop  on  wheels  is  invaluable.  It 
is  one  of  the  very  useful  auxiliaries  which  is 
not  " mentioned  in  dispatches,"  but  it  is  doing 
a  great  work  behind  the  smoke  of  battle  in 
this  war. 

Opposing  Aerial  Forces  Compared 
Although  France  had  more  than  a  year's  start 
of  other  nations  in  the  race  for  aerial  armament 
it  remained  for  Germany  to  beat  her  and  sur- 
pass her  during  the  last  three  years.  At  the 
outbreak  of  this  war,  Germany  had  the  advan- 
tage of  an  aerial  fleet  superior,  not  only  in  con- 
structive merit  and  practical  equipment  but 
also  in  organisation  and  personnel,  to  that  of 
France,  her  keenest  rival. 

The  reader  has  probably  already  perused  the 
statistics  given  out  as  official  and  published 
widely  by  an  unsuspecting  press.  Let  it  be 
said  once  for  all  that  these  statistics,  while  they 


34  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

are  official  in  a  popular  sense,  are  more  remark- 
able for  what  they  are  intended  to  hide  than 
for  what  they  are  supposed  to  give.  Counting 
the  machines  owned  by  the  army,  and  such  as 
have  been  commandeered  into  service,  Germany 
probably  went  to  war  with  fully  600  aeroplanes 
of  all  kinds.  But  this  figure  does  not  represent 
her  actual  flying  strength.  Nowadays  the  man- 
ufacture of  aircraft  has  been  standardised, 
which  in  turn  admits  of  large  numbers  of  ma- 
chines being  made  with  great  rapidity.  There 
are  upward  of  thirty  aeroplane  factories  in 
Germany  that  went  to  work  on  a  night-and-day 
rush  order  basis  at  the  call  to  arms  on  specifica- 
tions previously  completed  by  the  Imperial  Fly- 
ing Corps.  This  tremendous  effort,  supported 
by  the  emergency  stock  of  motors  and  spare 
parts  always  carried  by  the  government,  has 
enabled  Germany  to  increase  her  aeroplane  arm, 
during  several  months'  fighting,  until  she  has 
now  fully  one  thousand  machines  in  service. 

Most  of  these  additions,  it  will  be  found  when 
the  smoke  of  battle  clears  away,  will  adhere  to 
a  type  of  craft  which  may  constitute  a  surprise 
the  same  as  the  secret  Krupp  and  Skoda  ar- 
tillery.   The  Grand  General  Staff  has  an  admi- 


AIECEAFT  35 

rable  system  providing  for  the  manufacture, 
during  times  of  peace,  of  parts  and  accessories 
that  demand  great  time  and  care,  such  as 
motors,  chassis,  propellers,  etc.,  so  that  when 
the  bugle  sounds  it  is  largely  a  matter  of  assem- 
bling, rather  than  manufacturing,  additional  ma- 
chines. The  staff  calculates  its  work  on  the 
theory  that  about  sixty  per  cent,  additional 
craft  is  required  in  a  war  on  two  fronts,  as  at 
present.  It  is  also  staff  policy  to  settle  in 
advance,  so  far  as  practicable,  which  of  modern 
improvements  ought  to  be  acquired  for  the  gov- 
ernment with  a  view  to  keeping  them  secret  so 
that  a  quite  considerable  proportion  of  the 
mobilised  aerial  forces  may  have  certain  special 
advantages  over  those  of  the  enemy.  As  tech- 
nical improvements  in  aerodynamics  and  aero- 
station are  chiefly  supplied  by  military  engi- 
neers, Germany  has  experienced  little  difficulty 
in  maintaining  technical  secrets  intended  for 
use  only  in  so  far  as  they  remain  secrets. 

In  Zeppelins,  Parsevals  and  other  dirigibles, 
Germany  had  twenty-four  craft  in  service  at  the      ^€ufe 
call  to  arms,  capable  of  an  average  speedjrf  48 
miles  per  hour.    At  this  writing  she  has  man- 
aged to  complete  at  least  three  partly  finished 


36  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

Super-Zeppelins  with  the  prospect  of  finishing 
an  extra  squadron  of  these  formidable  aerial 
fighters — probably  not  less  than  nine  craft — be- 
fore February. 

Against  this  dazzling  equipment  France 
makes  but  a  poor  showing.  Although  her  mili- 
tary programme  calls  for  seven  large  swift 
aerial  cruisers  of  24,000  cubic  metres  to  be  de- 
livered in  January,  1915,  none  have  been  com- 
pleted and  only  three  are  in  process  of  construc- 
tion. The  other  French  dirigibles,  of  which 
there  are  sixteen  of  all  kinds,  from  the  unwieldy 
Astra  craft  of  1,000  horsepower  to  the  Zodiac 
toy- vessels  of  110  to  220  horsepower,  are  so  far 
inferior  in  speed,  cruising  range  and  offensive 
capacity  to  the  German  dirigibles,  that  it  is 
futile  to  draw  comparisons. 

In  the  aeroplane  arm,  France  is  much  better 
equipped.  Although  fully  1,000  machines  have 
been  acquired  by  the  French  Government  since 
1911,  it  is  quite  safe  to  say  that  only  half  of  this 
number  meet  the  requirements  of  modern  war 
efficiency.  But  France  has  more  aeroplane  fac- 
tories than  Germany,  and  she  ought  to  be 
able  to  increase  this  her  only  effective  aerial 
arm  even  more  rapidly.    One  thing  is  likely  to 


AIRCRAFT  37 

interfere  more  than  anything  else.  France 
lacks  the  thoroughgoing  system  and  masterly 
organisation  that  characterise  everything  the 
Germans  undertake  to  do. 

Russia  has  the  ideal  "paper"  armada  of  the 
air.  The  official  statistician  credits  her  with  a 
neat,  round  500  machines,  and  some  "official" 
lists  add  an  extra  hundred  to  this  number  by 
way  of  good  measure!  Undoubtedly  this  total 
has  been  arrived  at  by  computing  the  customs 
receipts  including  all  aeroplanes  imported  to 
Russia  since  1910  for  both  private  and  military 
use.  If  Russia  can  actually  muster  one-fifth 
of  her  boasted  aerial  strength  she  will  have  a 
good  deal  more  than  I  would  be  prepared  to 
vouch  for,  and  the  Germans  should  be  able 
to  shoot  down  their  antiquated  craft  at  will. 
The  only  item  of  interest  in  Russia's  aerial  de- 
velopment is  the  Sirkoski  giant  machines,  of 
which  only  four  are  completed.  This  native 
type  of  monster  biplane  possesses  several  not 
uninteresting  and  meritorious  features,  but  it  is 
more  remarkable  as  the  probable  forerunner 
of  what  will  eventually  constitute  a  troop- 
carrying  aeroplane  than  for  any  feature  of  prac- 
tical warlike  use  against  existing  craft.     As 


38  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

many  as  sixteen  soldiers  have  been  carried 
safely  by  a  single  Sirkoski  machine  at  low 
altitudes,  however,  where  they  would  soon 
change  into  corpses  if  carried  on  the  firing-line. 
Of  dirigibles  it  is  unlikely  that  Eussia  can  have 
more  than  two  fairly  modern  craft  in  commis- 
sion. These  vessels  are  of  the  French  Astra 
type  and  of  little  consequence  anyhow. 

England  is  much  better  equipped  with  air- 
craft than  is  generally  believed.  Having  bor- 
rowed most  of  her  constructive  ideas  from 
France,  England  has,  nevertheless,  succeeded  in 
producing  a  native  type  of  aircraft  which  is 
remarkable  for  excellence  of  workmanship,  es- 
pecially the  seaplane.  She  is  credited  with  a 
total  of  300  aeroplanes,  but  even  if  comman- 
deered machines  are  included  in  this  estimate,  it 
is  probably  more  than  twenty  per  cent,  ex- 
aggerated. Small  as  this  force  is  compared  to 
those  of  France  and  Germany,  it  has  given  a 
good  account  of  itself  at  the  front,  chiefly  in 
reconnoissance  work  and  raids  on  German 
aerial  bases.  The  care  with  which  the  Eoyal 
Flying  Corps  has  undertaken  to  train  pilots  as 
well  as  observers  has  proved  an  object-lesson  to 
France  no  less  than  to  Germany.    In  dirigibles, 


)  Underwood  &  Underwood,  N.  Y. 

nhe  "Eye  in  the  Shy'9  that  eliminates  surprise  tactics.  Above 
is  the  latest  type  of  French  military  "avion,"  capable  of  a 
speed  of  125  miles  per  hour.  Below  is  an  automobile 
aeroplane  hospital,  containing  every  requisite  tool  and 
appliance  for  repairing  aeroplanes  on  the  field  of  battle. 


AIRCRAFT  39 

however,  Great  Britain  makes  a  sorry  picture. 
Seven  slow  and  rather  old-fashioned  non-rigid 
airships  of  various  kinds  is  all  she  can  muster, 
but  these  vessels  are  powerless  to  manoeuvre  in 
bad  weather  and  will  probably  not  be  taken  to 
the  front.  A  half-dozen  improved  non-rigids 
are  building,  capable  of  negotiating  45  miles 
an  hour,  and,  if  finished  according  to  plans, 
these  ships  should  be  able  to  join  the  colours  in 
January.  Unless  convoyed  by  a  squad  of  armed 
aeroplanes  it  would  be  fatal  to  employ  such 
craft  for  reconnoitring  over  hostile  territory. 

Belgium  has  a  miniature  aerial  corps  chiefly 
consisting  of  French  aeroplanes  manned  by 
French-trained  pilots,  and  it  requires  no  imagi- 
nation to  understand  how  typically  Belgian  this 
is ;  but  vivid  imagination  is  requisite  to  see  in  the 
ancient  and  honourable  gas-bag  labelled  "Bel- 
gique  III"  the  semblance  of  aerial  efficiency. 

Austro-Hungary  has  two  passenger  dirigibles 
of  the  early  Zeppelin  type,  which  are  available 
for  military  purposes,  and  three  non-rigid 
dirigibles  belonging  to  the  army.  Small  as  this 
squadron  is,  the  Dual  Empire  has  already  bene- 
fited greatly  by  it,  in  a  tactical  sense,  as  its  bor- 
der enemies  have  nothing  of  consequence  to 


40  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

oppose  against  it.  In  aeroplanes,  however, 
Austro-Hungary  is  the  weakest  of  the  great 
powers.  She  can  have  little  more  than  a  score 
of  modern  machines  at  the  front,  unless  Ger- 
many has  been  thoughtful  enough  to  loan  her  a 
squadron  of  fliers. 

The  activity  displayed  during  the  last  few 
months  in  the  way  of  mobilising  the  aerial  arm 
is  well-nigh  stupefying.  In  dirigibles  alone 
Germany  lacks  only  three  of  equalling  the  com- 
bined strength  of  France,  England,  Russia  and 
Japan,  according  to  the  latest  obtainable  official 
figures;  and  in  aeroplanes  the  Allies  have  not 
been  able  to  exceed  by  more  than  eighty  ma- 
chines the  total  increase  of  Germany  since  the 
first  shot  was  fired.    The  score  is  as  follows : 

Dibigibles 

Mar.       Aug.       Jan. 

Allies 43       51        64 

Austria  and  Germany 39       48        69 

Aeboplanes 

Allies  2700    3380 

Austria  and  Germany 1400    2000 


AIECEAFT  41 

The  Austro-German  increase  in  dirigibles  is 
practically  concentrated  in  a  tremendous  out- 
put of  Zeppelin  craft  of  the  marine  type,  un- 
doubtedly with  a  view  of  torpedoing  tlje  British 
blockading  fleet  from  above  as  it  has  been  tor- 
pedoed from  below  hitherto.  Another  point 
that  has  been  elucidated  since  hostilities  com- 
menced is  that  aero-scouting  is  not  nearly  as 
fatal  as  it  was  assumed  to  be.  The  casu- 
alty rosters  show  that  the  percentage  of 
killed  and  wounded  in  the  military  and  naval 
aero  corps  is  lower  than  that  of  any  other 
arm. 

The  Advance  in  Bomb-Dropping 

The  lay  impression  prevails  that  the  drop- 
ping of  bombs  from  aircraft  has  proved  rather 
failure  than  success.  The  layman  instinctively 
compares  bomb-dropping  with  artillery  fire,  un- 
aware of  the  fact  that  the  former  is  not  intended 
to  replace  or  even  complement  the  latter.  The 
greater  weight  of  projectile,  and  its  superior 
striking  velocity  on  impact,  added  to  the  rapid- 
ity of  fire  and  inexhaustible  supply  of  ammuni- 
tion, are  the  advantages  of  terrestrial  artillery 


42  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

which  no  system  of  aerial  artillery  can  be  ex- 
pected to  duplicate. 

In  a  military  sense  the  aerial  bomb  is  in- 
tended partly  as  a  demoralising  factor  and 
partly  as  a  destructive  agent  under  isolated 
conditions  where  no  other  means  of  inflicting 
damage  can  be  brought  into  play.  To  be  sure, 
the  latest  Super-Zeppelins  carry  a  store  of 
heavy  explosive  projectiles  which  would  cause 
havoc  comparable  to  that  of  heavy  field  artil- 
lery if  dropped  with  accuracy  of  aim,  but  that 
does  not  imply  that  they  are  supposed  to  carry 
the  burden  of  the  artillery.  A  fleet  of  such  craft 
attacking  massed  formations  of  troops  in  the 
enemy's  rear,  beyond  the  artillery's  range, 
could  without  doubt  at  times  cause  destruction 
similar  to  what  the  artillery  is  capable  of  within 
range.  Nevertheless,  such  a  coup-de-main  has 
not  been  essayed  so  far  in  this  war,  the  osten- 
sible cause  being  the  risk  of  forfeiting  part  of 
the  aerial  fleet,  which  is  more  urgently  needed 
for  larger  and  more  ambitious  operations. 

There  are  many  different  kinds  of  aerial 
bombs  in  use,  but  they  are  all  similar  in  that 
they  explode  on  contact  with  a  terrestrial  ob- 
ject.   Hence,  the  damage  caused  is  in  most  cases 


AIRCRAFT  43 

no  more  serious  than  that  of  a  large  hand 
grenade  and  generally  far  less  than  exploding 
shrapnel.  That  such  would  be  the  case  in  ac- 
tual war  was  foreseen  by  the  writer  as  early  as 
1910,  when  he  joined  in  collaboration  with  Lieu- 
tenant R.  E.  Scott  of  the  United  States  Artil- 
lery, in  evolving  a  new  type  of  aerial  bomb, 
which  would  be  more  destructive  than  a  grenade, 
equal  to  shrapnel,  and  detonating  like  it  by 
time  fuse,  and,  on  demand,  quite  as  effective 
as  a  mine  exploded  in  the  earth  under  the 
enemy's  position.  The  outcome  of  this  col- 
laboration was  an  apparatus  with  means  for 
launching  heavily  armoured  explosive  projectiles 
from  aircraft  in  motion,  the  launching  device 
actuated  by  an  aerial  range-finder  to  insure  ac- 
curacy of  aim.  The  entire  apparatus  weighs 
but  26  pounds  and  is  installable  alike  in 
dirigibles  as  in  aeroplanes.  The  ammuni- 
tion consists  of  15  projectiles  weighing  18 
pounds  each  and  fitted  with  steering  vanes  to 
insure  their  steady  course  through  space  and 
striking  head  on  without  tumbling.  The  mathe- 
matical problem  involved  was  that  of  suiting 
the  range-finding  to  a  quick  and  accurate  de- 
termination of  the  parabolic  curve  which  the 


44  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

projectile  is  forced  to  follow,  impelled  by  the 
speed  of  the  aircraft;  of  finding  speed  of  the 
latter  in  relation  to  earth,  and  means  of  esti- 
mating windage  on  the  projectile  after  launch- 
ing. Two  years'  experimenting  enabled  us 
finally  to  produce  an  apparatus  which  in  1912 
fulfilled  the  above  requirements  well  enough  to 
win  the  great  Michelin  Prix  Aero  Cible  of 
150,000  francs  under  the  auspices  of  the  French 
Government  and  the  Aero  Club  de  France.  Our 
apparatus,  which  is  the  pioneer  of  all  bomb- 
launching  machines,  not  only  defeated  all  sim- 
ilar devices  entered  by  other  pilots  represent- 
ing the  efforts  of  various  nations,  but  attained 
the  remarkable  score  of  making  eleven  bull's- 
eye  shots  in  a  target  only  ten  yards  in  diameter 
from  an  altitude  of  more  than  2,500  feet,  the 
aeroplane  going  at  a  speed  of  about  sixty-five 
miles  an  hour  against  a  stiff  breeze.  Rendered 
into  the  favourite  allegory  of  the  newspaper 
writer,  the  aeroplane  was  speeding  as  fast  as  the 
Empire  State  Express  at  an  altitude  more  than 
thrice  the  height  of  the  Woolworth  skyscraper, 
and  buried  eleven  armoured  projectiles  in  a  tar- 
get about  as  large  as  one  of  the  funnels  on  the 
Mauretania.    Despite  this  performance — which 


AIRCRAFT  45 

France  took  pains  to  herald  as  a  French  vic- 
tory!— it  was  very  difficult  for  us  to  convince 
the  general  staffs  of  Europe's  leading  powers 
that  we  could  sink  war  vessels  as  readily  as  we 
could  explode  fortified  places  and  rout  encamp- 
ments !  It  was  not  so  much  the  men  as  the  red 
tape  wound  around  the  men.  Before  the  present 
war  is  fought  to  a  finish  the  powers  that  hung 
back  in  1912  may  desire  to  adopt  the  device  in 
1915. 

The  points  of  divergence  I  wish  to  emphasise 
are  that  the  Scott-Dewitz  apparatus  is  the  only 
one  produced,  to  my  knowledge,  which  launches 
not  an  ordinary  bomb,  but  a  self-steering  projec- 
tile that  can  be  loaded  as  a  shrapnel  and  det- 
onated like  one,  of  additional  use  either  as  an 
incendiary  missile  spreading  flame  on  contact 
or  as  a  gaseous  agent  distributing  nauseous 
fumes;  and,  finally,  as  an  armour-piercing 
weapon  burying  itself  in  the  vitals  of  its  target, 
detonating  after  penetration,  on  the  delayed- 
action  principle  with  effect  similar  to  a  mine 
exploded  in  the  ground. 

It  is  clear  that  destruction  wrought  on  these 
lines  is  formidable  in  the  extreme  and  much 
more  positive  than  explosion  by  contact. 


46  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

A  system  quite  different  from  the  above  is 
that  invented  by  Steinmetz  for  both  aerial  de- 
fence and  offence.  The  defence  is  provided 
for  by  a  field  of  aerial  mines,  shaped  like  minia- 
ture captive  balloons  anchored  by  wire  contact 
with  the  earth  at  altitudes  where  they  will  in- 
terfere with  aircraft  and  explode  their  charges 
on  contact.  This  plan  of  "mining"  the  air  is 
patterned  upon  the  anchored  contact  mine  of 
naval  warfare,  but  unlike  the  latter  it  is  neither 
invisible  nor  impervious  to  currents.  The  only 
practical  use  of  air  mines  would  seem  to  be 
limited  to  the  nocturnal  operations  of  hostile 
aircraft,  and  as  they  can  be  set  very  quickly  in 
rows  distributed  over  various  altitudes  they 
should  offer  fairly  good  protection  even  if  they 
tangle  and  premature  explosions  are  caused  by 
wrecking  in  a  stiff  breeze. 

Somewhat  more  problematical  is  the  Stein- 
metz offensive  plan,  which  has  been  adapted 
from  the  ancient  and  honourable  method  of 
catching  fish  by  means  of  a  line  and  hook.  Only 
in  this  instance  the  line  is  a  light  wire  wound  on 
a  reel  and  the  hook  is  a  small  hand-grenade. 
The  inventor  now  proposes  to  go  fishing  for 
aircraft  in  the  heavens  in  a  very  speedy  aero- 


AIRCRAFT  47 

plane  by  overhauling  his  quarry  and  "  hook- 
ing" it  with  the  pendent  bombs.  I  do  not  say 
that  a  number  of  swift  aeroplanes  fitted  with 
this  simple  tool  could  not  succeed  in  pulling  a 
wire  over  a  dirigible  and  exploding  the  charge, 
but  in  order  to  capture  a  65-knot  Zeppelin,  for 
instance,  the  aeroplane  must  be  not  only  unar- 
moured  but  unarmed  in  order  to  insure  a  su- 
perior rate  of  speed  and  expert  handling  of  the 
reel  bomb.  This  means  that  the  Zeppelin  would 
have  an  excellent  chance  of  shooting  down  its 
assailants  before  the  latter  could  hope  to  over- 
haul it.  A  Zeppelin  thus  attacked  would  in- 
variably seek  its  highest  attainable  altitude  and 
speed  away  from  the  attack.  As  it  can  rise  at 
the  rate  of  more  than  2,000  feet  per  minute,  and 
maintain  a  horizontal  speed  of  65  knots,  the 
approach  of  the  aeroplane  to  a  fleeing  Zeppelin 
cannot  be  more  menacing  than  at  a  rate  about 
30  miles  per  hour,  that  is,  allowing  a  speed  of 
96  miles  for  the  aeroplane.  At  these  speeds, 
the  aeroplane  must  fly  a  distance  of  7y2  miles 
in  15  minutes  before  it  could  overhaul  and 
snare  the  Zeppelin.  During  the  first  five  min- 
utes, the  Zeppelin  would  have  ample  time  to 
get  the  range  and  adjust  its  rapid-fire  artillery, 


48  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

to  maintain  a  zone  of  fire,  a  continuous  stream 
of  bullets  focused  on  the  aeroplane.  During 
the  ensuing  ten  minutes,  the  latter  would  be 
compelled  to  fly  4.7  miles  against  a  zone  of 
murderous  machine-gun  fire  totalling  probably 
not  less  than  4,000  bullets  per  minute.  If  any- 
body thinks  the  aeroplane  has  a  chance,  let  him 
lead  the  attack.  It  is  only  in  exceptional  in- 
stances as  when  a  whole  squad  of  aeroplanes 
could  manage  to  swoop  down  out  of  a  protect- 
ing curtain  of  cloud  upon  a  Zeppelin  at  rest, 
and  take  it  by  surprise  before  it  could  get  under 
momentum  and  operate  its  guns,  that  the  Stein- 
metz  outfit  could  be  considered  in  the  light  of  a 
practical  aeronautic  equipment.  But  it  appears 
to  me  it  could  be  employed  with  more  certainty 
in  "hooking"  wireless  stations,  on  incendiary 
raids  against  hostile  hangars,  and  for  harass- 
ing lines  of  communication. 


CHAPTER  II 
AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY 

Firing  a  "Brummer" 

They  who  dwell  in  the  pleasant  valley  of  the 
Sarnbre,  where  the  ornate  border-posts  of  Flan- 
ders  salute  the  forts  of  France,  are  seized  by  the 
spell  of  its  autumnal  revelry.  Last  September 
saw  nature  on  the  Sarnbre  in  the  same  mood, 
but  the  Flemish  goodmen  and  goodwomen  failed 
to  respond. 

The  harvest  moon  stood  in  the  sky  like  a  fes- 
tive, round-faced  peasant  glowing  with  anxiety, 
but  there  was  no  harvest  anywhere  and  there 
was  no  festive  greeting  from  the  earth  peasant 
to  the  moon  peasant. 

Devastation,  stubble-fields  and  devastation. 

The  caMseway  flanked  by  double  rows  of 
grenadier  poplars  has  lost  not  a  few  of  its 
giants  by  shell  fire.  Some  of  the  trunks  are 
snapped  clean  off  as  one  would  break  a  match; 
others  are  splintered  as  by  thunderbolts.  The 
poplar  column  ranges  through  a  village  slain  to 
bits  with  heavy  shell  fire  and  consumed  by  flame. 
The  empty  village  lane  is  gutted  with  debris  and 
broken  masonry.    Bits  of  shattered  glass  gleam 

49 


50  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

in  the  moonlight.  Charred  timbers  and  beams 
grope  with  rusty  spikes  against  flame-seared 
walls.  A  solitary  chimney  stands  aloof,  veined 
with  cracks,  like  a  wounded  sentinel  intent  on 
his  duty.  What  was  before  a  quaint  little  place 
notv  turns  toward  heaven  a  crippled,  mangled 
corpse  of  charred  bone  and  pallid  brow  in  mute 
witness  of  the  horror  of  war. 

Out  on  the  causeway  a  lonely  figure  strides 
up  and  down — a  Prussian  picket  in  gray  with 
spiked  helmet.  A  half-mile  further  on  another 
sentry  and  so  on  at  intervals  along  the  fine,  old 
pike  toward  Charier  oi. 

A  buzzer  sounds.  The  picket  bends  down 
over  something  by  the  roadside  and  picks  up  a 
concealed  receiver.  "Jawohl!"  He  has  his 
orders.  A  squad  of  military  engineers  ap- 
proach him  presently.  They  are  "pioneers" 
and  carry  lanterns  doused  in  buckets.  With 
pick  and  spade  the  crew  begins  to  blaze  a  trail 
through  the  field,  paving  it  with  heavy  wooden 
planks.  Quickly,  silently  and  smoothly  work 
the  pioneers,  pushing  the  planked  trail  ever 
further  until  it  pierces  the  forest  fringe.  And 
there,  in  a  small  glade,  also  working  by  lantern 
light,  is  a  crew  of  masons  and  artificers  erect- 
ing bomb-proofs  and  laying  a  heavy  concrete 
base  in  a  circle. 

A  large,  long  shaft  of  light  breaks  upon  the 
horizon  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Sambre.    An* 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  51 

other  huge  shaft  cuts  in  on  the  west  bank.  The 
shafts  sweep  out  slowly  searching  every  inch  of 
ground.  Presently  they  meet  and  focus  on  a 
spot  somewhere  in  the  southwest  in  the  direction 
of  Fort  Maubeuge, — the  prelude  to  a  Prussian 
night  attack. 

Again  the  buzzer  sounds;  again  the  picket 
snaps  "Jawohl!"  There  is  a  dull,  rumbling 
sound,  barely  audible.  Shooting  it  is  not. 
Thunder  it  cannot  be,  smiles  the  moon. 

Closer  and  closer  comes  the  rumble,  and  as 
the  picket  peers  along  the  murky  highway  he 
discovers  a  huge,  unshapely  monster  ambling 
forward  with  the  tottering  pace  of  a  barbarian 
idol  on  wheels.  It  snorts  and  blows  and  growls. 
It  gnashes  steel  tooth  against  steel  tooth. 
Sparks  of  lightning  flash  from  its  monstrous 
eyes.  Onward  it  trundles  ponderously  like  a 
menace  to  mankind. 

It  comes  to  a  halt  before  the  picket.  The 
canvas  is  removed  and  a  big  42-centimetre 
"B rummer"  stands  revealed  gleaming  in  the 
moonlight.  With  its  three  heavy  recoil  cylin- 
ders tucked  around  the  monstrous  barrel  it 
looks  like  a  quadruple  cannon  pointed  to  shoot 
down  the  foolish  moon. 

The  crew  jumps  off  the  motor-tractor,  which 
is  detached.  The  pioneers  bring  up  a  team  of 
forty-eight  artillery  horses,  and  the  heavy  piece 
is  skidded  and  limbered  onto  the  wooden  trail. 


52  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

The  drivers  spur  on  their  teams,  and  the  big 
"Brummer"  moves  forward  tumultuously  over 
creaking  planks  to  its  base  on  the  big  concrete 
patch  hidden  behind  the  forest  fringe. 

The  platform  base  is  bolted  down,  the  mount- 
ings and  cylinders  are  set  in  place,  and  the 
barrel  is  backed  up  and  cradled  in  its  sleeve  of 
steel.  Pistons  are  snapped  into  gear,  hand- 
wheels  are  set  spinning,  levers  are  pulled,  the 
ton-heavy  side-breech  clicks  open  to  the  touch 
of  the  hand,  and  the  pawl  of  the  turn-table  gear 
begins  its  metallic  chatter  as  the  big  gun  is  being 
whipped  into  battery.  There  is  a  decade  of  in- 
ventive technical  skill  behind  every  move  com- 
pleted, behind  every  part  and  piece  of  the  huge 
machine.  It  responds  to  its  code  of  mechanical 
adjustment  with  the  precision  of  a  soldier  at 
drill.  A  sharp  command  sends  the  crew  into 
the  bomb-proof.  The  big  piece  is  loaded  and 
ready  for  the  range. 

With  the  first  gray  shimmering  of  dawn  there 
is  a  dull,  droning  sound  overhead — the  air  scout 
speeding  out  for  final  reconnoissance.  A  bugle 
calls  the  gun  crew  to  quarters.  Soon  the  air 
scout  returns,  signals  and  sweeps  away  to  his 
post  of  observation  several  miles  beyond  the 
enemy's  trenches,  where  the  steel-turreted  ram- 
parts of  Fort  Maubeuge  hide  in  the  morning 
mists. 

The  crew,  not  employed  in  firing,  lie  down  on 


« • .    ?k*4 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  53 

hands  and  knees;  even  the  gun-captain  crouches 
apprehensively !  The  buzzer  sounds  three  quick 
taps,  then  a  long  "F-e-u-rrr!" 

There  is  a  blast  as  of  an  exploding  volcano. 
A  hot  flash  blinds  and  gags  the  crew.  A  dis- 
integrating crash  convulses  the  earth.  And 
twelve  hundred  pounds  of  deadly  projectile  goes 
screaming  and  howling  through  the  air  in  a 
vast  arc  over  the  Prussian  front  beyond  the 
Franco-British  trenches,  beyond  their  rear,  and 
knocks  a  monstrous  hole  through  twenty  feet  of 
steel  and  concrete,  breaking  the  crest  of  the  fort 
impregnable  and  slaying  the  crew  in  one  vast 
explosion. 

The  shell  has  travelled  over  six  miles.  The 
gwn  has  not  moved  an  inch. 


Making  the  "Impossible"  Possible 

Because  non-technical  writers  are  freely  per- 
mitted, and  even  invited,  to  express  opinions 
on  technical  subjects  there  is  now,  in  this  conn- 
try,  widespread  confusion  on  many  military 
topics.  The  belief  that  the  big  gun  is  the  big- 
gest factor  in  deciding  modern  battles  is  a  case 
in  point.  The  success  of  the  secret  German 
heavy  artillery  of  the  howitzer  and  mortar  type, 
which  promptly  reduced  French  and  Belgian 
forts  considered  impregnable,  is  largely  respon- 
sible for  this  delusion.  To  to  sure,  artillery  of 
the  Krupp  42-centimetre  type  is  a  tremendous 
asset  to  an  invading  force  obliged  to  cut  its  way 
through  miles  of  barrier  forts  against  which  or- 
dinary field  cannon  is  comparatively  ineffective. 
But  when  these  big  pieces  have  done  all  they  can 
possibly  be  expected  to  do  in  the  way  of  de- 
stroying a  fortified  place,  it  still  remains  for  the 
infantry  to  advance  and  hold  the  ground  thus 
gained,  as  otherwise  this  advantage  would  soon 

be  lost.   Also,  while  the  heavy  projectiles  of  the 

54 


AUTOMOBILE  AETILLERY  55 

Krupp  mortars  can  devastate  any  modern  forti- 
fication no  matter  how  strong,  and  at  the  same 
time  destroy  the  garrison,  heavy  firing,  no  mat- 
ter how  long  continued,  cannot  completely  rout 
the  enemy,  who  would  deploy  anew  on  the  cessa- 
tion of  firing  in  case  hostile  infantry  should  fail 
to  advance  and  hold  the  terrain  bombarded. 

The  principal  difficulty  in  bringing  heavy  ar- 
tillery into  action  is  the  slow  and  laborious  man- 
ner in  which  it  must  of  necessity  be  advanced, 
coupled  with  the  danger  of  losing  it  to  the 
enemy  in  case  the  advance  intended  cannot  be 
completed.  Hence,  the  field  artillery  of  a  mod- 
ern army  consists  mostly  of  small-calibre  can- 
non of  the  direct-fire  type,  and  the  object  of  the 
artillery  commander  is  to  make  up  for  the  want 
of  extra-heavy  ammunition  by  rapidity  of  fire 
and  accuracy  of  aim. 

This  is  a  basic  requirement  in  the  armies  that 
are  now  warring.  Those  of  Germany  and 
Austria  are  the  only  ones  that  have  been  suc- 
cessful in  introducing  a  new  departure  by  de- 
signing mortars  for  field  service  that  out- 
class even  the  heaviest  naval  artillery,  at 
least  in  calibre,  and  of  quite  astounding 
mobility  despite   great  weight   and  unwieldy 


56  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

ammunition.  What  was  impossible  before  is 
not  only  possible  now  but  a  demonstrated 
success  owing  to  the  inventive  capacities  of 
the  Skoda  and  Krupp  arsenals.  Not  only- 
can  the  Kaiser's  armies  take  heavy  artillery  to 
the  front,  and  keep  it  moving  up  and  down  the 
front  at  a  very  creditable  pace,  but  the  metal 
thrown  by  these  giant  pieces  is  of  such  pre- 
ponderating calibre  that  the  destructive  effect 
of  a  42-centimetre  battery  practically  equals 
the  broadside  of  a  modern  battleship. 

All  this  would  have  been  impossible  were  it 
not  for  the  skill  with  which  motor  traction  has 
been  applied  to  furnish  these  modern  artillery 
monsters  with  the  requisite  degree  of  mobility. 
A  decade  ago,  even  had  the  Germans  been 
ready,  their  big  guns  would  never  have  seen  the 
front.  Motors  were  not  powerful  nor  reliable 
enough  then  to  do  the  traction  work.  The  guns 
would  have  been  platformed  in  steel  forts  and 
their  excellent  offensive  capacity  lost  to  the 
German  invading  armies.  It  would  take  a  team 
of  thirty-eight  to  forty-eight  horses  to  pull  a 
42-centimetre  piece  over  the  prevailing  terrain, 
and  relays  would  be  required  every  four  hours 
to  keep  the  big  gun  moving  apace  with  a  march- 


AUTOMOBILE  AETILLERY  57 

ing  army.  This  would  require  at  least  114 
horses  for  each  piece,  and  means  slow  transpor- 
tation if  everything  goes  without  a  hitch,  which 
it  doesn't  in  warfare. 

All  kinds  of  curious  estimates  are  current 
anent  the  monstrous  Krupp  42-centimetre 
pieces,  which  German  soldiery  has  variously 
nicknamed  "Brummers,"  because  of  the  growl- 
ing note  of  their  report,  "Tanten  aus  Essen," 
because  of  their  origin,  and  "Dicken  Luders," 
because  of  their  squat  and  stout  proportions. 

One  military  "expert"  even  goes  so  far  as 
to  state  that  the  piece  weighs  124  tons,  fires  a 
ll^-ton  projectile  costing  $9,500  apiece,  has  a 
barrel  length  of  69  feet,  a  maximum  range  of 
28  miles,  and  glibly  fixes  the  total  cost  of  this 
mechanical  monster  at  the  modest  figure  of 
$462,000!  In  the  absence  of  authentic  specifi- 
cations why  not  draw  a  bit  on  the  imagination? 
Another  similarly  accredited  ' i  expert ' '  abruptly 
denies  the  existence  of  the  gun.  He  regards  it 
as  a  myth,  arguing  that  according  to  the  rules 
of  artillery  construction,  which  allows  three 
feet  length  of  barrel  for  every  inch  of  bore,  the 
gun  would  be  51  feet  long  and  weigh  34  tons, 
and,  of  course,  he  adds,  such  a  monstrous  piece 


58  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

is  not  transportable  in  the  field !  A  third  critic, 
and  an  alleged  eye-witness  at  the  front,  corri- 
gates  all  preceding  guesses  by  announcing,  with 
the  air  of  finality,  that  the  Austrians,  not  the 
Prussians,  are  the  chaps  who  have  placed  the 
big  guns  at  the  front,  "none  of  which,  however, 
are  of  more  than  30.5-centimetre  calibre  and  no 
larger  than  the  standard  siege  cannon  in  Rus- 
sia's army."  In  the  absence  of  facts  it  is  quite 
remarkable  how  certain  people  regale  them- 
selves with  conclusions.  Once  they  have  shaped 
for  themselves  a  theory,  no  matter  how  weird, 
they  have  no  difficulty  in  finding  or  manufac- 
turing " facts"  to  fit  the  theory. 

It  is  quite  true  that  the  well-known  Russian 
PutilofF  arsenals  several  years  ago  designed  a 
heavy  field-piece,  based  on  drawings  and  speci- 
fications obtained  from  Creusot  of  France.  The 
gun  proper  weighs  6  tons,  the  carriage  and 
mounting  about  28  tons,  and  it  is  calibred  to 
30.2  centimetres,  or  about  12  inches.  This  piece 
was  designed  more  for  siege  requirements  than 
for  field  operations,  to  which  its  low  degree  of 
mobility  is  not  likely  to  suit  it,  and  it  is  for  all 
practical  purposes  more  of  a  mortar  than  of  a 
cannon. 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  59 


Some  Big  Gun  Blunders 

Soon  after  war  was  declared  the  Skoda  works 
in  Austria,  practically  the  equal  to  Creusot  in 
artillery  technique,  sent  a  battery  of  30.2-centi- 
metre howitzers  to  be  tried  out  in  comparison 
with  the  21-centimetre  field  and  the  28-centi- 
metre siege  howitzers  of  Krupp  make.  These 
are  the  three  types  of  pieces  that  finally  re- 
duced the  chain  of  forts  defending  Liege  and 
Namur  to  fragments,  but  as  the  maximum 
calibre  was  held  by  the  Skoda  guns  some  ob- 
servers got  the  notion  into  their  heads  that 
Austria  furnished  the  big  guns  and  not  Prussia. 
It  was  not  until  the  army  of  General  von  Kluck 
crossed  the  Meuse  and  the  bombarding  of  Fort 
Maubeuge  began  that  the  "Brummers,"  the  42- 
centimetre  Krupp  automobile  mortars,  were 
allowed  to  decide  the  issue,  hence  the  confusion 
in  terms  and  calibre  by  "veteran"  war  corre- 
spondents et  al.,  most  of  whom  are  unable  to 
tell  a  recoil  cylinder  from  a  barrel. 

It  may  also  surprise  the  reading  public  to 
know  that  up  to  the  present  time  of  writing,  or 
about  one  hundred  days  of  warfare,  the  alleged 


60  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

Krupp  42-centimetre  cannon  that  have  been  so 
elaborately  photographed  and  vociferously 
heralded  in  the  newspaper  and  periodical  press 
are  not  at  all  German  guns  but  Austrian  30.2- 
centimetre  howitzers  of  Skoda  make.  It  must 
be  admitted,  however,  that  only  a  military  ex- 
pert could  tell  the  latter  type  apart  from  the 
German  28-centimetre  siege  howitzers,  but 
neither  type  comes  within  range  of  secret  arma- 
ments as  they  are  published  as  standard  equip- 
ment in  the  official  lists  of  both  countries. 

So  far,  the  writer  has  not  seen  a  single  genu- 
ine photo  of  the  real  German  "Brummer"  of 
42-centimetre  calibre,  and  until  one  of  them  is 
captured  we  are  not  likely  to  encounter  it  in 
print  unless  a  war  correspondent  is  willing  to 
forfeit  his  life  for  the  sake  of  entertaining  his 
readers. 

Nevertheless,  it  may  be  asserted  with  com- 
parative certainty  that  the  secret  42-centimetre 
pieces  do  not  differ  materially  from  the  stand- 
ard 28-  and  30.2-centimetre  pieces  except  in 
weight  and  ponderosity.  In  general,  all  three 
types  may  be  classified  as  heavy  siege  auto- 
mobile artillery,  since  they  have  main  features 
in  common.     The   transportation  problem  is 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  61 

effected  in  three  units.  First,  there  is  the  auto- 
mobile tractor,  which  carries  the  artillery  crew 
and  tools,  and  furnishes  the  motive  power. 
Second,  a  car  with  the  platform  and  turn-table 
for  the  gun  including  the  mounting,  the  sleeve 
and  the  recoil  gear.  Third,  a  car  specially  de- 
signed to  carry  the  barrel  or  gun  proper.  On 
level  roads  a  single  tractor  is  sufficient  to  move 
the  three  units  at  a  good  speed,  but  where  heavy 
grades  interpose  a  tractor  is  needed  for  each 
car.  It  is  a  mistake  to  assume,  as  some  writers 
do,  that  such  an  outfit  of  heavy  automobile  artil- 
lery can  race  up  and  down  the  firing-line  and 
select  bases  of  operation  at  will.  It  can  do  no 
such  thing.  When  military  men  speak  of  the 
unusual  mobility  of  these  guns  they  mean  that 
they  possess  a  greater  degree  of  mobility  for 
the  enormous  weight  carried  than  was  possi- 
ble before.  At  best  they  can  maintain  a  pace 
on  average  country  roads  corresponding  to  the 
double-quick  of  an  army  on  the  march,  which  is 
quite  sufficient  for  modern  artillery  needs.  The 
initial  transportation  of  the  gun  from  the  ar- 
senal to  the  army  base  is  undertaken  by  rail. 
From  this  base  to  its  predestined  position  in  the 
rear  of  the  firing-line,  the  gun  proceeds  under 


62  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

its  own  tractive  power,  that  is,  it  follows  the 
country  roads  as  close  up  to  this  position  as 
possible.  The  most  difficult  manoeuvre  of  the 
whole  journey  is  to  move  the  gun  from  the  high- 
way across  the  field  terrain  to  the  position 
plotted  for  it,  or,  to  use  a  military  term,  to  get 
the  gun  in  battery. 

Getting  a  "Brumrner"  in  Battery 

If  the  ground  is  soft  or  uneven,  the  army 
pioneers  are  set  to  work  constructing  a  tem- 
porary road  over  which  the  big  gun  is  then 
hauled  by  teams  of  from  thirty-eight  to  forty- 
eight  horses.  When  the  ground  is  passably  firm 
the  gun  proceeds  under  its  own  power  or 
assisted  by  horse,  as  the  exigencies  may  dictate, 
but  even  so  there  are  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
stone  fences,  ditches  and  soft  spots  that  must 
be  dealt  with  by  the  pioneers  before  the  big  gun 
can  be  limbered  into  place.  In  some  cases  the 
heaviest  mortars  are  shipped  direct  by  rail  to 
their  emplacements,  aided  by  specially  laid 
side  tracks.  Once  this  object  is  gained  a  heavy 
concrete  base  is  laid  and  the  platform  with  turn- 
table and  mountings   emplaced  in  it  solidly. 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  63 

Then  the  car  bearing  the  barrel  is  backed  up 
to  the  platform,  and  the  barrel  is  fitted  to  the 
double  recoil  cylinders  on  the  mountings  and 
drawn  forward  into  the  sleeve.  The  piston  rod 
of  the  recoil  cylinders  is  bolted  to  a  lug  at- 
tached to  the  breech,  the  barrel  is  elevated  into 
position,  and  the  big  "Brummer"  is  ready  to 
sling  a  ton-heavy  projectile  a  distance  of  seven 
miles  and  smash  any  defence  as  yet  devised  by 
the  human  brain. 

Some  people  do  not  understand  the  function 
of  a  piece  of  artillery  at  the  moment  of  being 
fired.  They  think  the  gun  jumps  back  the  same 
as  a  rifle  kicks  back.  Were  this  so,  neither 
accuracy  nor  rapidity  of  artillery  fire  would  be 
possible,  and  a  42-centimetre  piece  would  wreck 
itself  by  a  single  shot.  The  only  thing  that 
changes  place  at  the  moment  of  firing  is  the 
piston  in  the  recoil  cylinder  moving  back  with 
the  gun  proper  as  it  slides  in  its  sleeve  or 
cradle.  There  are  three  cylinders  running  par- 
allel with  the  gun  barrel.  The  middle  cylinder 
does  the  braking  actuated  by  a  recoil  spring, 
and  the  left  and  right  cylinders  are  merely  for 
air  storage.  All  the  cylinders  stand  fast ;  it  is 
only  the  piston  of  the  recoil  cylinder  that  jumps 


64  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

back  with  the  barrel  of  the  gun  at  the  point  of 
firing.  The  training  gears  on  the  mounting 
give  a  swift  and  positive  elevation  of  upward  of 
sixty-five  degrees,  and  also  permit  of  sweeping 
the  gun  quickly  through  a  horizontal  arc  of 
five  degrees  on  either  side  of  its  longitudinal 
centre.  Of  course,  the  entire  gun  with  platform 
and  mounting  can  be  swung  completely  around 
by  means  of  the  turn-table  fixed  in  the  base. 

The  Austrian  30.2-centimetre  Skoda  gun 
throws  an  explosive  projectile  weighing  close  to 
eight  hundred  pounds  a  distance  of  more  than 
six  miles,  firing  at  the  maximum  range  at  42^- 
degree  elevation.  The  weight  of  a  complete 
gun  outfit  is  thirty-nine  tons.  On  this  basis  it 
is  safe  to  say  the  42-centimetre  Krupp  piece 
ought  to  be  able  to  hurl  a  16-inch  shell,  weighing 
more  than  a  ton,  fully  seven  miles.  What  this 
means  can  perhaps  better  be  appreciated  when 
we  say  that  no  super-dreadnaught  built,  once 
within  range,  could  withstand  the  onslaught  of 
such  a  battery.  It  is  not  likely,  however,  that 
the  Germans  may  adapt  their  42-centimetre 
mortars  to  naval  requirements,  and  equip  a 
number  of  battleships  with  this  formidable 
arm. 


AUTOMOBILE  AETILLERY  65 

Every  now  and  then  a  writer  pops  up  with  a 
lurid  tale  showing  that  Germany  is  approach- 
ing her  finish  because  her  heavy  cannon  are 
worn  out  and  the  gunners  have  gone  crazy! 
As  usual  the  guesswork  expert  straddles  the 
wrong  steed  and  comes  a  cropper.  It  is  pre- 
cisely the  big  guns  of  the  "Brummer"  type 
that  suffer  least.  The  explosive  strain  is  much 
less  in  a  gun  of  the  howitzer  and  mortar  type, 
such  as  the  German  and  Austrian  "Brummers," 
than  in  a  direct-fire  type  of  cannon  to  which 
naval  and  field  artillery  in  general  belong. 
When  naval  men  say  that  the  main  batteries  of 
a  modern  battleship  can  be  fired  an  average 
of  only  two  hundred  rounds — and  this  applies 
to  12-inch  and  14-inch  pieces — they  mean  not 
that  it  is  dangerous  to  fire  the  guns,  though  the 
factor  of  safety  is  rapidly  reducing  after  the 
two-hundredth  round,  but  that  the  guns  are  be- 
coming inaccurate  and  difficult  to  serve.  Of 
course,  every  shot  fired  by  a  cannon  means  a 
certain  microscopic  injury  to  its  rifling — erosion 
is  the  artillery  term — and  continued  injury  of 
this  kind  will  gradually  bring  about  certain  de- 
fects in  the  rifling  that  make  good  marks- 
manship impossible.     While  erosion  is  more 


66  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

prevalent  in  large  guns  than  in  small  guns,  and, 
of  course,  least  in  the  army  rifle,  this  applies 
only  to  direct-fire  weapons  which  require  in- 
tense muzzle  velocity  of  projectile  to  be  effec- 
tive. The  indirect-fire  artillery,  to  which  Skoda 
and  Krupp  howitzers  belong,  is  not  menaced  by 
erosion  to  any  considerable  extent  and  can  keep 
up  comfortably  with  the  army  rifle.  As  to  the 
crews  getting  crazy  under  the  strain  of  serving 
the  batteries,  this  is  all  poppycock.  To  be  sure 
there  is  a  factor  of  fatigue  to  be  considered,  not 
only  in  metals  but  in  men.  The  latter  wear 
down  and  the  former  wear  out.  For  this  very 
reason  the  big  gun  crews  are  relieved  as  much 
as  possible,  and  the  arsenals  at  Essen  are  busy 
day  and  night  to  produce  new  batteries  of 
"Brummers."  If  gunners  are  getting  crazy,  it 
must  be  those  who  are  getting  the  big  shells 
about  their  ears  rather  than  those  who  are 
aiming  them. 

When  Repairs  Might  Win  Battles 

The  really  serious  side  of  the  artillery  prob- 
lem, on  the  firing-line,  is  how  to  provide  for 
renewals  and  repairs  of  the  active  guns.    On 


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AUTOMOBILE  ABTILLERY  67 

the  present  fighting  fronts  these  pieces  have 
been  under  high  pressure  requirements  for  sev- 
eral months,  and  by  the  time  this  book  may  see 
print  they  will  be  pretty  well  worn ;  at  least  they 
will  be  so  worn  as  to  be  inaccurate.  The  com- 
mander who  is  f arsighted  enough  to  provide  for 
this  eventuality,  and  has  means  at  his  disposal 
to  maintain  an  uninterrupted  process  of  repairs 
and  renewals  of  active  field  artillery,  will  have  a 
tremendous  advantage  over  the  commander 
who  waits  till  he  is  forced  to  do  it.  A  factor 
of  this  calibre,  which  most  laymen  would  ignore, 
might  easily  become  one  of  particular  moment, 
especially  if  the  war  is  going  to  last  the  winter 
out. 

But  tenderer  and  more  difficult  to  maintain 
than  rifled  field  cannon  are  the  motor-tractor, 
the  armoured  automobile,  and  the  motor-service 
cars  in  attendance  upon  the  artillery  corps. 
The  rough  handling  that  these  vehicles  are  of 
necessity  subjected  to  on  the  front  increases  the 
factor  of  depreciation  to  a  point  where  only 
extraordinary  repair  facilities  backed  by  ade- 
quate renewals  could  possibly  maintain  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  motored  vehicles.  Here  is  another 
chance  for  long-distance  generalship.    It  isn't 


68  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

so  much  who  has  the  most  and  the  best  cannon 
and  motor-artillery  now  as  who  can  keep  them 
best  and  most  numerous  till  the  last  great  battle 
of  this  war  is  fought  to  a  finish. 

At  the  outbreak  of  this  war  Germany  had 
some  four  thousand  guns  in  the  field  artillery, 
not  counting  secret  armaments,  against  three 
thousand  owned  by  France,  almost  two  thou- 
sand under  the  Austrian  eagle,  considerably 
more  than  four  thousand  under  the  Eussian 
knout,  and  little  more  than  a  thousand  pieces 
on  John  Bull's  side.  Of  this  artillery  it  is 
quite  safe  to  say  that  Germany  and  Austria 
have  their  full  combined  quota  of  six  thousand 
pieces  actually  in  the  field.  The  only  one  power 
of  the  Allies  that  has  all  its  guns  out  is  France, 
and  deducting  the  guns  that  Eussia  and  Eng- 
land have  saved  for  other  purposes,  we  find  that 
the  Allies  are  superior  to  the  Austro-German 
forces  by  little  more  than  eight  hundred  pieces. 
This  should  be  more  than  offset  by  the  heavy 
siege  howitzers  of  Skoda  and  Krupp  make,  and 
the  capacity  of  these  works  for  rapidly  manu- 
facturing new  artillery  in  huge  quantities. 
With  more  than  eighty  thousand  hands  working 
in  double  shifts  night  and  day  the  Skoda-Krupp 


AUTOMOBILE  AETILLERY  69 

combination,  added  to  the  twenty  thousand  men 
employed  by  Erhardt  and  other  gun-makers, 
are  most  certainly  in  a  position  to  outdistance 
the  combined  efforts  of  the  Russian  Putiloff,  the 
French  Creusot,  and  the  British  Armstrong 
and  Vickars  arsenals. 

One  of  the  most  potent  reasons  why  German 
strategy  chose  the  Belgian  route  for  invasion  in 
preference  to  blundering  into  the  trap  so  cun- 
ningly arranged  by  the  French  at  the  "trouee 
d'Epinal"  on  the  Toul-Belfort  barrier,  is  that 
the  highways  in  Belgium,  and  those  connecting 
the  Flemish  border  with  Northern  France,  are 
more  level  than  elsewhere  on  the  frontier,  and 
thus  better  suited  to  the  transport  of  these 
heavy  Krupp  and  Skoda  pieces  without  which 
von  Moltke  could  not  have  ventured  to  order 
the  storm-drive  toward  Paris.  Reducing  mod- 
ern steel  forts  by  siege  methods  is  a  slow 
operation,  but  von  Moltke  was  well  aware  that 
in  the  secret  Krupp  and  Skoda  heavy  artillery 
the  German  army  had  the  nucleus  for  quickly 
destroying  even  the  stanchest  forts  of  the 
enemy,  and,  moreover,  artillery  mobile  enough 
to  keep  pace  with  the  forced  marching  of  the 
German  army. 


70  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 


Armoured  Automobiles 

The  armoured  automobile  is  the  "  cavalry "  of 
motor-driven  artillery.  In  mobility  it  is  su- 
perior to  horse,  but  more  susceptible  to  break- 
down and  unable  to  swerve  from  the  beaten 
path  of  the  highway.  It  has  offensive  power 
superior  to  both  infantry  and  mounted  troops, 
but  lacks  their  capacity  for  concerted  and  con- 
tinuous action.  Mainly  for  these  and  similar 
reasons  the  work  detailed  to  the  armoured  auto- 
mobile in  this  war  has  been  limited  to  reeon- 
noissance  duty  involving  extraordinary  features 
not  hitherto  encountered  in  warfare.  For 
quickly  driving  a  wedge  into  hostile  territory 
in  advance  of  an  invading  force,  making  obser- 
vations under  speed,  and,  whenever  compelled, 
to  attack  and  disperse  with  rapid  artillery  such 
detachments  of  hostile  troops  as  it  may  run 
across,  there  is  no  weapon  comparable  to  the 
armoured  automobile.  Fighting  on  the  frontiers 
has  shown  that  such  machines  reach  their  maxi- 
mum value  when  operating  in  conjunction  with 
air  scouts,  that  is,  the  scouts  can  usually  direct 
them  to  the  vital  spots  and  warn  them  of  hid- 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  71 

den  danger.  When  the  terrain  is  wooded,  how- 
ever, or  in  case  of  misty  weather,  the  air  scout 
can  do  nothing  of  importance,  but  a  muffled  ar- 
moured car  can  sneak  through  and  complete  the 
scouting  where  mounted  men  would  be  detected 
if  not  decimated. 

When  Germany  invaded  Belgium  the  Ameri- 
can press  was  forthwith  flooded  with  accounts 
of  how  the  Germans  advanced  in  endless  col- 
umns of  armoured  cars !  Marching  belongs  to  a 
former  epoch,  the  soldiers  of  modern  armies  are 
carried  to  battle  in  armour-clad  automobiles — 
that  was  the  sweeping  impression  conveyed. 
Of  course,  nothing  of  the  sort  occurred.  The 
German  army  regulations  provide  that  an  in- 
vading force  be  invariably  preceded  by  its  ac- 
tive field  officers.  They  must  look  over  the  ter- 
rain and  select  positions  for  the  advancing  army 
corps.  These  officers  are  sped  forward  in  light 
armoured  autos,  complete  their  observations  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  and  return  to  their  post. 
Several  such  motor-scouting  squads  shot  across 
the  Luxembourg  and  Belgian  borders  at  the 
commencement  of  hostilities,  but  they  consisted 
of  officers,  not  privates,  and  only  officers  are 
thus  transported.     Marching  is  obligatory  as 


72  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

ever,  and  once  the  men  are  in  the  trenches 
forced  marching  orders  under  cover  of  night 
are  not  infrequent. 

The  motor-cars  used  for  high  speed  scouting 
purposes  are  armoured  but  not  armed.  There 
are  no  guns  mounted  in  the  cars.  The  rifle  is 
the  only  weapon  employed.  The  plating  is  very 
light — seldom  of  more  than  four-millimetre 
thickness — and  just  sufficient  to  turn  rifle  and 
machine-gun  bullets.  The  German  Opel  and 
N.  A.  G.  cars  of  this  type  have  a  vertical  steel 
blade  attachment  at  the  front  for  cutting  such 
wires  as  the  enemy  may  stretch  over  the 
roads. 

In  the  Minerva  military  model  the  Belgians 
possess  another  successful  type  of  armoured 
scout.  It  is  very  similar  to  the  light  German 
scout,  but  is  armed  with  one  rapid-fire  gun  and 
plated  with  five-millimetre  steel.  It  has  neither 
hood  nor  cupola  and  the  crew  inside  are  sup- 
posed to  protect  themselves  by  ducking  behind 
the  armoured  walls.  The  Belgians  also  have  a 
heavier  model  of  S.  A.  V.  A.  make,  which  is 
equipped  with  huge  headlights  to  operate  at 
night  also.  This  car  has  a  rapid-fire  gun 
mounted  in  a  cupola-formed  revolving  turret, 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  73 

and  although  it  is  supposed  to  be  an  improve- 
ment on  the  Minerva  type,  it  has  not  operated 
as  successfully  as  the  latter. 

When  it  comes  to  "  armoured  forts  on  wheels/ ' 
Germany  and  Italy  divide  honours.  The  Mer- 
cedes and  Opel  trucks  mounting  five  to  seven 
Krupp  rapid-fire  artillery,  plated  with  half -inch 
steel  armour,  and  having  solid-tire  disk  wheels, 
are  virtually  miniature  mobile  forts,  but  they 
are  not  very  speedy.  An  even  more  formidable 
fighting  machine  is  the  Isotta  Fraschini  heavy 
model  produced  by  Italy,  which  boasts  a  battery 
of  four  rapid-fire  guns  and  has  a  revolving 
turret  not  unlike  that  of  a  Gruson  fort.  Eng- 
land seems  to  depend  chiefly  on  commandeered 
vehicles,  and  her  subsidised,  armoured  Daimlers 
are  disproportionate  in  number  to  the  needs  of 
her  army. 

France  appears  to  have  done  comparatively 
little  fighting  with  her  armoured  cars,  though 
she  possesses  in  the  Schneider  and  Charron  at 
least  two  types  that  are  considered  models  of 
their  kind.  The  Charron  is  the  only  completely 
inclosed  armoured  car  that  affords  the  crew  an 
unobstructed  view  on  all  sides  through  steel- 
lattice  panels,  and  even  the  wind-shield  is  made 


74  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

on  this  plan.  A  revolving  cupola  mounting  a 
single  5-centimetre  gun  tops  the  car,  and  the 
appliances  for  training  the  gun  and  the  cupola 
are  very  complete.  Despite  its  weight  and 
heavy  equipment  this  car  is  quite  speedy,  hav- 
ing pneumatic  tires,  which,  strange  to  say,  are 
left  unprotected  by  shields. 

The  Schneider  type  of  armoured  car  is  chiefly 
noticeable  for  its  "superimposed"  turret,  that 
is,  the  lower  part  of  the  turret  is  stationary  and 
the  upper  part  is  rotating.  By  an  ingenious 
arrangement  the  gunner  can  sit  on  a  seat  at- 
tached to  the  gun  and  pedal  a  bicycle  crank, 
which  moves  the  gun  with  the  rotating  upper 
half  of  the  turret  cylinder.  The  gunner  has 
both  hands  free — and  this  is  an  advance  over 
other  systems — but  as  he  is  actually  sitting  on 
top  of  the  gun  at  the  moment  of  firing  he  is 
liable  to  a  good  deal  of  shaking  up. 

The  experience  gained  under  fire  in  this  war 
would  seem  to  discourage  the  further  building 
of  excessively  armoured  and  comparatively  slow 
cars  in  preference  to  speedy  cars  clad  with 
plates  of  medium  weight  and  armoured  with  one 
or  two  machine  guns.  To  appear  suddenly,  to 
maintain  a  withering  fire  for  a  while,  and  to 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  75 

disappear  suddenly,  these  are  the  capital  fight- 
ing assets  of  the  armoured  automobile  as  far  as 
this  war  has  taught.  The  extra-heavy,  slow- 
moving,  heavy-gun  cars  do  not  appear  to  have 
done  what  was  expected  of  them. 

An  instance  in  point  is  the  invasion  of  the 
Belgian  town,  Alost.  Instead  of  sending  a  fly- 
ing column  through  the  streets,  which  were 
heavily  barricaded  and  filled  with  snipers  in 
concealment,  the  Germans  wedged  in  with  a 
small  squad  of  light-armoured  automobiles  fitted 
with  machine  guns.  In  a  short  time  the  streets 
were  cleared,  and  more  than  fifteen  hundred 
Belgians  were  mowed  down  by  the  murderous 
motor  artillery.  Probably  a  corresponding 
number  of  Prussian  troops  would  have  been 
killed  by  the  barricaded  Belgians  had  the  ar- 
moured cars  not  been  employed  before  the  in- 
vestment of  Alost  took  place. 

The  "Super-Brummer" 

As  to  the  56-  and  60-centimetre  German 
"Brummers,"  which  the  American  newspapers 
have  so  insistently  heralded  under  scareheads 
like,  "Guns  to  Shoot  into  England,"  and  "Guns 


76  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

to  Shoot  over  Twenty-one  Miles,"  I  am  sorry 
to  say  I  have  no  information.  If  such  guns 
have  been  at  all  produced  they  must  of  necessity 
be  of  the  indirect-fire  class  known  as  siege  mor- 
tars, and  I  doubt  if  they  are  transportable  by 
motor  traction.  Their  use,  if  they  appear  at  all, 
will  be  confined  to  siege  operations,  and  for 
establishing  fortified  bases  on  the  Franco- 
Belgian  coast  for  German  torpedo  and  sub- 
marine craft.  Besides,  the  maximum  distance 
at  which  the  range-finder  ceases  to  operate, 
owing  to  the  earth's  curvature,  is  eleven  miles' 
range. 

When  we  consider  that  it  takes  fully  a  year 
to  produce  a  30.2-centimetre  gun  and  that  six 
months  must  be  added  for  one  of  42-centimetre 
calibre,  it  is  quite  evident  that  neither  Ger- 
many nor  Austria  could  at  this  time  have  quan- 
tities of  such  heavy  artillery  unless  they  had 
started  to  manufacture  in  series  years  ago.  As 
the  machinery  requisite  to  the  making  of  these 
artillery  monsters  consumes  fully  a  year  to 
produce,  and  does  not  maintain  its  efficiency  for 
long  periods,  it  is  clear  that  the  time  required 
and  the  difficulties  encountered  are  such  that  no 
other  nation  could  expect  to  compete  with  Ger- 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  77 

many  in  this  arm  within  the  epoch  of  the  present 
war.  So  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  gather,  the 
first  German  "Brummer"  was  laid  down  in 
1909.  At  a  subsequent  trial  at  the  proving 
ground  the  gun  was  pronounced  a  "failure" 
officially.  Owing  to  the  huge  calibre  this  was 
readily  believed  by  the  military  world,  which 
then  and  there  dismissed  the  idea  of  a  possible 
development.  This  is  what  the  Germans 
wanted,  and  forthwith  they  began  to  manu- 
facture "Brummers"  by  the  dozen,  keeping  the 
secret  so  close  that  only  the  highest  officers  of 
the  Grand  General  Staff  knew  what  was  going 
on  underground. 

How  the  Heavy  Shooting  Is  Done 

Judging  by  the  questions  I  have  been  asked 
since  the  war  began  there  must  be  a  lot  of  people 
in  this  country  who  are  not  aware  of  even  the 
rudiments  of  modern  artillery  practice.  They 
cannot  understand  how  it  is  possible  for  the 
artillery  gunner  to  fire  at  an  object  not  visible 
to  him  and  yet  hit  it. 

What  is  termed  "indirect"  firing  is  a  method 
of  reducing  artillery  practice  to  mathematics, 


78  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

which  all  modern  armies  have  adopted,  chiefly 
owing  to  the  enormous  range  of  modern  can- 
non. Of  course,  this  applies  also  to  the  artil- 
lery propelled  by  motor  traction. 

The  "indirect"  system  means  that  a  battery 
of  howitzers  and  field-pieces  can  stand  in  a  val- 
ley and  shoot  over  the  top  of  a  hillside,  drop- 
ping shells  upon  an  enemy  hidden  from  sight  in 
a  forest  several  miles  distant.  Artillery  officers 
are  required  to  be  expert  at  geometry  and 
trigonometry,  for  upon  the  triangle  is  based 
the  application  of  the  system.  The  officers 
take  their  post  some  distance  away  from 
the  battery  and  usually  on  the  tallest  avail- 
able eminence.  If  aeroplanes  are  operating 
in  connection  with  the  battery,  they  do  the 
"spotting"  not  only  of  the  enemy's  position, 
but  of  the  shots  as  they  strike  in  his  direction. 
One  point  of  the  triangle  is  represented  by  the 
officers'  post,  the  second  is  the  battery,  the  third 
is  the  enemy.  The  distance  between  the  officers' 
post  and  the  battery  is  called  the  base  line. 
This  distance  is  measured.  The  angles  at  both 
ends  of  the  base  line  are  figured.  This  done,  it 
only  requires  a  trigonometric  operation  to  de- 
termine the  actual  distance  of  the  enemy,  and 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  79 

this  is  called  " finding"  the  range.  From  the 
officers'  post  word  is  given  over  the  field  tele- 
phone to  the  gunners  of  the  battery  informing 
them  of  the  accurate  degree  of  elevation  and 
the  exact  point  of  compass  necessary  to  reach 
the  target.  These  adjustments  having  been 
made,  the  command  "Fire!"  is  given.  From 
their  point  of  vantage,  the  officers  observe  the 
effect  of  the  shot.  If  changes  in  the  range  are 
necessary,  owing  to  faulty  observation  or  the 
movements  of  the  enemy,  the  field  telephone 
carries  the  instructions  promptly  to  the  gun 
captains.  A  battery  thus  masked  in  a  depres- 
sion does  not  betray  its  position  except  for  in- 
conspicuous puffs  of  smokeless  powder,  and  it 
is  only  by  close-in  aero  scouting  that  its  exact 
place  on  the  map  can  be  ascertained. 

Whenever  the  enemy  succeeds  in  thus  spot- 
ting a  battery  an  effort  is  generally  made  to 
move  it  during  the  night  unless  the  battery  is 
holding  the  post  for  reinforcements.  Here, 
again,  motor  traction  is  an  invaluable  aid. 
"While  the  enemy  is  preparing  to  take  the  battery 
by  assault  at  dawn,  the  battery  has  been  motored 
away  to  a  concealed  position,  sometimes  miles 
distant,  and  the  first  news  the  enemy  gets  of  this 


80  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

nocturnal  manoeuvre  is  usually  a  sudden  shell 
fire  sweeping  his  trenches  from  an  altered 
angle. 


Actual  War  Automobile  Strength 

When  we  analyse  the  numerical  automobile 
artillery  strength  of  the  powers  now  at  war  we 
must  not  permit  ourselves  to  be  misled  by  the 
way  in  which  military  statistics  are  compiled, 
as  they  vary  in  different  countries.  With  250,- 
000  trucks  and  cars  and  more  than  200,000  run- 
abouts and  motorcycles  at  her  command,  Great 
Britain  would  easily  seem  to  predominate,  but, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  she  has  fewer  army  cars 
fitted  for  service  than  France,  and  quite  a  con- 
siderable proportion  will  remain  in  England  for 
home  defence.  Less  than  ten  per  cent,  of  her 
motor  lorry  division — a  scant  1,800  cars — have 
been  landed  in  France,  and  most  of  these  are  for 
commissariat  purposes.  Not  a  single  armoured 
automobile  was  in  the  lot.  Later  on,  a  few  were 
improvised.  Moreover,  the  British  cars  have 
caused  much  trouble  and  confusion  as  they  can- 
not use  French  parts  and  accessories  and  are 
poorly  provided  with  these  from  home.    These 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  81 

circumstances  have  not  tended  to  give  the  Eng- 
lish army  standing  at  the  front  in  the  automo- 
bile arm. 

With  100,000  passenger  cars,  25,000  motor 
buses,  taxi-cabs  and  motorcycles,  and  10,000 
motor  trucks  of  all  kinds  available  for  mili- 
tary use,  France  was  able  to  give  her  trans- 
portation and  commissariat  great  initiative  and 
well-maintained  endurance.  She  has  several 
squads  of  automobile  aeroplane  cannon  and 
armed  autos  of  the  Schneider  and  Charron 
models.  In  armoured  artillery  she  has  confined 
herself  to  batteries  of  12-centimetre  and  15.5- 
centimetre  Rimailho  howitzers.  As  there  are 
21  batteries  of  the  latter  type  of  gun  in  the 
French  army,  and  four  pieces  in  each  battery, 
France  would  make  a  very  presentable  showing 
in  automobile  artillery  provided  all  batteries 
are  motor-driven,  which  is  to  be  doubted.  The 
only  advantage  secured  appears  to  be  increased 
mobility  over  the  horse-drawn  cannon;  the 
French  have  not  understood  how  to  combine 
greater  offensive  power  with  greater  mobility 
like  the  Germans. 

It  is  quite  curious  that  the  power  with  the 
numerically  strongest  army — to  wit:  Russia — 


82  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

should  be  least  efficient  in  army  automobiles. 
There  are  less  than  600  trucks  in  the  Empire. 
Orders  for  almost  double  this  number  have  been 
placed  abroad  recently,  chiefly  in  this  country, 
but  it  is  a  question  if  delivery  can  be  made  in 
time  to  make  the  cars  effective. 

The  combined  Austro-German  forces  possess 
the  strongest  and  best  equipped  automobile  war 
outfit  by  far.  The  Dual  Empire  has  1,400 
trucks  available  for  army  use  and  about  20,000 
passenger  cars  convertible  to  the  same  use. 
A  small  squad  of  motor  tractors  for  the  heavy 
Skoda  howitzers  and  light-arm  automobiles 
armed  with  rifles  and  machine  guns,  complete 
the  contingent.  Germany  has  not  only  fully 
15,000  convertible  passenger  cars,  but  quite  as 
many  delivery  vans  and  trucks,  besides  1,200 
subsidised  military  motor  vehicles  with  trailers. 
On  the  offensive  end,  Germany  went  to  war  with 
some  250  armoured  automobiles,  18  searchlight 
motors,  fully  10,000  motorcycles,  and  at  least 
500  motor-driven  field-guns,  not  counting  a 
squad  of  extraordinarily  powerful  motor  tract- 
ors for  the  transport  of  the  big  Krupp  42- 
centimetre  howitzers  in  the  field.  In  addition, 
there  are  several  squads  of  aeroplane  repair 


AUTOMOBILE  AKTILLERY  83 

automobiles  and  motors  with  powerful  search- 
lights for  use  in  night  attacks.  At  the  call  to 
war  the  government  commandeered  no  less  than 
60,000  passenger  cars.  A  number  of  these  were 
told  off  for  the  commanding  officers,  adjutants, 
orderlies,  etc.,  in  order  to  give  the  greatest 
possible  mobility  to  every  move  affecting  the 
disposition  of  the  army,  but  the  majority  of 
these  cars  were  used  to  move  troops  on  the 
firing-line  under  cover  of  night.  When  it  is  con- 
sidered that  it  requires  only  510  passenger  cars 
to  transport  a  German  regiment  on  a  war  foot- 
ing of  3,000  men,  and  that  an  entire  army  corps 
can  be  moved  at  an  average  rate  of  20  miles  per 
hour  at  night  with  a  fleet  of  7,140  motor  cars,  it 
will  be  understood  why  the  Germans  have  been 
able,  in  most  of  the  decisive  encounters,  to  out- 
number, or  at  least  equal,  a  numerically  superior 
enemy. 

French  vs.  Prussian  Cannon 

Many  have  asked  me  if  it  is  true  that  Ger- 
man guns  are  inferior  to  French  guns.  That 
such  a  detail  can  still  stick  in  American  minds 
shows  that  ' 'incidents' '  of  the  Balkan  wars,  as 


84  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

interpreted  over  British  cables,  are  likely  to 
yield  erroneous  impressions. 

Stripped  of  technical  phrase,  the  French  field 
cannon  is  more  of  a  gun  than  the  Prussian — the 
same  as  a  Swiss  watch  is  more  of  a  veritable 
timepiece  than  an  American  movement.  The 
latter  will  keep  time  just  as  unfailingly,  never- 
theless, and  it  will  stand  careless  handling  much 
better.  It  is  easier  to  repair  and  cheaper  to 
buy.  A  Krupp  field  cannon  has  parallel  char- 
acteristics. It  withstands  rough  usage  better 
than  the  French  Creusot  rifle.  The  powder 
employed  does  not  injure  the  rifling  so  rapidly 
under  continuous  fire;  it  does  not  get  out  of 
order  so  easily ;,  it  has  fewer  parts  and  is  so 
thoroughly  built  that  explosions  (at  least  offi- 
cially attested  to)  are  unheard  of. 

The  Creusot  rifle  is  a  piece  of  high  art  gun- 
making.  It  represents  generations  of  excellent 
craftsmanship  and  the  best  traditions  of  artil- 
lery practice.  It  is  the  quintessence  of  the 
armourer's  art  and  an  object  of  admiration  in 
all  technical  detail.  Properly  handled,  it  is 
doubtless  a  degree  superior  in  efficiency  to  the 
Prussian  piece — at  least  on  the  practice  range — 
but  an  artillery  artist  is  required  to  serve  it 


AUTOMOBILE  ARTILLERY  85 

properly.  In  the  heat  of  battle  this  does  not 
matter  so  long  as  there  are  enough  gun  artists 
to  go  around. 

In  the  hands  of  French  gunners,  the  Creusot 
is  the  finest  piece  of  shooting  mechanism  ever 
invented,  especially  the  75-millimetre  model, 
corresponding  to  a  3-inch  gun.  Operated  by 
French-trained  Bulgar  gunners  it  scored 
markedly  over  the  Krupp  pieces  poorly  served 
by  incompetent  Turkish  artillerymen. 

"When  the  smoke  of  this  world-war  clears 
away  I  dare  say  the  verdict  will  show  for  the 
Krupp  rifle,  as  handled  by  Prussian  gunners, 
quite  as  high  percentage  of  efficiency  as  the 
Creusot  piece  operated  by  native  artillerists. 


CHAPTER  in 
THE  SUBMARINE 

A  Submarine  Attack 

The  haze  of  early  dawn  broods  over  the  bight 
of  Helgoland.  A  pale  and  chilly  sunrise  peeks 
cautiously  over  the  Friesian  dunes  outlining 
the  crags  of  the  island  fortress  crested  with  can- 
non. Slowly  the  pale  beams  filter  through  the 
vaporous  curtain  lifting  a  cover  in  places  like 
a  "hausfrau"  making  up  her  bed.    . 

The  sea  sleeps  calm  and  frigid  like  a  great, 
undulating  jelly  sealed  under  a  blanket  of  haze. 
The  stillness  is  oppressive,  ominous. 

It  is  broken  at  intervals,  but  not  relieved,  by 
gruff,  muffled  thuds  from  the  inner  harbour — 
from  the  dim,  hidden  distance  of  warlike  mys- 
tery and  menace.  Were  it  not  for  the  portly, 
rubicund  buoys  that  gasp  and  cough  their  warn- 
ing notes,  swaying  lazily  in  the  tide,  one  would 
fancy  a  school  of  sea-lions  barking  a  salute  to 
the  sun. 

Beyond  the  cordon  of  buoys,  a  row  of  painted 
poles  sail  in  the  inlet  marking  the  channel  that 
is  loaded  with  anchor  mines.    The  poles  are 

86 


THE  SUBMARINE  87 

bobbing  gently  up  and  down  like  floats  in  some 
giant's  fishing  tackle. 

One  of  the  poles  seems  to  be  drifting  away 
from  the  line.  It  is  of  a  dark-gray  colour. 
Curiously  enough  it  moves  against  the  tide 
leaving  a  thin,  keen  wake  of  froth,  cmd  is  lost  to 
view  in  the  haze.  Faster  and  faster  the  pole 
travels;  sharper  and  sharper  waxes  the  wake. 

Under  the  runaway  pole,  hidden  safely  beloiv 
the  sleeping  surface,  stands  a  man  in  a  conning 
tower.  His  eye  is  glued  to  a  periscope.  To  the 
right  cmd  the  left  are  speaking-tubes,  dials, 
gauges  and  levers.  '  He  is  the  commander  of 
that  most  dreaded  of  all  naval  craft,  the  sub- 
marine, the  stiletto  of  the  high  seas. 

Except  for  the  intense  drone  of  the  electric 
motor  there  is  no  sound  within  the  steel  skin  of 
the  great  mechanical  fish.  There  is  no  splash- 
ing of  water  against  the  sides,  no  wave  motion, 
only  the  tremendous  pressure  of  the  ocean 
depths,  and  the  "crusher"  gauge  shows  it. 

The  chief  gunner  stands  in  the  torpedo 
breech,  in  the  prow,  clasping  the  central  hand- 
wheel.  A  fling  of  this  wheel  and  all  the  tor- 
pedoes dart  away  simultaneously.  Other  men 
stand  by  other  wheels  commanding  port  and 
starboard  torpedoes  for  single  shots.  The 
quartermaster  is  posted  at  the  wheel  control 
of  the  horizontal  rudders  intent  on  gauges  show- 
ing the  inclination  degree  and  depth  level  of 


88  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

the  craft.  His  movements  are  curbed  to  the 
fraction  of  an  inch;  he  works  as  carefully  and 
minutely  as  a  jeweller — cm  awkward  move  of 
the  ivheel  means  disaster  to  all  hands.  Shoulder 
to  shoulder  with  the  commander  is  the  helms- 
man,  his  eye  on  the  compass,  his  hand  on  the 
wheel  steering  the  vertical  rudder. 

Back  in  the  stern  is  the  chief  engineer  with 
his  assistants  standing  by  switches  and  levers, 
cocks  and  valves.  This  is  a  "split-second" 
crew,  ready  on  the  instant  to  stop  or  reverse  the 
motors,  to  disconnect  them  altogether  or  start 
the  gasoline  engines  in  place  of  them,  to  bloiv 
out  or  force  water  into  the  ballast  tanks,  to 
draw  oxygen  and  expel  carbonic  gases,  to  load 
storage  batteries,  to  tend  compressors,  to  watch 
pressures  in  pistons  and  chambers,  to  make 
quick  repairs  when  necessary — to  do  more  en- 
gineering and  do  it  efficiently,  in  the  smallest 
and  compactest  engine-room  ever  devised,  than 
was  ever  done  before. 

Conversation  is  forbidden.  Martial  disci- 
pline governs  every  action.  Speech  is  reduced 
to  words  spoken  in  the  performance  of  duty. 
The  electric  lights  are  so  arranged  that  the 
tools  and  appliances  needed  are  distinctly 
visible.  Everything  is  in  its  proper  place  from 
the  potash  cartridge  chamber  that  absorbs  the 
foul  air  to  the  refuse  ejector  that  blows  waste 
out  into  the  water.    At  the  ear  of  every  man  is 


THE  SUBMAKINE  89 

a  speaking  tube.  From  the  officer  in  the  turret 
comes  an  occasional  command — a  wheel  is 
turned,  a  lever  is  moved,  a  switch  is  thrown — 
and  the  big  mechanical  fish  continues  its  daring 
course,  gliding  through  hostile  depths  dotted 
with  floating  mines  and  ploughed  by  the  swift 
forefoot  of  a  hundred  cruisers  whose  smallest 
gun  could  send  the  dauntless  diver  to  the  bot- 
tom with  0  single  shot. 

Availing  itself  of  the  haze,  the  submarine 
ventures  to  the  surface  and  runs  awash  at  its 
cruising  speed  of  16  knots  until  the  British  coast 
heaves  in  sight,  when  the  course  is  laid  N.E.  At 
six  bells  in  the  afternoon*  the  lookout  at  the 
omniscope  signals  a  fleet  of  fishing  smacks  on 
the  port  bow.  The  helm  is  laid  down  cmd  the 
big  mechanical  fish  bears  down  upon  the  dowsed 
smacks.  The  haze  has  cleared.  On  the  fringe 
of  the  horizon  is  a  spot,  a  dark  spot  getting  ever 
darker  and  bigger.  With  his  binoculars  fixed 
in  the  periscope  the  officer  gleans  the  blurred 
outline  of  three  large  funnels  belching  black 
smoke. 

There  is  a  sharp  command.  The  gas  engine 
stops.  The  speaking  tubes  commence  to  rattle 
with  words  of  command — sharp,  precise,  stac- 
cato— answered  by  the  quick  ((Aye — aye,  sir," 
of  the  crew. 

The  commander  takes  an  observation,  the  dis- 
tance between  the  enemy  is  measured  mathe- 


90  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

matically,  the  course  is  laid  by  compass,  the 
rate  of  speed  is  timed  to  the  distance,  there  is  a 
rapid  inspection  of  all  gears — and  the  final  dive 
is  ordered. 

The  engine  tube  speaks.  At  once  the  electric 
motors  strike  up,  sending  the  craft  on  its  course. 
The  trimming  tank  tube  speaks,  and  hand- 
wheels  are  set  spinning  as  the  forward  tanks 
blow  their  ballast.  The  quartermaster  has  al- 
ready clasped  his  wheel.  The  tube  talks  and 
he  digs  in  with  a  gleam  in  his  eye.  The  dial 
of  the  inclinometre  shows  how  smartly  he  is 
pointing  the  craft  on  its  downward  dive.  The 
chief  gunner  is  at  his  post  in  the  torpedo  breech. 
Presently  his  tube  speaks.  He  spins  a  small 
wheel,  a  piston  snaps  with  a  hollow  thud,  and 
the  war-head  of  the  torpedo  chamber  clicks  into 
fighting  trim,  pointing  three  savage-looking  mis- 
siles at  the  enemy. 

And  thus  to  the  hum  of  throbbing  motors, 
punctuated  by  snapping  pistons,  speaking  tubes 
croaking  with  commands,  the  war-head  gleam- 
ing with  torpedoes  at  the  ready,  the  mechanical 
fish  plunges  through  the  foaming  brine  down- 
ward to  its  fighting  level  of  twenty  feet  below 
the  surface,  bearing  down  upon  an  enemy  it 
cannot  see  with  uncanny  precision, — relentless, 
irresistible.  Availing  itself  of  the  fishing  fleet 
as  a  screen,  the  submarine  is  able  to  take  one 
more  peek  over  the  surface  without  being  de- 


THE  SUBMARINE  91 

tected  by  the  enemy,  which  develops  to  he  a 
super-dreadnaught. 

The  experienced  eye  of  the  commander  ob- 
serves at  a  glance  that  he  shall  miss  his  target 
unless — the  emergency  command  rings  out: 
"Starboard  helm!  Forward  trim!"  The  sub- 
marine destroyer  swerves  from  its  course,  rising 
at  the  same  time  to  a  somewhat  higher  level.  By 
this  manoeuvre  her  commander  hopes  to  cut  the 
course  of  the  immeasurably  swifter  dread- 
naught,  and  intercept  her  before  she  can  pass — 
"Port  torpedo — ready!"  rings  the  tube.  A 
great,  monstrous  shadow  comes  bearing  down 
upon  the  little  craft.  With  incredible  swiftness 
it  approaches,  seeming  almost  to  draw  the  craft 
toward  it  with  the  suction  of  its  menacing  bot- 
tom. The  plunging  bilge  keels  are  visible  now. 
A  collision  means  death,  not  only  to  the  dread- 
naught,  but  to  the  destroyer  as  well.  Just  as 
the  great  armoured  ram  of  the  ponderous  hull, 
ripping  through  the  foam,  gaunt  and  grim  with 
barnacles,  seems  to  aim  a  deathblow  at  the 
little  craft,  the  main  tube  in  the  torpedo  breech 
screams:  "F-e-u-rrr!"  A  handwheel  spins,  pis- 
tons click  in  the  war-head,  there  is  a  hollow  pop 
as  of  a  huge  cork  being  pulled,  and  a  glittering 
torpedo,  charged  with  superheated  energy,  darts 
out,  cutting  the  brine  at  a  mile-a-minute  clip. 
Submarine  distance  is  always  deceptive;  the 
dreadnought  is  fully  a  cable  length  away. 


92  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

"Starboard  torpedo — ready — Fire!"  follows 
the  command.  But  before  the  second  missile 
can  cut  the  water  there  is  a  thunderous  explo- 
sion. The  whole  forefoot  of  the  huge  warship 
is  lifted  clean  out  of  the  water.  Before  its 
yawning  freeboard  is  buried  in  the  swirling 
foam,  the  second  torpedo  knocks  a  hole  amid- 
ships, exploding  her  magazines  with  the  roar 
of  an  erupting  volcano. 

The  huge  leviathan  of  armour-plate  and  giant 
gun,  fleet  as  a  scout,  strong  as  a  fort,  represent- 
ing twelve  million  dollars  in  the  mint  of  the 
realm,  and  nine  hundred  lives  in  human  flesh 
and  bone,  has  been  scrambled  into  a  horrible, 
tottering  wreck — steam  whistles  screaming  for 
help,  boilers  exploding  like  a  field  of  mines, 
flames  bursting  from  hatches,  masts  snapping 
in  two,  monster  cannon  rousing  their  turrets 
overboard,  the  crew  jammed  like  squealing  rats 
in  a  hundred  traps,  lashed  by  jets  of  scalding 
steam,  the  scuppers  oozing  blood  like  the  nos- 
trils of  a  wounded  bull.  In  short,  a  capital  ship, 
the  pride  of  the  proudest  navy,  has  been  van- 
quished by  a  small  marauding  craft,  looking 
very  like  a  mechanical  fish:  a  little  marine  toy, 
a  poor  skate  of  a  craft,  engineered  by  a  boat's 
load  of  dare-devils,  the  joke  of  naval  mess-rooms 
and  sometimes  derisively  referred  to  as  the 
"tin  sardine/9 


The  Submarine  Is  Vindicated 

If  you  had  laid  a  wager  on  August  5,  1914, 
that  it  should  be  possible  for  a  single  German 
submarine  to  send  to  the  bottom  three  British 
armoured  cruisers  of  12,000  tons  each,  scoring  a 
bulPs-eye  with  each  of  its  three  torpedo  tubes, 
and  escape  unhurt  and  intact,  you  would  not 
have  found  any  takers,  least  of  all  among  naval 
officers.  The  consensus  of  expert  opinion 
would  tend  to  show  that  whereas  a  lucky  shot 
might  bag  a  carelessly  manoeuvring  cruiser,  the 
accuracy  of  naval  gun-fire  is  such  that  the  sub- 
marine would  forfeit  its  existence  on  the  sec- 
ond, or,  at  all  events,  on  the  third  attempt. 

As  all  the  world  knows,  Lieutenant  Otto  Wed- 
digen,  commanding  the  "U  9"  of  the  German 
submarine  flotilla,  worked  his  way  through  hos- 
tile mine  fields  and  actually  accomplished  the 
"impossible.' i  '  The  attempt  of  the  British 
Admiralty  to  minimise  this  most  brilliant  and 
daring  raid  by  explaining  that  the  cruisers  tor- 
pedoed were  "obsolete  and  of  secondary  im- 

i     93 


94  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

portance"  is  a  bit  silly  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  same  Admiralty  took  occasion  to  plume  it- 
self on  the  " victory"  of' the  English  squadron 
in  the  engagement  of  Helgoland  Bight  when 
three  German  scout  cruisers  of  one-fourth  less 
tonnage  and  one-half  the  weight  of  armament 
carried  by  the  "obsolete"  British  cruisers  were 
defeated  by  an  overwhelming  force  including 
battle  cruisers ! 

Another  German  submarine  slipped  through 
the  deadly  British  mine  fields  at  Deal,  daring 
the  naval  blockade  of  the  combined  Franco- 
British  fleets,  and  boldly  navigated  up  to  within 
a  mile  of  the  English  coast,  where  it  torpe- 
doed and  sunk  the  mine-sweeper  Niger.  That, 
also,  was  "impossible" — before  it  was  made 
possible ! 

A  third  German  submarine  boldly  attacked  a 
squadron  of  three  English  scout  cruisers,  the 
Theseus,  Gibraltar  and  Hawke,  which  she  is 
reported  to  have  located  far  awayv  from  its  base 
and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Scottish  coast. 
In  this  case,  the  submarine  succeeded  in  sinking 
the  Hawke,  an  armoured  vessel  of  7,350  tons,  and 
while  her  sister-ships  escaped,  they  failed  to  cap- 
ture or  even  damage  the  little  German  raider. 


THE  SUBMARINE  95 

The  Pathfinder,  a  fast  scout  cruiser  of  about 
3,000  tons,  was  also  torpedoed.  The  super- 
dreadnaught,  the  Audacious,  of  23,000  tons,  lay 
on  the  bottom  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean  for  more 
than  two  weeks  before  the  British  Admiralty 
announced  the  loss  as  an  accident  caused  by  a 
drifting  mine.  Before  this  book  can  appear, 
perhaps  the  mystery  of  this  " accident"  will  be 
unravelled. 

By  hook  or  crook,  the  British  Government 
has  tried  to  make  it  appear  that  the  losses  in- 
flicted upon  its  fleet  by  submarines  are  incon- 
siderable, but  the  fact  remains  that  German 
submarines,  handled  by  expert  crews  and  offi- 
cers, are  doing  the  lion's  share  of  the  fighting 
against  overpowering  odds  not  only  in  war 
vessels  but  also  in  the  submarine  flotillas  of  the 
Franco-British  fleets.  No  amount  of  censorial 
"doctoring"  and  official  paraphrasing  will  les- 
sen the  weight  of  the  fifty-thousand  tons'  argu- 
ment in  sunken  British  cruisers  on  the  bottom 
of  the  sea;  and  no  further  attempts  to  explain 
away  the  successes  of  German  submarines  as 
accidental  will  avail  to  blind  even  the  laity  to 
the  fact  that  the  submarine  has  ceased  to  be  a 
mere  harbour  defence  auxiliary  and  has  become 


96  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

a  most  formidable  weapon  of  attack,  compara- 
ble to  that  of  the  capital  ship. 


Ignoring  "Tin  Sardine" 

A  decade  ago,  the  submarine  was  practically 
ignored  by  naval  men.  Its  limited  range,  slow 
rate  of  speed,  and  poor  sea-going  qualities  made 
the  "tin  sardine"  an  object  of  ridicule  in  mess- 
rooms.  It  was  relegated  to  the  rear  as  being 
of  probable  moral,  but  not  much  practical,  use 
in  assisting  the  defence  of  harbours  and  land 
fortifications.  But  the  "tin  sardine"  is  grown 
up  now.  Germany  has  at  least  a  dozen 
fine,  husky  specimens,  averaging  over  800  tons 
with  a  tactical  speed  of  10  knots  when  sub- 
merged, a  strategical  speed  on  the  surface  of  no 
less  than  17  knots,  and  a  cruising  radius  of 
upward  of  3,300  miles.  If  the  crew  could  hold 
out  it  should  be  possible  to  send  a  shoal  of 
such  "tin  sardines"  across  the  Atlantic,  but 
whereas  a  decade  ago  man  was  stronger  than 
the  machine  in  a  submarine  the  opposite  is  now 
a  fact:  the  machine  commands  the  man.  Not 
only  can  the  modern  type  of  submarine  hide 
on  the  bottom  of  the  sea  down  to  200  feet  when- 


THE  SUBMARINE  97 

ever  necessary,  and  successfully  withstand  the 
enormous  pressure  at  this  depth  for  twenty- 
four  hours,  but  it  can  avail  itself  of  the  air  in  its 
oxylithe  chambers  for  breathing  purposes  and 
continue  to  stay  below  for  several  days  and 
nights.  It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  how  far 
the  submarine  can  go  on  a  cruise,  but  how  long 
the  crew  can  stick  it  out.  The  capacity  of  the 
petrol  tank  is  far  greater  than  the  lung  capacity 
of  the  crew.  In  surface  cruising,  when  the 
vessel  can  speed  along  without  being  compelled 
to  dive  for  protection  against  gun-fire,  trips  of 
upward  of  fifteen  hundred  miles  have  been  ac- 
complished by  a  number  of  German  submarines 
seen  off  the  Scottish  and  Norwegian  coasts  in 
this  war.  This  is  hard  service,  however,  as  the 
watch  on  deck  is  drenched  to  the  skin  even  in 
tolerably  fair  weather,  and  there  are  no  means 
of  drying  clothes.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ac- 
commodations of  the  modern  submarine  in  re- 
gard to  cooking,  washing,  garbage,  etc.,  show 
great  practical  improvement. 

The  last  decade  has  been  a  struggle  for  speed, 
principally.  While  the  British  "A,"  "B"  and 
"C"  types  of  craft,  laid  down  in  1901-04,  had 
a  surface  radius  of  500  to  1,800  miles,  and  a 


98  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

submerged  endurance  of  3  to  4.05  hours  at  full 
speed,  the  "D"s  and  "E"s  constructed  in 
1910-13  have  3,000  to  4,000  miles'  surface  radius 
and  5  to  7  hours'  full  speed  submerged  endu- 
rance. The  latest  "E"s  have  three  periscopes 
for  scouting  the  entire  arc  of  the  surface,  and 
are  so  powerful  that  they  can  cruise  from  Yar- 
mouth to  Gibraltar,  fight  an  action  there  and 
return  to  Yarmouth  without  drawing  on  any 
vessel  or  base  on  the  way.  These  boats  carry 
no  less  than  six  long-distance  Whitehead  torpe- 
does, weighing  1,300  pounds  each,  with  an  initial 
speed  of  a-mile-a-minute  and  an  explosive 
charge  of  200  pounds  of  wet  gun-cotton.  It  is 
quite  strange  that  the  British  have  not  been 
able  to  deliver  a  single  blow  with  "E"  boats,  at 
this  writing,  for  not  only  in  range  and  power 
and  number  of  torpedoes  are  they  superior  to 
the  German  "U"  class,  but,  technically  at  least, 
the  English  boats  are  speedier  and  more  formi- 
dable. The  conning  tower  of  the  latter  is  pro- 
tected by  a  4-inch  armour  plate  as  a  protection 
against  the  rapid  artillery  of  destroyers,  and 
disappearing  12-pounder  quick-firers  are  car- 
ried for  attacking  seaplanes. 

Of  course,  the  submarine  is  preeminently  the 


THE  SUBMARINE  99 

weapon  of  the  weaker  naval  power.  With  the 
continued  naval  pressure  of  the  combined 
French-British  fleets  operating  against  her 
North  Sea  coast  in  overwhelming  force,  Ger- 
many had  no  other  alternative  but  the  defensive. 
To  her  credit  it  must  be  observed,  however, 
that  she  has  managed  to  turn  her  defensive  into 
bold  offensive  coups  at  times  by  means  of  sub- 
marine attacks.  She  has  used  this  alternative 
chiefly  because  it  is  the  only  one  available  with 
any  degree  of  success  in  fighting  a  heavy  block- 
ade. As  the  only  practical  protection  for  scout 
ships  against  submarines  is  frequent  change 
of  course  under  good  speed,  backed  by  eternal 
vigilance,  it  was  natural  and  logical  that  Ger- 
many should  seek  to  harass  the  movements  of 
scouts  by  setting  out  mines  as  she  did.  Having 
thus  availed  herself  of  the  menacing  danger 
of  the  anchored  and  the  floating  type  of  sub- 
marine mine,  Germany  lost  no  time  in  hurling 
her  submarine  boats  against  the  blockading 
fleet.  By  these  tactics  she  placed  the  enemy  in 
the  not  enviable  position  of  being  compelled  to 
move  on  for  fear  of  getting  speared  by  the  tor- 
pedo of  the  submarine,  and  at  the  same  time 
being  required  to  go  slow  for  fear  of  colliding 


100  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

with  a  contact  mine!  No  one  not  personally 
acquainted  with  naval  routine  can  appreciate 
the  strain  on  the  vigilance  and  resource  of  fleet 
crews  when  perplexing  conditions  such  as  these 
are  imposed  with  never-flagging  severity  week 
after  week,  month  after  month.  It  speaks 
volumes  for  the  discipline  of  the  British  Navy 
that  its  losses  were  not  larger  during  this  period, 
when  the  demoralising  factors  must  have  been 
appalling. 

The  naval  strategy  plotted  by  the  German 
Admiralty  has  worked  out  remarkably  well.  To 
attack  by  submarine  chiefly  and  prevent  the 
enemy  from  using  his  submarines  in  reprisal — 
this  seems  to  have  been  the  plan,  at  least, 
the  preliminary  phase.  Hence,  the  German 
fleet  was  ordered  to  its  naval  bases  on  the 
North  Sea  there  to  remain  under  the  additional 
protection  of  the  coastal  forts.  Screens  of 
heavy  steel-wire  mesh  were  anchored  across  the 
egress  to  every  base,  and  immediately  behind 
the  scouting  line  mine  fields  of  the  contact  type 
were  planted.  Mine-laying  craft  were  deployed 
to  load  the  waters  beyond  the  scouting  lines 
with  floating  mines.  In  other  words,  a  British 
submarine  advancing  to  attack  the  German  fleet 


THE  SUBMARINE  101 

would  encounter — first  a  danger  zone  of  drift- 
ing mines,  any  one  of  which  would  send  her  to 
kingdom-come  by  contact,  and  secondly  she 
would  face  gun-fire  by  destroyers  and  scout 
cruisers.  Granting  that  she  might,  perchance, 
discover  an  opening  and  slip  through  the  scout 
lines,  she  would  certainly  run  into  the  anchored 
mine  field  or  the  steel- wire  screen  studded  with 
mines,  which  shield  the  German  ships  of  the 
line  in  the  roadsteads  against  sanguinary  ex- 
ploits of  this  kind.  When  a  fleet  has  thus  pro- 
tected itself  against  submarine  as  well  as  tor- 
pedo-boat attack  it  is  next  to  impossible  for  a 
blockading  fleet,  no  matter  how;  superior,  to 
force  it  into  action,  to  dig  it  out.  Against  the 
chief  advantage  of  the  blockader,  which  is  keep- 
ing the  hostile  fleet  bottled  up,  the  defender  has 
the  not  undesirable  privilege  of  choosing  his 
time  and  place  for  action.  The  German  admiral 
can  order  a  submarine  attack  on  certain  British 
vessels,  and  he  has  done  so — but  the  British 
admiral  cannot  order  a  similar  attack,  and  he 
has  not  done  so.  The  North  Sea  has  been  open 
to  German  submarines  because  there  was  always 
a  chance  of  their  finding  a  quarry  some  time. 
The  English  submarines  have  had  nothing  to 


102  WAR'S  tfEW  WEAPONS 

hunt  except  mines,  which  they  are  supposed  to 
dodge,  and  destroyers,  which  are  usually  too 
speedy  to  lend  themselves  as  likely  targets. 

Even  under  favourable  circumstances  it  is  by 
no  means  an  easy  matter  to  drive  a  torpedo  into 
the  bowels  of  a  moving  war  vessel.  A  ruse  is 
sometimes  needed.  It  appears  that  Lieutenant 
Weddigen,  in  attacking  the  Aboukir,  laid  a 
trap  for  that  ship  by  getting  behind  some  fishing 
smacks  that  were  apparently  laying  mines.  As 
the  Aboukir  bore  down  on  the  smacks,  fol- 
lowed by  her  two  sisters,  the  "U  9"  dove  and 
launched  a  21-inch  calibre  torpedo  into  her,  re- 
peating the  manoeuvre  until  all  three  ships  were 
on  their  beam-ends  and  sinking. 

How  It  Works 

So  long  as  newspapers  persist  in  describing 
Zeppelins  and  submarines  alike  as  "cigar- 
shaped,"  I  am  really  at  a  loss  to  know  how  a 
real  submarine  looms  in  the  mind  of  the  layman. 
At  the  outmost  it  could  resemble  only  a  very 
bad  cigar.  The  main  changes  in  the  outward 
contours  are  a  tendency  toward  longer  lines  and 
increased  sea-going  features.    More  than  ever 


THE  SUBMARINE  103 

before  is  care  observed  in  the  riveting  of  the 
various  seams,  and  the  latest  boats  show  notable 
improvements  in  speed,  size  and  cruising 
qualities. 

The  manner  in  which  a  submarine  is  operated 
is  very  interesting,  but  the  work  of  describing 
the  operation  in  plain  language  is  a  cruel  test 
of  human  patience.  Briefly,  then,  the  sub- 
marine has  a  sort  of  dual  existence.  When  the 
boat  is  awash  and  under  cruising  speed  it  is 
operated  by  its  gasoline  engine  quite  like  a 
motor  boat.  While  thus  cruising  about  the  boat 
is  under  what  is  called  its  "strategical"  speed 
because  it  is  moving  from  its  base  to  a  place 
selected  for  an  attack.  When  the  boat  arrives 
at  this  place  and  dives,  it  is  operated  during  the 
period  of  submergence  by  electric  motors,  and 
the  steering,  pumping,  handling  and  loading  and 
firing  torpedoes  is  done  pneumatically  and  elec- 
trically. A  motor  boat  on  the  surface,  an  elec- 
tric diving-boat  under  the  surface — I  wonder  if 
this  explains  anything?  While  running  sub- 
merged the  boat  is  considered  as  being  under 
its  "tactical"  speed  because,  having  arrived  at 
the  point  determined  by  its  strategic  voyage,  it 
moves  on  its  target  and  completes  the  assault. 


104  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

The  gasoline  as  well  as  the  electrical  engines 
are  marvels  of  compactness  and  efficiency.  The 
gas  engine  may  drive  propellers  directly — 
and  it  always  does  when  the  boat  is  awash  and 
cruising — or  it  may  be  disconnected  and  drive 
a  motor  as  a  dynamo,  which  in  turn  generates 
electricity  for  charging  the  storage  battery. 
With  batteries  thus  charged  the  boat  can  dive 
and  the  electric  motor,  drawing  upon  the  power 
thus  stored  up  in  the  batteries,  will  drive  the 
propellers  and  do  all  necessary  work  while  the 
boat  is  running  submerged. 

The  gas  engine  may  also  be  used  for  driving 
an  air  compressor,  and  the  power  thus  stored 
is  made  available  for  bailing  out  the  ballast 
tanks,  for  driving  the  bilge  pumps,  or  for  eject- 
ing torpedoes  while  submerged.  On  the  tail 
shafts  running  to  the  propellers  are  several 
clutches  for  effecting  these  changes. 

When  the  ballast  tanks  are  empty  a  sub- 
marine boat  usually  weighs  about  twenty  per 
cent,  less  than  an  equal  volume  of  water.  The 
boat  may  be  made  to  float  high  or  low  by  adjust- 
ing the  amount  of  water  in  the  ballast  tanks. 
This  is  called  "trimming."  There  are  so-called 
"trimming  tanks"  both  in  the  bow  and  in  the 


THE  SUBMAEINE  105 

stern.  Unless  the  boat  is  properly  trimmed  it 
is  likely  to  turn  turtle  when  advancing  under 
speed.  Sometimes  it  is  expedient  that  the  boat 
should  be  brought  to  a  full  stop  when  submerged 
and  float  motionless  at  any  predetermined 
depth.  An  "adjustment"  tank  is  available  for 
this  manoeuvre. 

The  steering  below  the  surface  is  done  by 
horizontal  and  vertical  rudders.  The  surface 
navigation  is  by  compass,  chart  and  sextant. 
The  latest  boats  have  two  periscopes,  one  for 
the  helmsman  looking  straight  ahead,  and  one 
for  the  commander,  giving  a  zonal  view  all 
around  with  binocular  enlargement  when  de- 
sired. 

The  angle  of  diving  and  rising  is  automatic- 
ally controlled.  A  so-called  "crusher"  gauge 
prevents  the  submergence  of  the  vessel  to  depths 
where  the  pressure  of  the  water  would  endanger 
its  structural  safety.  A  "depth"  gauge  shows 
distance  below  surface  while  submerged.  Other 
gauges  and  dials  indicate  the  vessel's  speed,  the 
amount  of  fuel  oil  carried,  the  stored  electricity 
on  hand  for  submergence  runs,  the  reserve  com- 
pressed air  for  breathing  and  for  launching  tor- 
pedoes, the  temperature,  water  on  hand  in  bal- 


106  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

last  tanks,  etc.  Everything  is  "dialled,"  every- 
thing is  gauged.  Turn  a  handwheel,  pull  a 
switch,  throw  a  lever :  these  are  the  operating 
motions.    There  are  none  other. 

In  a  boat  carrying  three  torpedo  tubes  a  crew 
of  only  five  men  working  in  unison  can  operate 
the  craft  during  submergence.  First  man  is  at 
a  handwheel  controlling  horizontal  or  diving 
rudder.  His  eyes  are  glued  to  a  gauge  show- 
ing degree  of  submersion  and  an  inclinometre 
for  maintaining  an  even  keel.  Second  man 
operates  the  vertical  helm  from  the  conning 
tower,  steering  by  compass.  Third  man  is  an 
engineer  in  control  of  the  electric  motors  in  the 
stern  of  boat.  Fourth  man  stands  by  the  cen- 
tral handwheel  at  the  torpedo  breeches  in  the 
bow  of  the  boat.  Fifth  man  is  the  commander 
in  the  conning  tower.  He  signals  the  men  with 
speaking  tubes.  The  fourth  man's  job  is  to  spin 
the  central  handwheel  till  the  bow-cap  at  the  end 
of  the  revolving  axis  is  slid  forward  a  bit,  when 
it  is  revolved  until  the  two  holes  in  the  bow-cap 
disclose  a  torpedo  behind  each.  When  closed 
the  bow-cap  is  in  reality  the  bow  of  the  boat, 
but  the  cap  is  necessary  to  prevent  the  egress 
of  water  into  the  torpedo  tubes.    Each  torpedo 


THE  SUBMARINE  107 

has  a  breech  with  a  handwheel.  The  fourth  man 
fires  them  on  signal  by  spinning  the  handwheel, 
which  releases  the  pressure  in  the  pneumatic 
compressor,  and  out  flies  the  torpedo  at  a  mile- 
a-minute  clip. 

Most  boats  can  dive  within  the  three-minute 
limit.  Only  a  man  with  quartermaster's  experi- 
ence should  be  intrusted  with  the  horizontal 
rudders,  as  too  much  helm  when  the  vessel  is 
plunging  may  capsise  it.  Running  at  10  knots 
submerged,  the  maximum  speed,  only  5  degrees 
of  horizontal  helm  is  required  to  complete  a 
plunge  to  the  20-foot  war  level  at  an  inclina- 
tion of  Sy2  degrees. 

There  is  no  vibration  in  a  boat  running  sub- 
merged. And  there  is  no  noise  except  for  the 
hum  of  the  motors  relieved  by  the  speaking-tube 
commands.  The  ventilation  is  not  much  worse 
than  that  of  the  New  York  subway,  but  better 
care  is  exercised  in  renewing  it.  Steel  flasks 
with  compressed  air  or  oxylithe  supply  new 
air  while  the  carbonic  acid  gas  of  the  respired 
air  is  chemically  absorbed.  Food  is  cooked  for 
the  crew  on  a  handy  little  electric  stove.  Drink- 
ing water  is  on  tap  in  large  steel  flasks.  There 
are  pneumatic  pressure  exhausts  for  garbage, 


108  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

refuse,  etc.  Meals  are  served  on  trestle  tables 
amidships.  Hammocks  are  slung  under  the 
deck  for  the  crew  and  only  the  officer  has  a 
berth — collapsible.  And,  to  complete  the  tech- 
nical roster,  no  white  mice  are  carried  any 
longer  to  detect  gasoline  leaks  aboardship! 

Attack  and  Defence 

Submarine  does  not  fight  submarine  for 
obvious  reasons,  and  as  the  only  effective 
weapon  against  it  is  the  naval  gun,  the  methods 
of  protection  devised  naturally  assume  the  char- 
acter of  a  tactical  defensive.  The  attack  is  al- 
ways launched  by  the  submarine.  There  is  no 
single  instance  in  this  war  of  a  naval  vessel 
having  ferreted  out  a  submarine,  giving  chase 
and  sinking  it.  Destroyers  and  light  scouts 
have  happened  upon  submarine  craft  in  thick 
weather,  but  such  encounters  have  been  mostly 
accidental  and  not  the  result  of  a  plotted  chase. 
The  tactical  defensive  of  naval  vessels,  then, 
consists  in  a  combination  of  preventive  meas- 
ures. The  best  protection  for  vessels  on  block- 
ade patrol  seems  to  be  a  good  rate  of  cruising 
speed  with  frequent  alteration  of  the  course. 


THE  SUBMAEINE  109 

Vessels  thus  deployed  under  steam  should  al- 
ways be  convoyed  on  either  board  by  flotillas  of 
destroyers.  The  great  mobility  of  the  mosquito 
craft  enables  them  to  attack  quickly  under  full 
speed  and  focus  their  rapid  artillery  on  any 
rising  submarine  and  also,  if  the  distance  is  not 
too  great,  to  ram  the  same.  A  fleet  at  anchor, 
however,  must  rely  on  carefully  set  mine  fields^ 
steel-net  obstacles,  and,  in  the  last  instance,  on 
liberal  subdivision  of  the  hulls  in  watertight 
compartments.  Some  of  the  latest  dread- 
naughts  are  furnished  with  extra  internal  ar- 
mour as  a  protection  to  its  vital  parts  against 
torpedo  attack,  especially  the  projectile  maga- 
zines. The  belief  has  been  expressed  by  some 
naval  writers  that  thorough  subdivision  of  the 
hull  would  have  saved  the  three  ships  of  the 
Aboukir  class  from  foundering,  but  the  fate  of 
the  Audacious,  which  was  minutely  divided  by 
more  than  five  hundred  compartments  below  the 
armour  belt,  does  not  provide  a  good  argument 
for  the  subdivision  plan,  irrespective  as  to 
whether  a  mine  or  a  torpedo  sent  her  to  the  bot- 
tom. Personally,  I  am  inclined  to  think  that 
a  combination  of  destroyer  with  seaplane  scout- 
ing will  be  found  to  be  extraordinarily  effective 


110  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

before  the  signal  " cease  firing"  flaunts  over  the 
North  Sea.  For  detecting  submarines  there  is 
no  agent  that  can  compare  in  efficiency  with  the 
seaplane,  and  the  destroyer  is  the  best  weapon 
of  attack  against  them.  The  records  of  naval 
aviators  show  that  submarines  running  sub- 
merged can  be  spotted  by  air  scouts  from  altitudes 
ranging  upward  to  1,800  feet,  that  is,  when  the 
atmosphere  is  calm  and  clear.  In  rough  weather 
the  scouting  must  be  done  close-in  to  a  couple 
of  hundred  feet  over  the  surface,  but  even  under 
this  handicap  the  scouting  of  the  seaplane  will 
be  more  exact  and  thorough  than  that  of  any 
other  known  agent,  and  the  destroyer  is  more 
readily  available  to  take  prompt  advantage  of 
the  successful  spotting  by  the  seaplane. 

Operations  in  the  North  Sea  have  shown  that 
the  chances  of  a  destroyer  getting  close  enough 
to  drive  home  its  ram  in  a  submarine  are  better 
than  naval  critics  expected.  In  fact,  owing  to 
its  thin  skin  of  soft  iron  the  submarine  is  the 
most  vulnerable  of  all  naval  craft;  the  slightest 
touch  of  a  speeding  destroyer  is  quite  certain  to 
open  a  seam  or  rip  a  hole  in  the  hull.  The 
multi-periscope  craft  ought  also  to  provide  a 
fairly  good  target  for  the  rapid  artillery  of 


THE  SUBMARINE  111 

the  destroyers  even  when  running  submerged 
with  the  eye-pieces  awash.  Two  or  three  peri- 
scopes cutting  across  the  surface  over  a  single 
submarine  could  easily  be  put  under  zonal  fire 
by  the  destroyers  when  a  loss  of  one  or  all  of 
the  periscopes  would  be  a  practical  certainty. 
Bereft  of  its  tactical  "eye"  the  submarine 
would  not  be  able  to  manoeuvre  for  an  attack. 

The  Automobile  Torpedo 

Hand  in  hand  with  the  development  of  the 
submarine  boat  has  gone  the  improvement  of 
the  automobile  torpedo — its  only  weapon  of 
attack.  It  is  not  generally  realised  that  the 
kind  of  torpedo  used  in  the  Eusso-Japanese 
engagements  of  1904  is  little  more  than  a  toy 
compared  to  the  torpedo  of  1914.  What  was 
gun  range  then  for  battleships  is  torpedo  range 
now.  A  decade  of  constructive  experimenting 
has  evolved  a  marine  weapon  that  will  rip 
through  six  miles  of  water  at  a  40-knot  pace 
and  knock  down  a  super-dreadnaught !  To  be 
sure  this  is  the  extreme  performance,  but  it  has 
been  done  dozens  of  times  in  practice  tests  and 
it  will  doubtless  be  done  in  actual  battle  if  this 


112  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

war  demands  it.  At  any  rate,  the  "safety" 
battle  distance  of  modern  naval  tactics  has  been 
raised  to  five  miles,  and  it  is  the  automobile 
torpedo  that  has  raised  it  rather  than  the  naval 
gun.  Five  miles'  battle  distance  means  that 
vessels  engaging  in  combat  are  warned  not  to 
venture  inside  the  five-mile  zone,  as  by  so  doing 
they  expose  themselves  to  the  long-distance  tor- 
pedoes carried  by  cruisers  and  battleships. 
This  in  turn  means  that  the  naval  artillery 
must  do  its  main  effective  work  before  the  ves- 
sels approach  the  five-mile  limit.  Between  the 
ten-mile  and  the  five-mile  ranges  the  naval  gun 
has  the  decision.  As  long-distance  torpedoes 
are  not  generally  carried  by  submarines,  the  lat- 
ter will  probably  not  be  employed  in  a  running 
battle  action  between  ships  of  the  line  except 
under  extraordinary  conditions. 

The  much-abused  term  "cigar-shaped"  may 
be  applied  with  perfect  propriety  to  the  con- 
tours of  the  automobile  torpedo.  The  internal 
mechanism,  which  was  kept  a  close  secret  for 
so  many  years,  presents  one  of  the  most  in- 
genious methods  of  adapting  a  self-regulating 
steering  gear  to  a  self-propelled,  high-speed 
submarine  weapon  as  yet  invented  by  the  mind 


THE  SUBMARINE  113 

of  man.  Plainly  speaking,  then,  the  bow  sec- 
tion of  the  torpedo — usually  called  the  war- 
head— is  charged  with  upward  of  250  pounds 
of  gun-cotton  and  fulminate  of  mercury. 
Through  the  longitudinal  centre  of  this  charge 
runs  a  tube  loaded  with  the  detonating  ex- 
plosive. This  tube  has  a  plunger  point  at  the 
extreme  front  end,  which  protrudes  beyond  the 
war-head  and  strikes  the  target  first.  The 
plunger  acting  on  the  detonating  charge  in  the 
tube  explodes  the  war-head.  The  section  fol- 
lowing is  a  steel  chamber  loaded  with  com- 
pressed air,  which  is  used  as  motive  power  for 
the  machinery  in  the  adjacent  " secret' '  cham- 
ber. This  machinery  not  only  drives  the  pro- 
pellers by  means  of  a  turbine  engine,  but  regu- 
lates the  horizontal  and  vertical  rudders  with 
quite  an  amazing  degree  of  automatic  precision. 
The  controlling  mechanism  in  the  secret  cham- 
ber is  so  exact  that  as  soon  as  the  torpedo  is 
launched  the  horizontal  rudders  operate  so  as 
to  maintain  the  missile  at  the  prescribed  depth 
of  15  feet  below  water,  while  the  vertical  rud- 
der keeps  it  pointed  toward  the  target.  Simul- 
taneously a  small  hydrostatic  chamber  opens 
and  absorbs  enough  water  through  its  perfora- 


y 


114  WAB'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

tions  to  maintain  a  steady  course  and, even  keel 
for  the  flying  missile.  The  twin  propellers  are 
mounted  on  the  same  axis  and  are  made  to 
counter-rotate  in  order  to  prevent  swerving 
from  the  course. 

By  Gyroscope  and  Superheat 

The  most  interesting  and  valuable  improve- 
ments in  torpedo  construction,  however,  centre 
around  the  introduction  of  the  gyroscopic  gear 
and  the  ignition  superheating  of  the  compressed 
air.  The  gyroscope  was  adapted  to  torpedo  re- 
quirements because  it  was  found  that  occasion- 
ally a  torpedo  would  balk  and  act  "  mysteri- 
ously" for  no  ascertainable  reason;  in  some 
cases  it  would  suddenly  fly  from  its  course  in 
a  wide  circle  and  dart  back  at  the  vessel  firing 
it.  The  latest  type  of  gyroscope  gear  is  elec- 
trically driven  and  is  connected  up  with  the 
rudders  to  such  an  accurate  degree  of  mechani- 
cal nicety  that  it  is  feasible  now  to  launch  a 
torpedo  from  the  starboard  tube  against  an 
enemy  approaching  on  the  port  bow,  or,  as  a 
newspaper  man  would  say,  to  "  shoot  around 
corners/ '    A  gyroscopieally  controlled  torpedo 


THE  SUBMAKINE  115 

when  fired  broadside  from  starboard  can  be 
made  to  sweep  through  an  angle  of  45  degrees 
around  the  prow  of  the  launching  vessel,  con- 
tinue the  arc  for  an  equal  number  of  degrees  on 
the  port  side  of  the  prow,  and  speed  straight 
ahead  for  a  target  several  miles  distant.  To 
recapitulate,  a  cruiser  with  a  main  battery  of 
6-inch  rifles  could  venture  to  attack  one  having 
8-inch  rifles  by  speeding  in  beyond  the  five-mile 
limit  and  launching  its  torpedoes  under  gun- 
fire. While  firing  salvos  of  6-inch  projectiles 
over  the  port  side,  the  cruiser  fitted  with 
gyroscope  torpedoes  could  launch  these  over  the 
starboard  side,  and  a  single  hit  of  such  a  missile 
wrould  be  more  disastrous,  in  most  cases,  to  the 
heavier  cruiser  than  the  effect  of  its  heavier 
gun-fire  on  the  light  cruiser. 

The  superheating  of  the  compressed  air 
causes  it  to  expand  and  increase  in  propulsive 
capacity.  Before  this  discovery  was  made  and 
applied,  the  temperature  of  the  compressed  air, 
owing  to  gradual  escape  in  feeding  the  motor, 
would  frequently  fall  below  zero,  when  the  re- 
maining air  charge  would  fail  to  expel  itself 
with  force  sufficient  to  be  effective.  The  low 
temperature  would  cause  the  lubricants  and  the 


116  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

exhaust  to  clog,  and  put  an  insuperable  limit  to 
the  effective  range  of  the  weapon.  Of  the  two 
hundred  pounds  of  compressed  air  stored  in 
the  chamber,  little  more  than  150  pounds  could 
be  made  available  for  use;  the  rest  was  dead 
weight.  There  are  several  methods  of  super- 
heating, but  the  ignition  plan  appears  to  be  the 
simplest  and  most  effective.  It  consists  of  a 
mechanism  which  ignites  an  alcohol  flame  in  the 
air  chamber  at  a  point  when  something  like  half 
the  distance  has  been  negotiated  by  the  torpedo. 
The  air  remaining  expands.  The  high  speed 
attained  up  to  this  point  is  thus  maintained  to 
the  end.  The  range  is  considerably  increased. 
It  is  largely  through  the  successful  application 
of  superheating  that  torpedo  speeds  have  been 
increased  from  30  to  50  per  cent,  during  the  last 
few  years.  Whereas  formerly  the  extreme 
speed  attainable  at  1,000  yards  was  35  knots 
with  a  21-inch  torpedo,  the  same  weapon  will 
travel  at  a  rate  of  44  knots  with  ignition  super- 
heater. 

The  Submarine  Mine 

The  submarine  mine  caused  great  damage  in 
the  Russo-Japanese  engagements,  and  is  keep- 


THE  SUBMARINE  117 

ing  up  its  record  of  destructiveness  in  the  pres- 
ent war.  It  is  difficult  to  say  which  of  the  two 
kinds — the  anchored  or  the  floating  mine — is  the 
more  dangerous,  but  the  trouble  seems  to  be 
that  they  are  not  dangerous  to  the  enemy  only. 
The  loss  of  the  Speedy  and  the  Amphion  to  the 
British,  and  the  loss  of  the  Yorck  to  the  Ger- 
mans, are  significant  instances  of  the  almost 
prohibitive  danger  involved  in  the  planting  and 
maintaining  of  mine  areas. 

The  floating  mine  is  provided  with  a  trigger- 
handle.  As  soon  as  this  handle  jostles  against 
the  hull  of  a  ship  the  detonating  charge  acts  on 
the  explosive  loaded  in  the  mine  and  the  blast 
follows.  To  make  this  operation  more  certain, 
mines  are  frequently  anchored  in  pairs,  that  is, 
two  mines  are  connected  by  a  light  steel  cable, 
supported  by  floats,  each  mine  being  anchored 
besides,  of  course.  As  the  ship  touches  the 
cable  and  advances  with  it  on  its  prow,  the 
mines  attached  to  the  extremities  of  the  cable 
are  forced  against  the  vessel,  one  on  either  side, 
and  a  double  explosion  is  the  result.  The  usual 
depth  at  which  the  anchor  mine  is  planted  is 
fifteen  feet  below  the  surface.  Heavily  mined 
areas  have  series  of  anchor  mines  for  depths 


j 


118  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

scaling  down  to  twenty-five  and  even  thirty  feet, 
one  tier  of  mines  above  the  other. 

The  naval  operation  known  as  mine  sweeping 
is  not  a  popular  one  aboard  the  mosquito  flotilla. 
Two  destroyers  advance  to  the  field  dragging 
a  length  of  light  chain  cable  between  them. 
They  keep  well  abreast  of  each  other  and  are 
separated  by  one  or  two  cable  lengths.  The 
bight  of  the  cable  is  dragged  across  the  bottom 
of  the  sea  and  the  mines  thus  caught  in  the 
cable  soon  jostle  together  and  explode — but  not 
always  without  damage  to  the  destroyers.  Of 
course,  mine  sweeping  of  this  sort  would  be  im- 
possible under  shore  batteries  or  close  to  a  hos- 
tile squadron,  but  it  is  the  only  efficacious  means 
known  for  clearing  the  high  seas  of  the  deadly 
menace  of  drifting  mines. 

The  fouling  of  a  German  submarine  in  a  fish- 
net off  the  Dutch  coast  may  suggest  the  use  of 
special  nets  as  a  defensive  measure  against  sub- 
marine boats  as  well  as  submarine  mines  in  this 
war.  The  heavy  nets  used  for  deep-sea  fishing, 
if  properly  weighted  and  boomed  out,  should 
be  able  to  tangle  almost  any  submarine,  and  it 
should  be  possible  to  take  advantage  of  the  cur- 
rent and  dispatch  net  sections  on  booms  to  foul 


THE  SUBMARINE  119 

the  mines  in  the  mouths  of  harbours  and  thus 
cause  them  to  explode.  A  rope  around  the  pro- 
peller of  a  submarine  is  apparently  sufficient  to 
put  the  little  assassin  of  the  briny  depths  out 
of  action. 

Seaplane  Torpedoes 

The  fact  that  seaplanes  have  been  success- 
fully launched  from  improvised  platforms  over 
the  decks  of  war  vessels  has  induced  Admiral 
Fiske  of  the  United  States  Navy  to  point  out 
a  rather  interesting  method  of  launching  naval 
torpedoes  from  seaplanes  instead  of  from  sub- 
marines. He  contends  that  while  the  submarine 
is  powerless  to  operate  at  night,  the  seaplane  is 
ideally  fitted  to  transport  a  torpedo  under  cover 
of  darkness  and  launch  it  within  one-fifth  of  its 
striking  range  against  hostile  vessels.  It  is 
quite  true  that  a  seaplane  can  manoeuvre  prac- 
tically invisible  at  night  at  an  altitude  of  little 
less  than  a  mile,  but  where  is  the  seaplane  that 
can  carry  two  men  and  the  1,300-pound  naval 
torpedo  to  a  height  of  nearly  a  mile?  Even  if 
a  machine  could  be  perfected  to  accomplish  such 
a  feat  the  method  of  manoeuvring  would  be 


120  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

slow  and  laborious,  which  might  entail  detection, 
and  it  would  be  compelled  to  volplane  to  within 
something  less  than  ten  yards  to  the  surface 
of  the  water,  before  it  could  launch  the  torpedo, 
and  again  there  would  be  the  danger  of  detec- 
tion, at  least  by  the  searchlights  of  auxiliaries. 
The  idea  is  fundamentally  sound,  but  a  light- 
weight torpedo  of  medium  range  and  a  heavy- 
weight seaplane,  both  specially  made  for  the 
combined  service,  are  necessary  requirements 
before  this  ingenious  plan  could  be  realised  in 
battle  action.  It  is  obvious  that  a  dirigible  of 
the  Zeppelin  type  would  have  no  difficulty  in 
carrying  several  standard  naval  torpedoes,  but 
its  commander  could  not  afford  to  risk  his  ship 
to  gun-fire  by  approaching  the  surface  to  launch 
a  torpedo.  The  plan  is  suited  only  to  specially 
constructed  seaplanes.  Their  vast  range  of 
vision,  far  greater  speed,  their  superior  habi- 
tability  and  manoeuvring  capacity,  are  the  very 
features  which  entitle  them  to  tactical  prefer- 
ence over  submarines  for  bringing  up  torpedoes 
to  the  point  of  attack.  Submarines  for  day 
action  and  the  seaplane-torpedo  for  night  action 
may  be  a  future  phase  of  war — deux  faces  d'un 
meme  probleme! 


THE  SUBMARINE  121 


Is  There  a  Super -submarine? 

Is  there  such  a  thing  as  a  super-submarine? 
There  is.  However,  only  a  few  of  these  craft 
are  in  active  commission,  and  what  is  expected 
to  be  the  ultimate  super-ship  of  the  depths  is 
only  in  the  "blue  print"  stage  at  this  writing. 

Of  course,  one  may  be  permitted  to  regard  the 
very  latest  German  "U"  boats  as  being  in  the 
super  class.  They  displace  no  less  than  850 
tons.  They  are  armour-plated  over  every  square 
inch  of  visible  surface  when  cruising  awash. 
The  turret  is  of  4-inch  Krupp  plate  and  armed 
with  a  brace  of  rapid  3-inch  rifles.  No  less  than 
5,000  horsepower  is  stowed  away  in  the  Diesel 
oil-engines  that  propel  this  type  of  craft  at  a 
pace  of  17  knots  awash  and  11  knots  submerged. 
In  other  words,  these  boats  do  not  have  to  duck 
for  protection  against  destroyers.  They  are  suf- 
ficiently well  armoured  to  withstand  destroyer 
gun-fire  at  2,000  yards  and  present  a  much 
smaller  target  than  the  latter.  With  their 
heavy  shooting  3-inch  rifles  they  are  able  to 
open  up  any  destroyer  within  3,500  yards'  dis- 
tance, or  about  two  miles.    These  boats  carry 


122  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

no  less  than  eight  21-inch  torpedoes  capable  of 
long-range  work,  and  are  designed  especially 
for  attacking  battleships. 

The  French  navy  is  producing  two  boats  of 
the  same  type  approximately,  though  not  quite 
so  formidable  in  armour  and  armament,  but  to 
make  up  for  this  they  have  anti-aerial  guns  on 
the  turrets,  and  are  supposed  to  be  a  trifle 
speedier  than  the  German  craft,  at  least  on 
paper. 

Out  of  the  "D"  class  the  British  navy  has 
tried  to  evolve  a  super-craft  somewhat  on  the 
lines  of  the  German  and  French  boats,  but 
there  is  no  official  information  available  as  to 
what  has  actually  been  accomplished.  England 
is  jealously  guarding  her  progress  in  this  arm. 
The  opinion  of  naval  men  is  that  she  will  be 
able  to  put  boats  in  the  water  of  the  super- 
type  before  the  battle  standard  is  hauled 
down. 

It  may  be  a  matter  of  surprise  for  most 
Americans  to  know  that  the  first  submarines  for 
the  British  navy  were  built  in  1901,  from  de- 
signs furnished  by  John  P.  Holland,  the  Ameri- 
can inventor.  Italy  was  quick  to  follow,  France 
and  Eussia  subsequently  adopted  the  idea.    Not 


THE  SUBMARINE  123 

until  1904  did  Germany  actively  begin  to  pro- 
duce a  flotilla  of  submarines. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  United  States  navy  has 
been  outdistanced  by  its  European  rivals, 
though  it  remains  the  pioneer  in  adopting  the 
first  practical  boat.  A  parallel  to  this  curious 
condition  was  the  pioneer  work  of  the  Wright 
brothers  in  evolving  the  first  practical  aero- 
plane, and  the  failure  of  America  to  keep 
abreast  with  Europe  in  the  further  evolution  of 
aircraft. 

However,  the  period  of  "submarine"  apathy 
has  come  to  an  end.  The  present  war  has  prod- 
ded Uncle  Sam  to  activity  once  more,  and  the 
old  pioneer  has  voted  himself  a  lordly  check 
to  show  the  world  what  he  can  do  in  the  line  of 
the  super-submarine! 

Congress  has  sealed  its  approval  with  a  grant 
of  $1,300,000,  and  when  the  war  is  over,  and 
all  the  fighting  of  a  whole  generation  is  done, 
wTe  shall  be  able  to  contemplate  this  marvellous 
engine  of  destruction  with  the  feeling  that  it 
"could  have  licked  them  all,"  to  anticipate 
the  gentleman  of  the  goatee  and  the  bettle- 
brow. 

There  is   no  suggestion  of   "tin   sardine" 


124  WAB'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

about  the  new  Yankee  craft.  The  foc'sle  wits 
may  possibly  christen  it  the  "electric  whale"! 
At  any  rate,  it  will  be  larger  than  any  cetacea 
ever  created  by  Nature  or  heralded  by  skipper's 
tales!  It  will  displace  1,000  tons  on  a  total 
water-line  length  of  265  feet,  or  almost  double 
the  capacity  of  the  average  submarine  boat. 
The  strategic  or  cruising  speed  will  approach 
20  knots  and  effort  will  be  made  to  insure  a 
tactical  or  submerged  speed  of  12  knots.  It  will 
be  a  sea-going  submarine  in  the  completest  sense 
of  the  term,  inasmuch  as  it  will  have  a  cruising 
radius  of  6,300  miles  and  a  submerged  radius 
of  3,200  miles.  She  can  trail  a  modern  fleet  of 
dreadnaughts  and  cruisers,  which  seldom  aver- 
ages more  than  14  knots  in  times  of  peace  and 
18  knots  on  a  war  footing,  and  go  where  they  go 
jwithout  being  outdistanced,  except  when  the 
wireless  signals  forced  draught  and  cleared 
decks.  She  is  armoured  over  all  her  visible  hull 
heavily  enough  to  stand  an  engagement  with 
light  scouts  and  destroyers,  and  her  armament 
of  three  4-inch  rifles  should  enable  her  to  rout 
such  craft,  as  she  herself  presents  but  a  poor 
target.  Her  torpedo  equipment  is  tremendous. 
There  are  ten  tubes,  each  capable  of  launching 


THE  SUBMARINE  125 

a  21-inch  long-distance  torpedo  with  a  war-head 
of  390  pounds  of  gun-cotton,  over  a  range  of 
3y2  miles.  An  ingenious  departure  in  the  tor- 
pedo armament  is  effected  by  placing  the  six 
tubes  in  the  hull  as  fixtures  and  putting  the 
four  remaining  tubes  on  pivotal  disappearing 
carriages  on  the  deck.  By  virtue  of  this  equip- 
ment the  new  super-submarine  can  sweep  the 
horizon  at  any  angle  with  four  torpedo  tubes 
wThile  awash  and  cruising,  which  in  turn  means 
that  any  cruiser  venturing  within  gun-range  is 
within  reach  of  the  four  torpedoes  on  her  deck 
that  are  easily  concentrated  on  a  target.  If  the 
enemy  is  too  formidable  the  boat  can  house  its 
deck  torpedoes  in  the  twinkle  of  an  eye,  and 
dive  to  its  submerged  level  where  it  will  have 
the  use  of  four  tubes  in  the  bow  and  two  tubes 
in  the  stern. 

If  the  new  submarine  monster  proves  a  suc- 
cess— and  there  are  no  technical  obstacles — the 
time  will  be  approaching,  as  prophesied  by  Ad- 
miral Sir  Percy  Scott,  when  submarines  work- 
ing in  conjunction  with  seaplanes  will  decide 
naval  battles,  and  not  the  super-dreadnaught. 
At  any  rate,  no  battleship  as  yet  devised  could 
attack  a  super-submarine  of  the  type  proposed 


126  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

and  escape  its  torpedoes  unless  it  were  to  be 
most  efficiently  protected  by  a  veritable  cordon 
of  destroyers  and  scouts,  but  even  the  British 
navy  cannot  guarantee  protection  on  this  scale 
at  all  times. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  CAPITAL  SHIP 

Super-dreadnaught  vs.  Battle  Cruiser 

The  North  Sea  is  seldom  calm  where  it  rolls 
into  the  Skagerak,  that  stormy  strait,  whence 
Norse  sea  kings  were  wont  to  sally  forth  under 
bellying  sail  with  crews  of  vikings  in  mail  and 
plate,  bending  to  the  ponderous  oars.  No  sail 
in  sight,  only  a  fane  of  inky  smoke  on  the  hori- 
zon. By-and-by  two  funnels  can  be  seen  under 
the  threatening'  curtain  and  a  low  rakish  vessel 
heaves  into  sight,  cutting  the  water  with  in- 
credible  speed.  It  glides  through  the  heavy 
sea,  tapering  smartly  from  bow  to  stem,  as 
though  its  long,  sleek  sides  were  not  armoured 
as  stoutly  as  a  fortress.  The  deck  is  dotted  with 
steel  turrets  spiked  with  monster  cannon,  each 
turret  a  citadel  itself.  The  whole  vessel  is  con- 
trived like  a  floating  fortification,  but  it  moves 
and  steers  with  nimble  ease  as  though  it  were 
the  merest  cockle-shell  and  the  giant  guns  but 
tubes  of  paper.  This,  then,  is  the  modern  sea- 
king,  the  battle  cruiser  of  the  high  seas,  an 
armoured,    turbined,    heavily -gunned    brother- 

127 


128  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

in-arms  to  that  adventuresome  craft  of  yield- 
ing hemp  and  canvas,  the  viking  bark  of 
old. 

Suddenly  the  course  is  changed.  Bugles  call, 
buzzers  snarl,  dials  oscillate,  levers  click,  hand- 
wheels  spin,  and  at  every  battle  post  electric 
signals  register  the  commands  from  the  bridge. 
The  decks  are  cleared  for  action.  The  monster 
turrets  swing  into  position  over  the  port  side. 
The  menacing  muzzles  of  a  dozen  huge  cannon 
rise  as  by  magic  to  an  acute  angle,  remaining  in 
focus  there. 

Another  fane  of  smoke  has  broken  on  the  port 
bow;  another  vessel  less  tapered  but  more  pon- 
derous has  appeared  under  three  stout  funnels. 
A  thick  wave  of  foam  curls  under  the  massive 
prow.  The  decks  are  dotted  with  turrets  even 
more  ponderous,  spiked  with  giant  guns  even 
more  overawing. 

Not  a  mem  is  in  sight  on  deck  even  though 
there  are  almost  a  thousand  souls  aboard  either 
one  of  the  marine  monsters  intent  on  mutual 
destruction. 

At  ten  miles9  range  the  super-dreadnaught 
opens  fire  with  a  shot  from  one  of  its  mighty 
14-inch  rifles.  The  sound  of  the  ton-heavy 
projectile  as  it  hurtles  screaming  through  the 
air  is  like  a  death-gasp  from  the  underworld. 
The  missile  remains  in  the  air  something  like  a 
half -minute,  but  it  seems  hours  before  it  strikes, 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  129 

tossing  a  crater  of  water  as  it  explodes.  An- 
other  shot  follows  and  a  third  as  the  big  sea- 
fighter  improves  his  aim;  but  before  the  accurate 
range  can  be  learned  the  battle  cruiser  has 
changed  her  course  and  bears  down  upon  him 
under  a  full  head  of  steam. 

Range  shots  explode  on  all  sides  of  the  battle 
cruiser  as  she  continues  her  grim  advance  at 
desperate  risk,  until  the  distance  falls  under  the 
effective  range  of  her  11-inch  ordnance.  Once 
more  the  battle  cruiser  lays  down  her  helm,  and 
as  her  freeboard  swings  into  play  under  full 
speed  the  whole  ship  seems  to  jump  out  of  the 
water  under  the  shock  of  a  tremendous  explo- 
sion. A  broadside  of  11-inch  pieces  has  been 
fired.  The  air  moans  and  howls  under  the  on- 
slaught of  the  storm  of  projectiles.  Half  the 
guns  have  been  aimed  short,  the  other  half  long, 
of  the  plotted  range.  The  long  shots  take  their 
toll.  The  super-dreadnaught  is  discovered  with- 
out her  aft  funnel  and  a  jagged  hole  yawns 
under  her  superstructure,  emitting  smoke  and 
flame  and  hissing  steam. 

Something  knocks  in  the  port  plates  of  the 
battle  cruiser  and  explodes  on  her  berth-deck, 
killing  two  gun  crews,  choking  the  hull  with 
fumes,  and  wrecking  three  6-inch  guns — the  first 
bulVs-eye  of  a  14-inch  shell.  The  battle  cruiser, 
being  quicker  at  the  range-finding,  manages  to 
land  two  salvos  of  her  big  guns  before  she  has 


130  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

to  take  the  full  punishment  of  her  adversary's 
14-inch  ordnance. 

Those  two  salvos  save  the  battle  cruiser.  Of 
the  twenty  projectiles  fired  at  the  super-dread- 
naught,  thirteen  have  taken  their  toll,  some  of 
them  hitting  in  the  same  spot.  Her  gunners 
have  understood  how  to  concentrate  their  fire 
with  admirable  skill.  A  water-line  hit,  breached 
by  the  first  salvo,  was  knocked  into  a  yawning 
chasm  by  the  second,  a  lucky  shot  sailing  clean 
through  and  exploding  in  the  boiler-room,  rip- 
ping a  ghastly  hole  in  the  very  vitals  of  the  big 
fighter. 

The  latter  has  fired  but  a  single  broadside, 
four  shots  taking  effect,  but  such  is  the  smash- 
ing power  of  her  giant  14-inch  rifles  that  the 
stern  turret  of  the  battle  cruiser  is  breached 
and  the  guns  wrecked.  Other  shots  have  clipped 
her  freeboard  and  dismasted  the  foretop. 

But  that  double  water-line  hit  proves  fatal  to 
the  super-dreadnaught.  Before  he  can  launch 
a  second  broadside  the  boilers  explode,  rolling 
him  over  with  an  ugly  starboard  list  and  foul- 
ing his  aim. 

Up  to  this  phase  of  the  action  both  vessels 
were  steaming  freely,  the  cruiser  under  forced 
draught  bent  on  cutting  the  range  to  the 
maximum  of  her  offensive  capacity.  But  the 
heavy  list  impairs  the  manoeuvring  of  the 
dreadnaught  and  he  is  unable  to  prevent  his 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  131 

fleet  adversary  from  getting  within  torpedo 
range.  The  first  missile  roams  wide,  but  the 
second  explodes  under  the  dreadnaught's  fore- 
foot, twisting  the  heavy  ram  and  at  the  same 
time  detonating  his  forward  torpedoes.  The 
double  explosion  has  the  effect  of  splintering 
and  amputating  the  entire  bow  of  the  big  ship. 

The  havoc  aboardship  is  appalling.  On  the 
lower  decks  are  lacerated  and  bleeding  men, 
seared  by  flame  and  smoke,  running  about  in 
swirling  fumes  among  corpses  still  warm  with 
the  blood  oozing  from  gaping  wounds  and  sev- 
ered members.  The  inrush  of  the  sea  floods  the 
madly  struggling  crew  before  it  can  force  a 
passage  through  the  wrecked  hatchways  already 
littered  with  dead  and  dying.  A  heavy  steam- 
pipe  bursts  under  the  deck,  scalding  many  sur- 
vivors to  death  with  a  tremendous  roar  that 
drowns  their  piteous  screams.  The  heavy  list 
puts  the  big  turret  guns  beyond  the  power  of 
man  to  handle;  the  crews  tumble  out  on  the 
blood-spattered  deck.  The  ammunition  hoists 
jam;  the  fire-control  station  dangles  helplessly 
against  the  mast;  the  command  tubes  and  signal 
wires  are  tangled  and  twisted  out  of  order;  the 
captain  and  the  officers  are  powerless  to  fight 
the  ship  any  longer.  Suddenly  there  is  a  wild 
scramble — panic  has  seized  the  crew  of  the  now 
defenceless  wreck — and  with  one  tumultuous 
yell  those  who  cam,  leave  their  posts,  and  jump 


132  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

overboard.  The  officers  draw  their  revolvers, 
but  it  is  too  late  for  discipline.  With  one  awful 
blast  of  escaping  steam,  punctuated  by  the  dull 
thud  of  bursting  bulkheads,  and  the  savage  crash 
of  plunging  wreckage,  the  super-ship  turns  up 
her  blood-trickling  deck  and  flame-swept  sta- 
tions and  keels  over,  turning  turtle  in  the  heav- 
ing sea. 


The  Strategic  Situation 

The  naval  situation  in  the  present  world  war 
provokes  comparison  with  David's  dauntless 
stand  against  Goliath  and  Gulliver's  pugnacious 
handling  of  the  fabled  giant.  As  yet  there  is  no 
indication  that  the  little  fellow  may  whip  his 
ponderous  adversary,  despite  the  fact  that  the 
former  has  outstripped  the  latter  as  a  fighter 
in  almost  every  action  at  this  writing. 

The  naval  odds  against  Germany  are  greater 
than  even  the  military  odds.  Not  only  is  Ger- 
many compelled  to  fight  the  British  navy,  more 
than  twice  as  strong  in  tonnage  and  armament, 
but  the  French  navy  prevents  Austria  from 
aiding  her  ally  and  the  Eussian  Baltic  squadron 
hinders  the  German  grossadmiral  from  focusing 
his  entire  fleet  strength  against  the  British 
blockade.  Add  to  this  the  ever-present  possi- 
bility of  Japan  dispatching  a  battle  squadron  to 
European  waters,  not  only  to  convoy  an  armada 
of  troop  ships  with  military  .reinforcements, 
but  also  to  act  as  a  naval  reserve  for  the  Allies, 
and  it  will  be  apparent  that  no  matter  how 

133 


134  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

bravely  and  efficiently  the  Germans  may  fight 
their  vessels,  they  cannot  hope  to  win  the  naval 
war.  Even  if  they  could  manage  to  defeat  a  su- 
perior unit  of  British  capital  ships  in  a  decisive 
fleet  action,  the  reinforcements  available  against 
her  by  the  allied  French,  Japanese  and  Eussian 
fleets  would  enable  the  defeated  British  navy 
to  rally  and  insure  a  final  victory  to  itself 
against  such  units  as  Germany  would  have  left 
in  this  contingency.  The  German  navy  may 
score  intermittent  victories,  ship  for  ship,  and 
possibly  squadron  for  squadron,  and  its  per- 
sonnel may  demonstrate  a  superior  degree  of 
fighting  ability,  still  when  it  comes  to  the  great, 
final  line-up  and  the  super-dreadnaughts  on 
either  side  clear  decks  for  a  pitched  battle,  sum- 
moning every  class  and  type  of  naval  craft  in 
auxiliary  support  of  their  main  offensive,  the 
Germans  are  hopelessly  outclassed. 

There  are  some  possible  exceptions  to  be 
quoted  against  this  estimate  of  naval  exigencies 
based  on  the  known  and  certified  strength  of  the 
opponents.  The  unknown  power  of  secret 
armaments  must  also  be  considered.  It  is  not 
logical  to  reason  that  because  Germany  was  able 
to  produce  secretly  made  siege  artillery  that 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  135 

ground  " impregnable"  fortresses  to  dust,  she 
should  also  be  able  to  produce  naval  armaments 
of  like  superiority,  but  it  is  not  unreasonable 
to  assume  that  the  German  admiralty  has 
availed  itself  of  the  same  opportunity  for  un- 
detected warlike  enterprise  provided  by  the 
German  general  staff.  If  the  naval  Zeppelins 
now  being  completed  are  equipped  with  ap- 
paratus of  adequate  power  to  destroy  armoured 
ships  rather  than  for  the  bombardment  of  bases 
and  cities,  and  if  by  skilful  handling  of  this 
novel  unit  the  Germans  might  succeed  in  sink- 
ing a  considerable  number  of  the  British  capital 
ships  on  blockade  patrol  with  but  little  disaster 
to  their  Zeppelin  fleet,  the  chances  for  an  equal 
final  combat  would  be  much  improved.  But 
unless  the  new  naval  Zeppelins  can  launch 
armour-piercing  torpedoes  and  detonate  heavy 
charges  of  explosives  in  the  vitals  of  capital 
vessels — unless  they  can  torpedo  from  above  al- 
most as  effectively  as  the  submarines  torpedo 
from  below — this  new  and  untried  combination 
of  aerial  and  naval  offensive  is  not  likely  to  be  a 
decisive  factor  in  the  naval  campaign  as  a  whole, 
though  it  might  aid  in  destroying  quite  a  num- 
ber of  valuable  vessels. 


136  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

Another  possibility  is  that  Germany  may 
have  utilised  the  respite  occasioned  by  the  block- 
ade to  install  in  the  turrets  of  her  battleships 
a  larger  calibred  weapon  than  the  30.5-centi- 
metre Krupp  piece,  which  is  the  regular  equip- 
ment. Efficient  as  these  rifles  are,  and  almost 
equal  in  offensive  power  to  the  British  12-inch 
naval  gun,  they  are  no  match  for  the  13-  and 
14-inch  rifles,  not  to  mention  the  15-inch  pieces, 
which  are  carried  by  the  latest  British  super- 
dreadnaughts.  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that 
inasmuch  as  Germany  could  produce  42-centi- 
metre guns  for  her  army  she  should  also  be 
able  to  produce  42-centimetre  guns  for  her  navy. 
The  technical  requirements  involved  are  of  an 
entirely  different  nature.  The  military  42- 
centimetre  piece  is  in  reality  a  transportable 
mortar  in  which  the  gaseous  pressure  is  low  com- 
pared to  the  colossal  pressure  in  the  breech  of 
a  naval  gun.  The  latter  belongs  in  the  so-called 
" direct-fire"  category  of  cannon,  which  neces- 
sitates the  flattest  possible  trajectory,  which 
in  turn  compels  the  highest  attainable  velocity 
of  projectile.  In  case  the  Krupps  have  ac- 
tually developed  a  type  of  42-centimetre  naval 
gun — and  necessarily  such  manufacture  must 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  137 

have  been  initiated  years  ago  to  be  available  in 
proper  quantities  now — and  the  capital  vessels 
of  the  German  navy  could  sally  forth  armed 
with  42-centimetre  pieces  in  every  turret  that 
held  only  30.2-centimetre  weapons  before,  the 
superiority  of  the  British  fleet  would  be  seri- 
ously interfered  with,  to  say  the  least.  There 
may  be  inherent  structural  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  laying  a  42-centimetre  gun  in  barbettes  de- 
signed to  hold  only  30.2-centimetre  pieces,  but 
who  knows  but  what  this  contingency  was 
provided  for  in  advance?  Besides,  while  the 
power  and  range  of  modern  cannon  have  been 
increased  marvellously  during  the  past  decade, 
their  space  requirements  have  been  noticeably  * 
decreased.  If  only  the  latest  type  of  German 
super-dreadnaught  could  make  effective  use  of 
a  possible  42-centimetre  armament,  and  even  if 
the  added  weight  would  make  it  imperative  to 
limit  installation  to  the  centre  line  turrets,  a 
squadron  equipped  with  such  formidable 
weapons  ought  to  be  able  to  engage  two  squad- 
rons of  British  super-dreadnaughts  equipped 
with  13-  and  even  14-inch  primary  armament. 

I  will  admit  that  the  deductions  entering  into 
this  forecast  are  largely  speculative,  but  I  will 


138  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

not  admit  that  conclusions  are  futile  merely  be- 
cause they  have  been  arrived  at  by  agencies 
other  than  those  licensed  by  reason  and  knowl- 
edge. At  any  rate,  the  latter  qualities  made  a 
pitifully  poor  showing  when  a  wondering  world 
began  to  draw  on  them  for  an  explanation  of  the 
Krupp  secret  military  armaments.  In  this  con- 
nection perhaps  it  would  not  be  amiss  to  recol- 
lect that  the  British  navy  actually  boasted  16.5- 
inch  rifles  in  the  early  eighties.  These  ponder- 
ous pieces  were  of  Armstrong  manufacture  and 
weighed  110  tons  each,  or  fully  as  much  as  the 
heaviest  coast  defence  guns.  These  giant  guns, 
which  were  regular  primary  equipment  in  battle- 
ships of  the  ill-starred  Victoria  class,  required 
seven  minutes  to  fire  one  round,  weighing  1,800 
pounds.  While  superior  in  "smashing"  power 
to  anything  afloat  these  guns  were  inferior  in 
penetration  to  the  present  9.2-inch  naval  rifle. 
Mainly  owing  to  their  tremendous  tonnage  and 
slow  delivery  of  projectile  the  Armstrong  mon- 
sters were  finally  discarded.  The  Krupps  be- 
came leaders  of  the  modern  tendency  to  make 
cannon  more  effective  and  less  ponderous,  and 
it  is  not  impossible  that  this  enterprising, 
aggressive  firm  may  have  evolved  a  42-centi- 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  139 

metre  naval  rifle  only  slightly  heavier  and 
proportionally  less  ponderous  than  the  present 
British  14-inch  naval  piece.  Moreover,  the  in- 
stallation of  15-inch  rifles  in  the  very  latest 
English  super-dreadnaughts  goes  a  long  way 
to  show  that  the  improvements  made  in  limiting 
bulk  while  increasing  power  in  modern  arma- 
ments is  such  that  the  extraordinary  calibres, 
which  were  dismissed  in  the  eighties  as  imprac- 
ticable, are  once  more  forging  to  the  front, 
backed  by  substantial  guarantees  of  superior 
effectiveness. 

Only  by  perpetrating  a  combination  of  su- 
perior naval  armaments  with  strong  aerial  ar- 
tillery does  it  appear  that  Germany  could  take 
her  several  adversaries  by  surprise  and  match 
their  superiority  with  a  novel  tactical  offensive, 
backed  by  super-armaments,  naval  as  well 
as  aerial.  The  Germans  have  demonstrated 
their  ability  to  concoct  surprise  on  land;  it 
remains  to  be  seen  if  they  can  do  it  at  sea 
also. 

The  battle  which  naval  critics  have  been 
looking  for  has  not  happened  at  this  writing. 
The  battle  cruiser  has  not  fought  it  out  with 
the  super-dreadnaught.    The  experts'  attention 


140  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

is  focused  on  this  long-expected  encounter, 
which  is  supposed  to  decide  whether  a  few  knots 
of  additional  mobility  and  greater  steaming 
radius  is  an  advantage  in  a  running  fight,  when 
armaments  are  practically  equal.  To  sacrifice 
a  little  in  "smashing"  power  and  range,  but 
nothing  in  tonnage  for  the  sake  of  out-manoeu- 
vring an  adversary  that  is  taking  no  chances 
in  armour  or  armament,  these  are  the  basic 
qualities  of  the  battle  cruiser  which  are  yet  to 
be  tried  out  in  a  death  grapple  with  the  super- 
dreadnaught  before  we  know  which  of  these 
types  shall  remain  the  "capital"  ship  of  the 
future.  i 

The  dominant  tendency  of  naval  architects 
appears  to  favour  a  high  rate  of  speed  backed 
by  a  tremendous  steaming  radius,  provided  the 
sacrifice  in  armour  and  armament  does  not  dis- 
qualify the  vessel  from  combat  with  the  heaviest 
battle  unit — and  these  main  essentials  are  in- 
corporated with  acute  insistence  in  that  most 
modern  of  modern  sea-fighters,  the  battle 
cruiser. 

The  only  vessels  that  have  been  engaged  at 
this  time  at  all  fitted  to  decide  the  momentous 
argument  of  B.  C.  vs.  B.  were  the  Audacious 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  141 

and  the  Goeben.  A  duel  between  these  two  ves- 
sels— the  latter  a  fine  specimen  of  the  German 
idea  of  a  battle  cruiser,  the  former  a  typical 
example  of  the  British  idea  in  super-dread- 
naughts — should  have  been  tremendously  in- 
structive if  not  of  decisive  moment. 

There  are  naval  critics  like  Admiral  Sir  Percy 
Scott  who  incline  toward  the  belief  that  the 
submarine  may  eventually  replace  the  capital 
ship.  The  successful  development  of  the  one- 
thousand- ton  super- submarine  with  huge  cruis- 
ing radius  and  tremendous  torpedo  armament, 
most  admittedly  points  to  the  day  when  naval 
engagements  may  be  fought  out  under  the  sea 
rather  than  on  it,  and  our  gallant  fleet  admirals 
may  shrink  to  the  proportion  of  mere  submarine 
savants  I 

The  "Goeben-Breslau"  Escape 

In  a  tactical  sense  the  most  brilliant  exploit 
of  the  German  navy  at  this  writing  was  one  in 
which  not  a  solitary  shot  was  fired  nor  a  drop 
of  blood  wasted.  A  powerful  British-French 
fleet  chased  the  battle  cruiser  Goeben  and  the 
protected  cruiser  Breslau  into  Messina  harbour, 


142  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

giving  the  German  commander  the  choice  of 
suffering  the  internment  of  his  vessels  or  fac- 
ing destruction  if  he  attempted  escape.  Not 
only  did  the  German  commander  prefer  the  lat- 
ter alternative,  but  he  managed  to  hoodwink 
and  elude  the  overpowering  enemy.  He  handled 
his  vessels  so  efficiently  that  he  was  able  to  save 
them  from  what  seemed  certain  annihilation,  and 
dropped  his  anchor  under  the  guns  of  the  Dar- 
danelles before  the  British  commander  realised 
that  he  had  been  the  butt  of  some  clever  ruse. 
The  German  commander  not  only  succeeded  in 
eliminating  loss  or  even  damage,  but  he  added 
his  vessels  to  the  navy  of  a  friendly  power, 
which  was  destined  to  make  use  of  them  sub- 
sequently, and  offset  a  loss  suffered  by  that 
power  in  two  capital  vessels  seized  by  England 
shortly  before  their  completion. 

A  naval  lesson  is  pointed  by  this  action.  An 
inferior  unit  having  maximum  speed  and  large 
cruising  radius  has  not  only  inherent  possibili- 
ties for  outmanoeuvring  a  vastly  superior 
enemy,  but  accidental  possibilities  for  outwit- 
ting him  or  confounding  his  judgment  at  the 
executive  moment.  The  speed  of  a  squadron  is 
that  of  its  slowest  unit,  but  the  speed  of  two 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  143 

fast  cruisers  is  the  maximum  of  their  capacity. 
This  will  generally  account  for  an  advantage  of 
a  few  knots  in  favour  of  the  smaller  unit.  Be- 
sides, there  are  other  agencies,  such  as  "  jam- 
ming" the  wireless  or  tampering  with  the  code 
of  the  enemy,  which  may,  in  this  instance,  have 
aided  the  escape  of  the  German  vessels,  entirely 
aside  from  their  tactical  mobility.  The  court- 
martialing  of  the  British  admiral  soon  after 
this  episode  indicates  that  contributory  causes, 
more  potent  than  mere  mobility,  aided  in  his 
deception,  causes  that  are  likely  to  remain 
admiralty  secrets. 

The  Helgoland  Action 

In  the  engagement  of  the  bight  of  Helgoland 
the  British  commander  appears  to  have  been  the 
abler  tactician. 

A  searching  rake  of  destroyers  was  deployed 
as  a  bait  to  the  German  patrol  scouts.  A  light 
cruiser  squadron  supported  this  movement 
with  a  powerful  squadron  of  battle  cruisers  in 
reserve.  The  fog  enabled  the  British  to  screen 
this  manoeuvre  from  the  enemy.  The  Germans 
nibbled  the  bait  and  engaged  the  destroyers  and 


144  WAB'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

the  scouts  with  similar  units.  Eliminating  the 
destroyer  flotilla  the  main  fighting  units  at  this 
phase  of  the  action  included  two  British  scouts, 
the  Fearless  and  Arethusa,  against  three  Ger- 
man scouts,  the  Koln,  Mainz  and  Ariadne. 
While  numerically  superior  to  the  British  unit, 
the  Germans  suffered  the  disadvantage  of  a 
slightly  weaker  armament,  that  is,  their  total 
primary  power  of  thirty-four  4.1-inch  rifles  did 
not  appear  to  be  quite  as  effective  as  the  two 
6-inch  and  eighteen  4-inch  rifles  mounted  by 
the  enemy.  That  the  Arethusa  should  have 
been  able  to  inflict  most  of  the  damage  with  its 
6-inch  pieces,  up  to  this  point,  is  additional 
proof  that  the  slightly  heavier  gun  possesses 
marked  advantages  in  an  action  between  un- 
armoured  vessels.  As  it  was,  the  Germans  were 
not  able  to  inflict  much  damage  before  the 
British  battle  cruiser  squadron  hove  in  sight 
and  took  its  toll  in  death  shots  of  12-inch  calibre, 
placing  the  German  scouts  on  the  loss  roster. 
This  engagement  contains  no  lesson  of  conse- 
quence. That  it  should  be  possible  to  bait  a 
blockaded  enemy  with  a  rake  of  scouts,  only  to 
insure  the  destruction  of  his  patrols  by  driving 
in  a  wedge  of  battle  cruisers  at  the  opportune 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  145 

moment,  is  a  well-enough  established  tactical 
contingency.* 


The  Coronel  Battle 

The  action  off  Coronel  was  also  decided  by 
superior  artillery,  although  the  British  virtually 
commanded  the  heaviest  guns.  Admiral  von 
Spee  not  only  outmanoeuvred  Admiral  Crad- 
dock,  but  greatly  outpointed  him  in  gunnery. 
The  main  fight  developed  between  the  armoured 
cruisers  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau,  mounting 
a  total  of  sixteen  8.2-inch  and  twelve  5.9-inch 
rifles  in  primary  batteries,  against  the  Good 
Hope  and  Monmouth,  armoured  cruisers,  total- 
ling two  9.2-inch  and  thirty  6-inch  rifles.  The 
Germans  were  superior  in  the  weight  of  metal 
thrown  by  sixteen  8.2-inch  pieces  as  against  two 
9.2-inch  pieces  of  the  British,  but  the  latter  had 
the  advantage  of  greater  range  and  "smash- 
ing" power  in  their  weapons.  As  the  action 
was  fought  in  "line  ahead"  formation  the  arm- 
aments that  could  be  brought  to  play  were 
limited  to  two  9.2-inch  and  seventeen  6-inch 

*  For  an  account  of  the  torpedoing  of  the  British  cruiser 
squadron  "  Hogue,"  "  Aboukir  "  and  u  Cressy  "  see  the  chapter 
on  "  The  Submarine." 


146  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

rifles  on  the  British  side  against  twelve  8.2- 
inch  and  twelve  5.9-inch  rifles  on  the  German 
side. 

Tactically,  the  British  should  have  opened 
fire  and  made  their  two  superior  rifles  effective 
before  the  Germans  could  land  a  broadside. 
The  reports  indicate  that  they  either  failed  to  do 
so  or  that  the  shots  fell  short.  At  7,000  yards' 
range,  had  the  English  maintained  this  distance, 
they  would  have  been  able  to  penetrate  the 
armour  of  the  German  cruisers  with  their  9.2- 
inch  pieces,  while  the  latter  would  have  been 
at  a  loss  to  hull  the  British  cruisers  with  the 
8.2-inch  batteries.  Admiral  von  Spee  very 
cleverly  manoeuvred  his  vessels  until  the  range 
had  been  cut  to  about  6,000  yards,  when  he  sud- 
denly opened  fire  with  broadsides  of  8.2-inch 
rifles.  It  was  these  well-aimed  salvos,  concen- 
trated first  on  the  Good  Hope  and  then  on  the 
Monmouth,  which  sent  these  fine  vessels  to  the 
bottom.  It  is  probable  that  the  minimum  range 
during  this  action  did  not  drop  much  under  5,000 
yards,  owing  to  the  sundown,  and  it  is  possible 
that  the  secondary  batteries  of  5.9-  and  6-inch 
guns  had  no  decisive  voice  in  the  argument. 
The  British  9.2-inch  naval  gun  discharges  a 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  147 

980-pound  armour-piercing  projectile  at  the 
rate  of  6.5  rounds  per  minute  with  a  muzzle 
velocity  of  2,800  foot-seconds  and  a  muzzle 
energy  of  20,685  foot-tons.  At  6,500  yards' 
range  a  single  shot  of  this  calibre  could  have 
pierced  any  part  of  the  German  cruisers,  not 
excepting  the  armoured  belt. 

The  explanation  offered  by  the  British  ad- 
miralty that  a  heavy  rolling  sea  precluded  ac- 
curate marksmanship  is  laughable,  for  certainly 
the  Germans  were  wallowing  in  the  same  rolling 
sea  and  their  marksmanship  was  excellent. 

Of  scout  cruisers  Germany  had  three  in  this 
battle — the  Numb  erg,  Leipzig  and  Bremen — 
opposed  to  a  single  British  scout,  the  Glasgow, 
and  an  armed  transport.  Despite  their  vast 
superiority,  in  tonnage  as  well  as  in  armament, 
the  Germans  did  not  succeed  in  destroying  the 
Glasgow,  which  showed  a  fine  burst  of  speed, 
and  escaped  in  a  ragged  condition.  The 
English  cruiser  had  an  advantage  of  a  couple 
of  knots  over  the  German  vessels,  but  the  latter 
matched  no  less  than  thirty  4.1-inch  rifles 
against  two  6-inch  and  ten  4-inch  rifles  of  the 
former.  Perhaps  the  German  scouts  were 
slower  than  their  tactical  rating,  owing  to  foul 


148  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

bottoms — a  handicap  characteristic  of  hunted 
fighters— but  this  does  not  minimise  the  tactical 
efficiency  of  the  Glasgow's  commander  in  out- 
manoeuvring his  greatly  superior  opponent. 

The  "Audacious"  and  "Bulwark"  Disasters  * 

The  loss  of  the  super-dreadnaught  Audacious 
in  Lough  Swilly  on  the  north  coast  of  Ireland 
shows  that  a  submarine  is  equal  to  the  sangui- 
nary exploit  of  cruising  hundreds  of  miles  away 
from  its  base  and  destroying  the  most  formi- 
dable of  fighting  vessels.  The  sinking  of  the  pre- 
dreadnaught  Bulwark  almost  in  the  very  mouth 
of  the  Thames  proves  that  a  cleverly  handled 
submarine  can  steal  through  the  most  ingeni- 
ously planted  mine  fields  and  elude  hostile 
scouting  screens  with  a  good  chance  of  striking 
down  the  enemy  on  his  own  base.  These  two 
losses,  totalling  almost  fifteen  million  dollars, 
constitute  a  more  serious  disaster  than  all  the 
British  losses  gone  before.  The  naval  archi- 
tects who  advocate  multiform  bulkheads  are 
not  likely  to  refer  their  arguments  to  these  two 

*  According  to  the  original  British  admiralty  reports  both 
of  these  vessels  were  sunk  by  contact  with  mines,  but  subsequent 
investigation  indicates  that  they  were  torpedoed. 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  149 

vessels,  one  of  which  sank  like  a  plummet,  the 
other  slowly  enough  to  encourage  the  belief  that 
it  " could"  have  been  saved.  The  charges  car- 
ried in  the  torpedoes  of  modern  submarines  are 
so  tremendously  effective  that  the  theoretically 
plausible  plan  of  the  "subdivisionist"  is  not 
likely  to  find  practical  proof  in  this  war.  It  is 
all  very  well  to  design  a  ship  supporting  water- 
tight decks  on  watertight  bulkheads,  and  it  is 
not  difficult  to  convince  naval  boards,  by  a  show 
of  mathematical  fireworks,  that  so-and-so  many 
bulkheads  may  be  blown  without  seriously  im- 
periling the  flotation,  but  wet  gun-cotton  has 
a  way  of  opening  up  a  vessel  that  is  anything 
but  mathematically  correct.  It  is  fatal  to  rely 
on  a  multiplicity  of  compartments  to  prevent  a 
ship  from  sinking.  A  torpedo  may  bend  in  a 
score  of  bulkheads  and  still  the  ship  may  float 
while  another  torpedo  may  blow  only  a  single 
bulkhead  and  sink  the  ship.  The  pressures 
developed  by  submarine  explosion  are  so  enor- 
mous that  not  only  are  the  bulkheads  blown  but 
the  longitudinal  seams  between  the  decks  are 
opened,  and  the  leakage  thus  caused  is  bound, 
in  most  cases,  to  waterlog  and  finally  wreck  the 
vessel.     It  is  not  improbable  that  some  such 


150  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

erratic  starting  of   seams  is   what   sent  the 
Audacious  to  the  bottom. 

The  Dashing  Sea-Hussars 
In  a  tactical  sense,  the  sea-raiding  done  by 
the  light  German  scouts  the  Emden,  Leipzig 
and  Karlsruhe  is  the  smartest  exhibition  of 
seamanship  in  the  present  war.  These  three 
"  musketeers "  of  the  high  seas  have  defied  cap- 
ture for  several  months  by  a  powerful  enemy 
looking  for  them  with  wireless  and  cruiser 
squadrons  in  all  the  oceans.  They  have  been 
able,  not  only  to  destroy  scores  of  hostile  mer- 
chantmen, but  they  have  provisioned  and  coaled 
from  their  prizes  before  sinking  them,  and  in 
some  instances  they  have  managed  to  establish 
bases  on  obscure  islands.  The  Emden,  single- 
handed,  almost  swept  British  shipping  off  the 
Indian  Ocean  and  stopped  the  mail.  The  daunt- 
less deeds  of  her  brothers-in-arms  are  too 
numerous  to  mention  here.  Whatever  one  may 
choose  to  think,  the  fact  remains  that  never 
before  were  naval  vessels  handled  with  better 
tactical  efficiency  and  keener  resource  and  dar- 
ing in  the  face  of  desperate  odds,  than  these 
three  daring  "Flying  Dutchmen"  of  the  seven 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  151 

seas.  The  Germans  refer  to  their  exploits  as 
"Hussarenstuchsen,"  and  quite  so,  for  cavalry 
has  seldom  attempted  adventure  of  a  character 
more  sanguinary  and  romantically  warlike. 
Even  the  somewhat  less  brilliant  performances 
of  the  Nurnberg  and  Konigsberg  would  be  quite 
sufficient  in  themselves  to  establish  for  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  German  navy  a  reputation  second 
to  none  and  equalled  by  few. 

These  five  German  sea-hussars  have  managed 
to  almost  paralyse  British  shipping  in  the 
Pacific,  the  South  Atlantic  and  the  Indian 
Ocean  for  several  months,  and  have  captured 
and  destroyed  more  than  one  hundred  hos- 
tile merchant  vessels.  British  and  French 
cruisers  have  raked  the  oceans  in  vain,  and 
at  one  time  there  was  actually  a  total  of 
some  eighty  odd  vessels  commissioned  with 
their  destruction.  And  still  they  remained 
afloat,  challenging  capture  with  the  utmost  per- 
tinacity and  dauntless  daring.  The  fate  of  the 
Emden  was  not  accomplished  until  that  little 
vessel  was  handicapped  by  a  foul  bottom  and 
empty  ammunition  chambers,  and  even  then  it 
did  not  surrender,  but  chose  self-destruction. 

From  a  naval  viewpoint  the  exploits  of  the 


152  WAB'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

German  sea-hussars  provide  a  very  opportune 
lesson,  indicating  that  a  small  raiding  unit, 
efficiently  handled,  can  keep  the  high  seas  in 
good  cruising  shape  for  a  long  time,  and  do  a 
great  amount  of  damage  to  shipping  under  the 
very  nose  of  a  vigilant  and  far  superior  enemy 
equipped  with  every  means  for  the  destruction 
of  the  raiders. 

Naval  Losses  Compared 

It  being  the  custom  of  newspaper  writers  to 
compare  naval  losses  by  the  number  of  vessels 
vanquished,  there  is  now  a  widespread  delusion 
that  Germany  has  suffered  the  severest  blow  in 
the  loss  of  25  vessels  as  against  20  British  ves- 
sels, at  this  writing.  Comparisons  of  this  cali- 
bre maybe  instrumental  to  " headline"  artistry, 
but  governments  take  cognisance  of  the  tonnage 
and  armament  involved  and  the  class  of  vessel. 
The  affixed  tables  are  compiled  with  a  view 
of  determining  the  relative  naval  status  of  the 
losses  incurred  on  both  sides.  It  will  be  noticed 
that  the  greater  numerical  German  disaster  con- 
cerns chiefly  minor  craft  of  the  ' 'mosquito" 
fleet,  while  the  lower  numerical  British  disaster 
includes  a  large  proportion  of  valuable  fighting 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  153 

ships.  Stripped  of  diplomatic  phrase,  the  fig- 
ures plainly  show  that  the  weaker  German  fleet, 
bottled  up  and  isolated  from  its  ally,  managed 
to  cause  the  allied  enemy  a  loss  of  139,070  tons 
in  the  same  space  of  time — approximately  fif- 
teen weeks — that  she  suffered  a  loss  of  only 
41,559  tons  herself!  Dealing  a  blow  fully  three 
times  as  hard  as  that  imposed  by  its  adversary 
speaks  volumes  for  the  superior  enterprise  and 
superb  training  of  the  German  navy. 

BRITISH  LOSS: 

TONNAGE  PRIMARY  ARMAMENT 

Super-Dreadnaught 

"  Audacious  "     23,400  10—13.5  in.,  16 — 4  in. 

Pre-Dreadnaught 

"Bulwark"    15,250  4— 12  in.,  12— 6  in. 

Armoured  Cruiser 

"  Warrior "     13,550  6—  9  in.,    4—7.5  in. 

"  Good  Hope  "   14,300  2—  9  in.,  16—6  in. 

"  Aboukir  "   12,200  2—  9  in.,  12—6  in. 

"  Cressy  "    12,200  2—  9  in.,  12—6  in. 

"  Hogue "    12,200  2—  9  in.,  12—6  in. 

"Monmouth"    9,950  14— 6  in. 

Protected  Cruiser 

"  Hawke  "     7,500  2—  9  in.,  10—6  in. 

"Hermes"    5,700  11— 6  in. 

"Amphion"    3,500  10 — 4  in. 

"Pathfinder"    3,000  9— 4  in. 

"  Pegasus  "     2,200  8 — 4  in. 

Mine  Sweeper 

"Niger"    820 

Gunboat 

"Speedy"    800 

Destroyer 

"  Bullfinch  "   400     Total  Primary  Armament : 

Submarines  10—13.5";    4—12";  16—9" 

AE-1,  E-3,  and  D-5  . .  2,100     4—  7.5";  99—  6";  43—4" 

Total  tons  displacement:  139,070 


154  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

GERMAN  LOSS: 

TONNAGE  PBIMARY  ABMAMENT 

Armoured  Cruiser 

"  Yorck  " 9,500           4—8.2  in. ;  10—5.9  in. 

Protected  Cruiser 

"  Magdeburg  "    4,500                               12 — 4.1  in. 

"  Koln  " 4,280                                12—4.1  in. 

"  Mainz  "    4,232                               12 — 4.1  in. 

Scout  Cruiser 

"  Emden  » 3,544                               10—4.1  in. 

"  Ariadne  *     2,618                               10 — 4.1  in. 

"  Hela " 2,040                               10—4.1  in. 

"  Cormoran "    1,600                                8—4.1  in. 

Gunboat 

"  Jaguar  n 900 

"litis"   900 

"  Luchs  " 900 

"  Tiger  "    900 

Surveying  Ship 

"  Planet "    495    Total  Primary  Armament : 

"  Mowe  "  495         4—8.2" ;  10— 5.9" ;  74—4.1" 

Destroyers 

S115,S117,andS119  1,600 

S124  and  S126  ....  1,050 

S90  and  "  Taku  "  . .  825 

V187    680 

Submarine 

U15    500 

Total  tons  displacement:  41,559 

In  explanation  of  the  above  estimate,  fairness 
compels  me  to  say  that  the  heaviest  German 
loss  was  not  caused  in  hostile  action,  for  the 
Yorck  was  sunk  by  contact  with  a  German  mine. 
Also,  although  primary  armament  is  sup- 
posed to  include  no  weapon  lighter  than  the 
6-inch  rifle,  I  have  taken  the  liberty  of  extend- 
ing this  classification  to  the  4-inch  rifle,  which 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  155 

is  in  reality  a  quick-fire  piece.  It  will  be  seen 
that  while  the  British  loss  in  tonnage  is  more 
than  three  times  greater  than  the  German,  ther 
British  armament  loss  is  even  much  more  severe 
and  out  of  all  proportion  to  that  suffered  by 
the  German  ships.  Even  were  we  to  include  the 
3-inch  rifles  on  the  gunboats,  the  proportion  in 
favour  of  Germany  would  not  be  unbalanced. 
When  we  consider  the  complements  it  appears 
that  something  like  nine  thousand  English 
sailors  and  officers  suffered  death  or  capture 
against  only  one-third  this  number  in  German 
crews. 

Since  the  above  was  written  the  defeat  of 
Admiral  von  Spee's  squadron  off  the  Falkland 
Islands  by  a  vastly  superior  British  force  in- 
creases the  German  loss  in  the  following  pro- 
portions: A  total  tonnage  of  32,250  as  rep- 
resented by  the  Scharnhorst,  Gneisenau,  Leip- 
zig, Numb  erg  and  Dresden,  and  a  total  arma- 
ment of  twenty  8.2-inch,  twelve  6-inch  and 
thirty-two  4.1-inch  rifles.  In  this,  as  in  other 
naval  engagements,  the  Germans  appear  to  have 
fought  to  the  last  man  and  the  last  gun  with  an 
esprit  de  corps  something  akin  to  the  berserker 
fury  of  the  ancient  vikings.    They  refused  to 


156  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

surrender  even  on  honourable  terms,  preferring 
to  meet  death  like  warriors,  singing  their  na- 
tional songs  defiantly  with  their  faces  turned 
toward  the  flag  until  the  waves  closed  over  them. 
The  English  admiral  deserves  credit  for  tactical 
efficiency  in  rounding  up  and  destroying  the 
elusive  enemy  without  much  damage  to  his  own 
squadron,  which  was  so  vastly  superior,  both  in 
armour  and  armament,  as  to  enable  him  to  crip- 
ple the  Germans  at  the  maximum  range  before 
they  could  return  his  fire  effectively.  The  fight 
was  so  unequal  as  to  be  a  foregone  conclusion : 
12-inch  ordnance  scoring  over  8-inch  ordnance 
in  perfect  conformity  with  the  artillery  manuals. 
The  advantage  was  with  the  British  but  the 
Germans  reaped  the  glory.  I  do  not  mean 
to  intimate  by  this  that  valour  is  a  historical 
rather  than  an  active  quality  in  the  British 
navy.  The  dash  of  an  English  submarine  below 
several  rows  of  anchor-mines  guarding  the  Dar- 
danelles, resulting  in  the  sinking  of  an  obsolete 
Turkish  battleship,  proves  that  the  British  are 
not  content  with  sporting  the  laurels  of  gallant 
traditions,  but  quite  capable  of  emulating  the 
Germans  in  adventuresome  exploit. 
Technically  speaking,  the  German  naval  raid 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  157 

on  the  Scarborough,  Hartlepool,  Whitby  bases 
was  a  most  efficiently  conducted  operation, 
and  apparently  without  a  flaw.  The  main 
object — to  elude  a  superior  and  vigilant  enemy 
and  shell  his  coast  effectively  before  he  could 
gather  for  pursuit — was  accomplished  without 
a  hitch.  The  Germans  made  their  way  despite 
fog  and  mine  fields,  and  took  their  vessels  in- 
shore where  no  British  pilot  has  ever  taken 
ships  of  that  size.  Their  maps  were  accurate, 
and  in  thirty  minutes  their  artillery  had  found 
the  vital  spots  in  the  coastal  targets  selected. 
In  effecting  their  escape  the  Germans  appear 
to  have  destroyed  some  of  the  enemy's  torpedo 
craft,  and  every  phase  of  their  action  seems  to 
have  been  most  accurately  timed  and  skilfully 
carried  out.  To  be  sure,  the  raid  accomplished 
no  purpose  of  material  consequence  beyond  the 
punishment  inflicted  on  the  coast  towns  under 
fire,  but  it  demonstrated  the  fact  that  England 
can  be  invaded  from  the  sea,  and  that  the 
British  navy  cannot  be  relied  upon  absolutely 
to  prevent  attack — and  the  moral  effect  of  this 
experience  is  an  asset  of  no  mean  calibre. 

To  compare  this  raid  to  the  cross-ravaging 
methods  of  the  ancient  freebooter,  and  to  cen- 


158  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

sure  Germany  for  bombarding  the  English  coast 
while  British  vessels  bombard  German  bases  on 
the  Belgian  coast,  is  little  less  than  ridiculous 
in  a  military  sense,  whatever  it  may  be  con- 
strued to  mean  ethically. 


British  vs.  German  Naval  Status 

While  it  is  quite  apparent  to  an  unprejudiced 
eye  that  the  British  navy  has  not  been  able  to 
prevent  its  weaker  adversary  from  inflicting 
vastly  more  damage  than  it  could  deal  in  turn, 
it  should  be  said  in  justice  that  the  British  navy 
on  the  whole  has  accomplished  the  mission  in- 
trusted to  its  care,  nevertheless.  The  British 
blockade  still  remains  intact.  Under  its  pres- 
sure German  raids  have  been  confined  to  the 
submarine  arm,  with  one  exception.  The  navy 
made  it  possible,  by  adequate  convoy  lines,  to 
transport  the  entire  available  expeditionary 
army  to  French  soil,  a  feat  that  had  something 
to  do  with  staying  the  German  flanking  offen- 
sive. The  navy  swept  German  commerce  from 
the  seas  and  policed  the  ocean  lanes  sufficiently 
to  insure  the  safe  passage  of  troop  transports 
bearing  reinforcements  from  Canada  and  India, 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  159 

not  a  small  task,  taken  in  the  aggregate,  even 
for  a  big  navy. 

Despite  the  heavy  punishment  suffered,  the 
British  navy  is  measurably  stronger  at  this 
writing  than  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  owing  to 
the  addition  of  such  vessels  as  were  acquired 
or  have  been  finished  in  the  meantime.  As  to 
the  immediate  future,  the  status  of  the  German 
naval  programme  is  such  that  Germany  will 
gain  proportionally  more  in  new  additions  to 
her  fighting  units  before  February,  1915,  than 
will  England.  Assuming  that  the  building 
operations  will  not  fall  short  of  schedule,  Ger- 
many should  have  3  super-dreadnaughts  ready 
in  this  interim  against  2  British  ships  of  the 
same  class.  The  Konig,  Markgraf  and  Grosser 
Kurfurst,  each  displacing  26,575  tons,  are  a 
more  necessary  and  valuable  addition  to  the 
German  naval  needs  than  the  War  spite  and 
Queen  Elizabeth,  each  of  27,500  tons,  are  to  the 
already  greatly  superior  English  fleet.  Ger- 
many also  has  3  battle  cruisers  building,  all 
measuring  up  to  the  30,000  tons  mark — the 
Victoria  Luise,  Hertha  and  Lutzow — all  of 
them  superior  to  the  Moltke  and  Goeben  class, 
which  would  strengthen  this  arm  of  her  fleet  so 


160  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

that  she  could  venture  to  match  it  against  Eng- 
land's squadron  of  10  battle  cruisers.  Besides, 
no  vessels  of  this  class  are  now  building  in 
British  yards.  In  armoured  cruiser  construction 
there  is  no  activity  on  either  side,  but  in  the 
Graudenz  and  Regensburg  Germany  has  two 
fine  5,000-ton  cruisers  of  271^-knot  speed  that 
should  leave  the  ways  before  England  could 
launch  any  of  her  newly-planned  30-knotters 
of  the  3,800-ton  class. 

As  far  as  building  activities  may  influence 
the  naval  strategy  of  the  opponents  it  is  evi- 
dent that  while  it  may  be  a  matter  of  compara- 
tive indifference  to  England  as  to  the  time  most 
favourable  for  a  pitched  battle,  there  is  every 
incentive  on  Germany's  part  to  assume  the  of- 
fensive as  soon  as  her  new  battle  units  are  ready 
for  action,  as  she  will  then  have  reached  her 
greatest  attainable  strength. 

In  the  destroyer  and  submarine  arm  there  is 
considerable  building  activity  on  both  sides. 
Exactly  what  the  proportional  developments 
are,  it  is  not  possible  to  estimate,  but  it  is  highly 
probable  that  Germany  will  try  to  increase  her 
submarine  arm  to  the  very  utmost;  at  least,  she 
has  a  dominant  incentive  to  increase  the  arm 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  161 

whereby  she  has  scored  her  main  successes  even 
to  the  point  of  actually  commissioning  craft  of 
the  super-submarine  class.  England,  on  the 
other  hand,  being  tactically  on  the  defensive, 
is  probably  striving  to  strengthen  her  destroyer 
flotillas  as  the  most  readily  available  defence 
against  submarine  attacks. 

The  operations  of  the  German  right  wing 
along  the  Ypres  channel  have  puzzled  many  ob- 
servers. Why  such  tremendous  military  sacri- 
fices should  be  deemed  expedient  to  occupy  an 
additional  strip  of  coast  line,  does  not  appear, 
at  first  glance,  to  be  an  essential  military  re- 
quirement. Only  when  the  strategical  objective 
of  the  German  admiralty  is  admitted  to  consid- 
eration does  the  military  necessity  for  this  des- 
perately contended  offensive  coincide  with  the 
naval  plan. 

It  is  not  possible  to  adequately  mine  the  strait 
of  Dover.  The  depth  of  the  current-swept  chan- 
nel at  this  point  precludes  the  planting  of  mine 
fields  to  effectually  repel  submarine  operations, 
whereas  the  distance — some  twenty-two  miles — 
is  eminently  favourable  to  concerted  action  by 
submarine  flotillas. 

Moreover,  should  the  Germans  take  Calais 


162  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

and  convert  it  into  an  advanced  naval  base  they 
would  be  well  placed  for  preventing  further 
reinforcements  to  the  British  expeditionary 
army.  Also,  should  the  Germans  reassume  the 
offensive  against  Paris,  based  on  this  point, 
the  German  right  wing,  protected  by  the  Channel 
from  molestation,  would  be  in  a  stronger  posi- 
tion than  during  the  drive  of  the  von  Kluck 
army.  Besides,  such  a  movement,  or  even  a 
stand  made  here,  would  prevent  a  concerted 
operation  of  the  British  expeditionary  army 
and  the  British  navy  against  the  German  naval 
bases  at  Wilhelmshaven,  Emden  and  Cuxhaven. 
The  capture  of  Antwerp  was  the  first  link  in 
this  chain  of  preventive  measures  against  just 
such  a  move.  The  fighting  along  the  Ypres 
channel  was  the  final  anvil  blow,  and  if  the  chain 
has  been  forged  by  the  time  this  book  can  ap- 
pear the  importance  of  Calais  as  a  determining 
factor  will  hardly  need  further  explanation.  Had 
the  Germans  incautiously  pushed  on  to  Paris 
— a  movement  of  more  political  than  strategic 
importance — they  would  have  exposed  them- 
selves to  a  flanking  attack,  not  only  on  land  but 
on  their  blockaded  coast,  and  jeopardised  their 
naval  force  at  a  very  disadvantageous  moment. 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  163 


Chaos  in  Naval  Nomenclature 

Thanks  to  omniscient  newspaper  strategists 
the  public  mind  in  this  country  is  now  in  such 
a  deplorably  chaotic  state  in  regard  to  naval 
matters  that  a  little  elucidation  on  certain  basic, 
elementary  points  may  find  readers. 

In  these  days  when  boatswains  do  no 
"swaining,"  and  ship's  carpenters  do  no  car- 
pentering, and  seamen  are  largely  incapable  of 
seamanship,  naval  employments  are  not  what 
they  used  to  be,  that  is,  the  terms  remain  but  the 
functions  have  been  altered,  or,  as  an  American 
would  say,  the  job  has  changed.  The  flag  com- 
mand and  the  post  commission  are  the  chief 
emblems  of  the  highest  naval  executive  rank. 
A  fleet  admiral  may  have  under  his  command  no 
less  than  two  divisions  of  eight  battleships  each, 
ten  armoured  cruisers,  six  protected  scouts,  and 
twenty-four  destroyers.  This  fleet  is  divided 
into  various  individual  correlative  flag  com- 
mands held  by  vice  or  rear  admirals.  Ordi- 
narily, a  full  admiral  would  be  assigned  six 
battleships  of  such  a  unit  while  vice  or  rear 
admirals  would  get  four,  so  that  each  unit  of 


164  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

battleships  with  its  auxiliary  cruisers  and  de- 
stroyers would  be  under  flag  command  by  an 
admiral,  and  all  the  units  of  the  entire  fleet 
under  the  supreme  command  of  the  fleet  ad- 
miral. A  squadron  is  usually  a  unit  or  division 
of  a  fleet,  but  sometimes  the  term  is  applied  to 
what  is  in  reality  a  fleet  intact,  such  as  the  first 
cruiser  squadron  of  the  Channel  fleet. 

Neither  the  fleet  admiral  nor  the  flag  admirals 
attached  to  his  command  have  anything  to  do 
with  the  vessel  that  flies  their  ensign,  which  is 
termed  the  flagship.  An  admiral  merely  uses 
the  latter  as  a  sort  of  naval  headquarters  from 
whence  he  directs  the  executive  command  as 
regards  his  particular  division.  The  flagship 
proper  is  commanded  by  a  post  captain.  He  is 
responsible  for  the  ship  as  the  admiral  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  squadron.  On  a  modern  sea- 
fighter  the  captain  is  very  little  in  evidence, 
however.  He  does  not  stand  on  the  bridge  with 
a  dapper  little  spyglass  as  pictured  in  the  Sun- 
day supplements.  The  chief  navigation  officer 
is  the  man  responsible  for  the  handling  of  the 
vessel  under  way.  The  chief  engineer  is  su- 
preme in  the  engine-room.  The  torpedo  and 
gun  crews  are  under  separate  commands.    The 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  165 

detail  operations  of  these  various  commands  are 
discharged  by  numerous  petty  officers.  In  the 
British  navy  there  are  no  less  than  sixty-nine 
different  ratings  of  such  warrant  officers, 
divided  into  chief  and  petty  grades.  The  "sec- 
ond-in-command," usually  a  post  commander, 
is  the  man  on  whom  devolves  the  lion's  share 
of  what  used  to  be  the  captain's  duties.  He  is 
the  chief  superintending  agent  of  the  vessel, 
and  a  sort  of  focus  of  responsibility.  The  cap- 
tain's office  nowadays  is  more  like  that  of  chief 
inspector  and  final  authority  in  all  matters. 
Of  course,  when  the  decks  are  cleared  for  action 
he  is  in  supreme  executive  command  and  fights 
the  ship  the  same  as  the  admiral,  using  the  flag- 
ship as  his  base,  fights  the  squadron  under  his 
ensign. 

Homogeneity  of  Units 

To  some  it  is  a  mystery  why  warships  are 
being  built  in  classes.  The  Congressional  agi- 
tation in  Washington  is  limited  to  idle  argu- 
ments for  or  against  a  two-ship  or  a  three-ship 
naval  building  programme,  a  secondary  matter 
compared  with  the  far  greater  advantage  of  es- 


166  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

tablishing  and  maintaining  a  homogeneous  fleet. 
It  is  of  no  use  to  build  battleships  unless  they 
are  at  the  same  time  supplemented  by  the  neces- 
sary number  of  cruisers  and  scouts  and  de- 
stroyers to  insure  their  maximum  efficiency  in 
line  of  battle.  A  homogeneous  fleet  is  one  con- 
sisting of  squadrons  of  capital  ships  built  on 
the  class  principle  supplemented  by  squadrons 
of  cruisers  and  auxiliaries  built  on  the  same 
principle.  A  heterogeneous  fleet  is  one  con- 
sisting of  good  " ideas"  and  political  poppy- 
cock. To  illustrate,  a  modern  homogeneous 
squadron  would  include,  say  four  capital  vessels 
of  super-dreadnaught  calibre  capable  of  25 
knots,  complemented  by  eight  armoured  cruisers 
of  28  knots,  twelve  protected  scouts  of  30  knots, 
and  a  flotilla  of  35-knot  destroyers.  In  such  a 
squadron  the  vessels  that  must  of  necessity  be 
possessed  of  extreme  speed  in  order  to  do  the 
work  assigned  to  them  efficiently — the  destroy- 
ers and  the  scouts — are  able  to  move  as  a  unit 
at  their  highest  maximum  speed.  One  ship  is 
as  good  and  as  fast  and  as  well  armed  as  any 
other  ship  of  that  unit.  Likewise,  the  armoured 
cruisers  are  able  to  manoeuvre  and  fight  as  a 
unit,  and  the  battleship  division  can  be  sent 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  167 

into  action,  when  the  cruisers  have  prepared 
the  way,  with  the  certainty  that  no  one  vessel 
will  outspeed  any  other  and  that  all  the  vessels 
are  equal  in  combative  power.  Homogeneity  in 
speed,  in  steaming  radius,  in  offensive  and  de- 
fensive armament,  and  in  class  of  the  units 
composing  a  squadron,  or  in.  the  squadrons  com- 
posing a  fleet,  is  what  makes  a  naval  force  ef- 
fective and  efficient.  The  addition  of  fighting 
vessels  not  belonging  in  any  class  or  unit  of 
such  a  force,  no  matter  how  powerful,  is  not  an 
advantage  but  rather  a  detriment  unless  enough 
such  vessels  are  added  to  constitute  a  unit  by 
themselves.  If  the  above  outlined  fleet  were 
added  to  by  two  super-dreadnaughts  of  28  knots, 
the  speed  of  the  battle  unit  would  still  remain 
at  25  knots,  and  as  the  3  extra  knots  were  in- 
tended to  give  the  28-knot  vessel  a  chance  to 
select  her  range  and  position  in  an  action,  this 
advantage  is  lost.  They  would  be  fought  and 
handled  under  fire  as  if  they  were  what  they 
are  not,  25-knot  vessels,  because  the  action 
would  be  based  on  the  class  and  capacity  of  the 
main  unit  of  25-knot  battleships. 

If  the  agricultural  gentlemen  on  whom  this 
country  bravely  relies  to  build  up  its  naval  de- 


168  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

fence  were  to  have  their  way,  the  United  States 
navy  should  every  year  have  a  brace  of  mon- 
ster vessels  that  would  be  able  to  run  away 
from  any  vessels  previously  built  and  so  on 
indefinitely  until  it  would  be  impossible  to 
gather  a  squadron  of  fighting  vessels  that  could 
be  manoeuvred  together  and  properly  comple- 
mented, and  this,  then,  would  be  a  hetero- 
geneous fleet.  The  French  navy  is  a  good  ex- 
ample of  baneful  heterogeneous  building  plans. 
It  is  a  collection  of  good  " ideas,"  not  a  fleet. 

Contrary  to  the  popular  idea  the  lookout  in 
the  "crow's  nest"  is  not  the  man  who  finds  the 
range  and  tells  the  gunners  where  to  shoot. 
What  was  once  the  fighting  top  of  a  battleship, 
bristling  with  rapid  artillery,  is  now  the  fire- 
control  station,  fitted  with  apparatus  for  range 
finding  and  observation.  An  electrical  switch- 
board connects  this  station  with  every  primary 
battery. 

The  heavy  guns  are  inclosed  in  turrets,  pro- 
tected by  barbettes,  which  are  in  reality  little 
citadels  of  armour-plate  surmounted  by  cupolas. 
The  barbettes  turn  with  the  guns  on  cylinders. 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  169 

Naval  vs.  Military  Strategy 

The  strategical  speed  of  a  vessel  is  its  steam- 
ing distance,  the  factor  of  mobility  that  deter- 
mines its  radius  of  action.  The  tactical  speed 
is  the  maximum  pace  at  which  the  vessel  can  be 
manoeuvred  when  going  into  action.  The  rated 
speed  is  determined  by  a  series  of  trial  trips 
when  the  vessel  is  taken  over  a  measured  course 
under  forced  draught,  aided  by  supplementary 
personnel  and  such  added  contingencies  as  can- 
not be  secured  under  service  conditions,  hence, 
the  rated  speed  is  always  somewhat  in  advance 
of  practical  service  performance. 

The  principles  of  naval  strategy  are  radically 
different  from  military  strategy.  On  land  the 
offensive  is  the  weapon  of  the  stronger,  the 
defensive  is  the  lot  of  the  weaker.  At  sea  the 
opposite  is  the  case.  The  more  powerful  naval 
force  will  always  attempt  preventive  measures 
against  the  less  powerful  force,  which  will  al- 
ways seek  to  checkmate  such  measures  by  inter- 
mittent attacks.  The  British  navy  is  at  present 
on  the  defensive,  trying  to  prevent  the  German 
fleet  from  breaking  through  the  blockade  by 


170  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

virtue  of  which  Germany's  sea  power  is  im- 
mobilised. But  in  order  to  do  more  than  this — 
to  win  an  action  or  a  fleet  battle — the  British 
fleet  must  move  on  the  German  and  risk  its  ves- 
sels against  coastal  forts  supporting  hostile 
vessels.  History  shows  that  naval  victories  are 
won  not  on  the  home  base  but  in  hostile  waters. 
Even  the  German  submarine  raids  were  not  won 
near  the  German  coast. 

The  Under -Munitioned  American  Navy 

The  factor  of  preparedness  is  a  far  more  im- 
portant character  in  naval  warfare  to-day  than 
ever  before  in  the  history  of  the  world.  An 
army  taken  unawares  can  be  mobilised  in  a  com- 
paratively short  time;  raw  recruits  can  be 
drilled  for  trench  duty  in  ten  weeks.  But  a 
navy  taken  unawares  cannot  be  mobilised. 
Ships  cannot  be  improvised  like  recruits.  There 
is  no  such  thing  as  mobilising  new  units  to  a 
naval  force.  The  navy  must  take  such  vessels 
as  it  has  and  fight  them  with  such  crews  as  it 
has.  The  only  kind  of  mobilisation  possible  is 
in  bringing  the  various  crews  up  to  their  full 
war  complements,  but  that  concerns  at  best  only 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  171 

a  few  thousand  men.  Increased  activity  in  the 
manufacture  of  ammunition  is  also  possible,  but 
that  benefits  chiefly  the  rapid  artillery  because 
heavy  ordnance  ammunition  requires  an  ex- 
tremely long  time  to  produce.  The  only  addi- 
tional vessels  a  navy  can  count  on  in  the  face  of 
war  are  such  as  are  building,  and  may  be  com- 
pleted quickly,  and  such  as  it  may  acquire  by 
purchase  or  capture. 

The  British  and  the  German  navies  are 
models  of  homogeneous  construction  and  su- 
perior preparedness  in  every  department.  Of 
the  remaining  great  navies  that  of  the  United 
States  is  without  a  doubt  least  fitted  for  actual 
combat.  The  vessels  are  as  good  as  similar 
vessels  of  the  leading  navies,  but  the  tendency 
to  heterogeneous  construction  cuts  down  the 
vessels  suitable  for  duty  in  first-line-of-battle 
to  a  surprisingly  small  number.  And  of  the 
vessels  suitable  for  this  duty  only  a  few  homo- 
geneous battle  units  can  be  built.  The  actual 
effective  naval  force  which  an  American  fleet 
admiral  could  oppose  against  an  enemy  would 
represent  something  like  half  of  the  American 
naval  strength  on  paper,  for  not  only  would  it 
be  lacking  in  the  number  of  vessels  fit,  but  it 


172  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

would  be  short  of  personnel,  short  of  auxiliaries, 
and,  most  dangerous  of  all,  it  would  be  short 
of  ammunition. 

While  it  takes  five  years  to  develop  an  expert 
gun-captain,  and  four  years  to  complete  a 
super-dreadnaught,  it  requires  no  less  than  four 
years  to  manufacture  a  full  complement  of 
heavy  naval  ordnance  ammunition.  At  this  rate 
it  is  obviously  futile  to  dispatch  "rush"  orders 
to  the  arsenals  once  war  is  declared,  and  should 
this  happen  at  the  present  time,  and  for  some 
time  to  come,  the  under-munitioned  American 
navy  could  not  hope  to  fight  a  successful  battle 
with  the  navy  of  a  first-class  power. 

The  maximum  capacity  of  the  United  States 
government  arsenals  is  only  500  14-inch  shells 
in  one  year — just  barely  enough  to  supply  one- 
fifth  of  the  dreadnaught  line  of  battle  with  its 
full  quota  of  projectiles.  And  this  was  a  record 
performance,  requiring  a  force  of  more  than 
2,000  men  working  double  time. 

What  about  the  other  four-fifths  of  the  big 
sea-fighters?  Aided  by  the  steel  works  at  Beth- 
lehem, Midvale  and  Watervliet,  and  such  private 
machine  shops  as  are  or  could  be  equipped  to 
make  projectiles,  it  is  possible  that  the  govern- 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  173 

ment  arsenals  might  achieve  a  complete  com- 
plement of  heavy  ammunition  for  the  entire 
navy  somewhat  within  the  four-year  limit.  We 
must  not  forget  that  in  the  meanwhile  the 
American  fleet  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  an  at- 
tacking fleet  inferior  in  tonnage  but  complete 
as  to  ammunition  requirements. 

It  is  not  so  much  a  question  as  to  whether  a 
three-ship  or  a  six-ship  standard  of  naval  pro- 
gramme is  adopted  in  future.  Three  super- 
dreadnaughts  completely  equipped  with  am- 
munition and  skilled  crews,  and  adequately  sup- 
ported with  the  auxiliaries  necessary  to  warrant 
their  maximum  efficiency  in  line  of  battle — such 
as  scouts,  cruisers,  colliers,  repair  ships,  etc.— 
would  constitute  a  far  more  formidable  weapon 
on  the  high  seas  than  six  such  vessels  with  in- 
sufficient ammunition,  incomplete  auxiliaries 
and  green  crews.  It  is  the  time  required,  not 
the  cost  involved,  that  the  American  Congress 
should  consider  in  planning  an  adequate  navy. 

Strategically,  the  greatest  handicap  to  battle 
efficiency  in  the  American  navy  is  the  lack  of 
an  admiralty  or  a  trained  general  staff  of  offi- 
cers. The  substitution  of  a  so-called  "board 
of  strategy''  in  the  emergency  of  war  is  a  poor 


174  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

makeshift.  What  the  general  staff  is  to  the 
army  the  admiralty  is  to  the  navy.  An  army 
without  the  coordinate  leadership  of  a  general 
staff  is  merely  a  horde  of  armed  men  and  quite 
helpless  on  the  modern  battlefield.  With  no 
thought  of  injuring  national  pride  I  do  not  hesi- 
tate to  say  that  a  single  army  corps  of  first-line 
German  troops  would  be  sufficient  to  deal  with 
the  entire  American  army  of  regulars.  Against 
a  completely  equipped  and  superbly  led  force  of 
45,000  troops,  the  American  army  could  only 
muster  about  55,000  fully  equipped  regulars, 
commanded  by  officers  with  no  divisional  or 
corps  training  nor  versed  in  tactics  on  the  gen- 
eral scale. 

A  navy  without  an  admiralty  is  only  a  collec- 
tion of  ships.  Even  if  the  ships  are  quite  as 
good  as  similar  ships  in  other  navies  they  can- 
not be  used  against  an  enemy,  to  the  complete 
extent  of  their  maximum  efficiency,  without  the 
preparatory  plans  and  strategic  leadership  of  a 
general  sea  staff  or  admiralty.  Not  until  a 
coherent  plan  of  organisation  is  perfected,  pro- 
viding for  thoroughgoing  military  method  and 
cooperation  between  fleet  divisions  and  an 
admiralty  staff  in  close  accord  with  the  navy 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  175 

department,  may  the  American  navy  hope  to  be- 
come something  more  than  a  string  of  ships. 
Individually,  ship  for  ship,  the  Americans  show 
up  pretty  well,  and  they  would  approach  the 
standard  of  the  German  and  British  navies  were 
they  not  under-manned  as  well  as  under-muni- 
tioned. The  suggestions  now  being  made  for 
improving  the  navy  would  only  raise  the  in- 
dividual vessel  to  the  foreign  standard,  and  the 
navy  would  still  remain  third-class  as  a  whole, 
even  if  Congress  kept  on  adding  vessels  until 
England  would  be  equalled  in  tonnage.  Navies 
do  not  enter  into  duels  with  single  ships,  but 
sail  into  battle  action  with  fleets  composed  of 
many  ships.  Hence,  it  is  not  so  much  a  question 
of  what  a  certain  vessel  can  do  as  how  many 
vessels  of  the  same  class  can  be  fought  as  a 
squadron,  and  how  many  such  squadrons  can 
be  ranged  into  fleet  formation  in  uniformly 
equipped  and  homogeneous  battle  units.  As  mat- 
ters stand  now  the  American  navy  is  not  only 
incapable  of  defending  the  country  from  event- 
ual attack  by  a  smaller  but  better  organised 
navy,  but  it  constitutes  a  menace  to  the  national 
security  in  that  its  very  presence  lulls  to  sleep 
the  fears  of  the  average  American  citizen  as 


176  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

certainly  as  it  invites  hostile  aggression. 
Sooner  or  later  the  so-called  Monroe  doctrine 
will  compel  the  United  States  to  fight  for  it 
or  drop  it.  It  is  altogether  too  sweeping  in  its 
contentions  to  remain  unchallenged  indefinitely. 
With  Japan  in  control  of  Germany's  island 
bases  in  the  Pacific,  forming  as  they  do  an  iron 
girdle  around  the  Philippines,  the  blow  may 
come  first  from  the  Japanese.  Should  this  hap- 
pen now  the  American  navy  would  be  compelled 
to  go  into  action  without  any  general  plan  of 
attack,  without  any  plan  of  battle  approach, 
and  without  subordinate  plans  for  the  torpedo 
and  submarine  arms.  It  would  be  obliged  to 
improvise  these  cardinal  essentials  on  which 
foreign  navies,  including  the  Japanese,  have 
spent  years  of  preparation,  and  its  fine  vessels 
and  competent  personnel  would  be  dispatched 
into  action  in  a  haphazard,  discreditable,  unmili- 
tary  manner,  nothing  short  of  criminal  negli- 
gence. The  navy  would  not  be  to  blame  for  de- 
feat under  these  conditions.  Only  miracles 
could  prevent  it. 

According  to  official  estimates,  prepared  since 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  a  fleet  of  some 
two  hundred  colliers  and  merchantmen  would  be 


THE  CAPITAL  SHIP  177 

necessary  to  supply  fuel  and  provisions  to  the 
American  navy  when  operating  five  thousand 
miles  from  its  home  bases  under  war  service 
conditions.  Such  a  fleet  of  merchantmen  is  not 
available.  As  a  substitute  the  naval  auxiliaries 
might  be  used,  to  the  serious  detriment  of  the 
entire  campaign,  of  course.  The  first-line  of 
battle  vessels  would  have  no  fast  cruiser 
squadron  to  fall  back  on  for  scouting.  There 
are  three  such  vessels  averaging  20  knots, 
against  28  to  30  knots  in  foreign  navies,  and 
there  is  not  a  single  30-  to  35-knot  destroyer  in 
the  American  navy  that  cannot  be  overhauled 
by  any  foreign  battle  cruiser  of  28  knots  in 
rough  weather. 

Eecord  scores  of  individual  gun  crews  are 
desirable,  but  it  is  well-nigh  fatal  to  depend 
upon  them  and  neglect  the  main  requirements  of 
the  navy  as  a  whole.  In  the  naval  engagement 
off  the  coast  of  Santiago,  when  a  far  superior 
squadron  of  American  battleships  attacked  four 
Spanish  cruisers,  there  were  forty-one  actual 
hits  out  of  a  total  of  nearly  two  thousand  shells 
fired  by  the  Americans.  There  are  several  crack 
gun  crews  in  the  United  States  navy  that  meas- 
ure up  to  European  standards  of  efficiency,  but 


178  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

here  again  we  encounter  an  improvement  that 
only  affects  certain  vessels  for  a  certain  time 
and  does  not  establish  the  navy  as  a  whole  on  a 
standard  basis  of  efficiency.  It  is  the  well-worn 
"  star  "  idea  of  the  variety  circus  applied  to 
naval  needs,  and  while  these  are  not  bettered  by 
it  there  is  an  element  of  "  hurrah  M  patriotism 
in  it,  which  is  very  valuable  material,  indeed,  to 
the  bold  and  fearless  gentlemen  who  are  en- 
gaged in  the  pursuit  of  politics  and  journalism. 
In  the  opinion  of  the  writer  extreme  speed, 
great  cruising  range,  heavy  armament  and  but 
little  armour  are  destined  to  be  the  dominant 
features  in  the  capital  ship  of  the  future.  A 
vessel  armed  with  15-inch  rifles  in  centre-line 
turrets,  capable  of  30-knot  speed  and  endowed 
with  a  steaming  radius  of  some  6,000  miles, 
would  not  need  the  protection  of  armour  except 
in  the  water-line  and  in  the  turrets.  Such  a 
vessel  would  assume  the  proportions  of  a  super- 
battle  cruiser  and  could  outfight  the  heaviest 
super-dreadnaught  afloat. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  TURRET  FORT 

A  Bull's-Eye 

The  Belgian  gunners  in  Fort  Pontisse,  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Meuse,  fought  like  fiends  and 
endured  like  heroes.  Shell  after  shell  smashed 
itself  into  shivers  of  steel  splinters  against  the 
armoured  dome  of  the  big  turret.  Shrapnel  ex- 
ploded on  the  glacis,  ploughing  ugly  scars  in  the 
greensward,  and  on  the  very  parapets  they 
would  burst,  with  a  blinding  crash,  hurling  hot 
slugs  and  splinters  through  the  embrasures, 
killing  the  men  behind  the  guns.  But  that  mat- 
tered little.  New  men  jumped  to  the  vacant 
post,  men  stripped  to  the  waist  swarthy  with 
smoke,  men  gleaming  from  sweat  and  decorated 
with  bloody  wounds. 

The  lieutenant,  his  blackened  head  wrapped 
in  white  bandages,  stood  by  the  gunlayers  di- 
recting the  firing  with  reeling  brain.  Half  of  his 
men  were  in  the  lazaret  below,  in  the  concrete 
bowels  of  the  fort.  His  captain  was  killed,  his 
brother  officers  were  maimed,  but  still  he  kept 
on  doing  his  duty  heroically. 

The  ammunition  hoist  jams  and  he  goes  below 

179 


180  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

to  give  directions.  The  crew  in  the  overheated 
vault  is  more  dead  than  alive.  Some  of  them 
have  turned  raving  mad  and  attack  their  com- 
rades with  sword  bayonets';  others  appear  to 
have  lost  their  hearing.  With  drawn  revolver 
the  officer  establishes  authority  in  the  pandemo- 
nium raging  among  the  blackened,  crazed  crew 
in  the  inferno  below. 

"To-night  we  shall  have  r enforcements  and 
provisions!"  he  cries,  and  the  men  rally  with 
hoarse  cheers  and  a  "Vive  Belgique!"  But 
"to-night"  never  comes.  As  the  officer  mounts 
the  winding  stair  to  the  cupola  where  the  cannon 
belch  forth  their  crashing  salvos,  something 
strikes  the  big  dome  with  the  force  of  an  earth- 
quake and  rends  it  in  half.  There  is  a  thunder- 
ous explosion  with  a  blinding  flash  of  smoke 
and  fumes.  As  the  smoke  rolls  away  there  is 
revealed  to  view  a  ghastly  crater  of  jagged 
armour-plate  and  broken  concrete  littered  with 
shattered  cannon  and  torn  shreds  of  bleeding 
bodies  while  from  below  comes  a  horror-stricken 
swarm  of  yelling  imbeciles — black,  panting, 
sweating  and  with  bloodshot  eyes — struggling 
through  the  debris  like  a  horde  from  hell  on 
doomsday! 

The  official  report  states  that  Fort  Pontisse, 
"after  gallantly  withstanding  the  fire  of  the 
enemy's  field  batteries,  was  finally  reduced  by 
a  42-centimetre  shell." 


Gruson  Forts  Not  Obsolete 

Is  the  modern  type  of  permanent  fortress 
obsolete  ?  Is  the  alleged  impregnability  of  steel- 
turreted  Gruson  forts  a  myth?  Why,  since  the 
heavy  German  siege  artillery  was  able  to  re- 
duce the  strongest  fortifications  in  Belgium  and 
northern  France,  are  the  barrier  forts  opposite 
the  German  line  between  Verdun  and  Toul,  and 
Epinal  and  Belfort,  still  intact? 

Most  of  the  Gruson  forts  referred  to  were 
designed  to  withstand  the  onslaught  of  4-inch 
and  6-inch  field  guns  and  7-inch  and  9-inch  siege 
artillery.  The  bombardment  of  Liege,  Antwerp, 
Maubeuge,  La  Fere,  Laon,  and  similar  perma- 
nent works,  shows  plainly  enough  that  they  per- 
formed their  duty  and  were  able  to  stand  up 
under  the  fire  of  batteries  superior,  not  only  in 
number  of  guns,  but  in  calibre  as  well.  It  was 
not  until  the  30.2-  and  42-centimetre  artillery 
w^as  emplaced  against  them  that  the  forts  crum- 
bled up  and  failed  to  take  a  strain  for  which 
they  were  never  designed.    Every  German  ar- 

181 


182  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

tillery  officer  knew  that  this  would  happen,  but 
the  French  officers  did  not  know  it  until  the 
first  shot  found  its  mark.  This  feat  does  not 
prove  that  Gruson  forts  are  obsolete,  contrary 
to  the  general  opinion;  it  merely  shows  that 
forts,  like  other  products  of  engineering  skill, 
cannot  be  expected  to  perform  service  out  of  all 
proportion  to  their  original  capacity.  There 
are  Gruson  batteries  in  the  German  coastal 
forts,  dotting  the  line  between  Wilhelmshaven 
and  Brunsbiittel,  which  are  designed  to  with- 
stand 12-inch  and  13-inch  naval  artillery  and 
capable  of  returning  the  compliment  with  15- 
and  17-inch  pieces.  Had  the  French  and  the 
Belgian  forts  had  the  advantage  of  such  pon- 
derous installations,  and  had  the  42-centimetre 
artillery  nevertheless  succeeded  in  reducing 
them  ultimately,  it  would  be  logical  to  conclude 
that  the  attack  had  once  more  beaten  the  de- 
fence in  artillery  practice.  As  the  matter 
stands  now,  nothing  has  been  settled  beyond  the 
fact  that  6-  and  8-inch  Gruson  turrets  are  no 
match  for  heavy  Krupp  siege  guns.  There  is 
but  one  possibility  of  arriving  at  a  conclusive 
determination  of  the  issue  in  case  those  of  the 
vessels  in  the  British  channel  squadron,  which 


THE  TUREET  FORT  183 

mount  15-inch  rifles,  would  try  these  weapons 
on  the  armoured  domes  of  the  German  coastal 
forts,  but  there  is  not  much  likelihood  that  such 
costly  ships  would  be  permitted  to  risk  their 
armoured  skin  in  a  sanguinary  attack  of  this 
order.  We  have  the  declaration  of  a  seasoned 
and  fearless  critic — the  former  British  sea-lord, 
Admiral  Beresford — that  only  madness  could 
move  a  naval  commander  to  oppose  coastal 
works  of  this  type  and  calibre. 

Infantry  Protecting  Artillery 

The  forts  on  the  barrier  line  Verdun-Belfort 
have  not  been  engaged,  not  because  the  Germans 
have  not  a  sufficient  quota  of  heavy  siege  artil- 
lery, but  because  the  German  lines  lack  the 
necessary  reinforcements  to  venture  out  of 
their  present  strong  intrenchments  and  force 
the  emplacement  of  their  30.2-  and  42-centimetre 
guns  within  range  of  the  forts.  On  this  historic 
barrier  line  the  world  is  being  treated  to  the 
spectacle  of  infantry  protecting  forts  from  ar- 
tillery attacks,  whereas  it  is  usually  the  forts  and 
the  artillery  that  are  supposed  to  cover  the  in- 
fantry.   Obviously  it  is  futile  for  the  Germans 


184  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

to  try  to  force  emplacement  when  they  have  not 
the  required  force  of  reserves  to  hold  the  ad- 
vanced position,  which  would  be  instantly  sub- 
jected to  a  combined  attack  en  masse  by  the 
French.  Not  being  able  to  provide  emplace- 
ment within  range  of  hostile  forts,  it  is,  of 
course,  out  of  the  question  to  employ  the  42- 
centimetre  ordnance  at  all,  which  again  proves 
the  fact,  already  elaborated  in  a  previous  chap- 
ter, that  it  is  the  infantry  which  prepares  the 
way  for  the  artillery,  the  latter  being  subject 
to  capture  or  destruction  without  the  support 
of  the  former. 

The  MaJang  of  a  Turret  Fort 

The  barbette  battery,  or  as  it  is  popularly 
termed  the  turret  fort,  which  is  named  after 
its  inventor,  Hermann  Gruson,  a  South-German 
engineer,  is  the  property  of  the  great  gun- 
making  firm,  Krupp  Aktiengesellschaft.  Spe- 
cial machinery  had  to  be  invented  before  it 
was  possible  to  produce  the  armour  required 
for  the  barbettes.  Several  years  of  indefat- 
igable experimenting  and  large  expenditure  of 
capital  followed  before  the   requisite  quality 


THE  TURRET  FORT  185 

of  chilled  cast  iron  could  be  produced  in  the 
proper  quantities.  New  cranes,  moulds,  vats, 
furnaces,  machines,  tools,  etc.,  had  to  be  con- 
trived and  constructed  before  the  systematic 
production  of  barbetted  fortress  batteries  could 
be  undertaken. 

To  the  scout  who  happens  to  get  a  glimpse  of 
a  Gruson  battery  undetected,  it  looks  very  much 
like  the  top  of  a  huge  tortoise  rising  but  a  few 
feet  above  ground.  The  heavy  steel  dome  is 
curved  to  prevent  the  impact  of  shell-fire  at  an 
acute  angle,  and  it  can  be  rotated  around  its 
axis  by  electric  power.  The  rifles  within  the 
barbette  are  mounted  very  much  like  naval 
guns,  and  the  entire  operation  of  serving  and 
loading  the  piece  reminds  of  naval  gun  prac- 
tice rather  than  of  land  artillery.  The  sighting 
and  loading  mechanism  of  the  guns,  and  the  ro- 
tating machinery  of  the  barbette,  complete  the 
contents  of  the  dome.  Below  it  are  concrete 
vaults,  stationary  of  course,  containing  the  am- 
munition magazine  and  hoist,  the  special  en- 
gines for  supplying  power,  pumps,  tools,  etc. 
The  method  of  pointing  such  a  battery  is  very 
interesting.  The  guns  are  not  turned  as  in  a 
field  battery.    The  barbette  is  rotated  until  the 


186  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

guns  are  in  line  with  the  target,  when  the  guns 
are  elevated  or  lowered  in  the  vertical  plane 
according  to  the  range  given.  Ordinarily  this 
would  require  quite  spacious  apertures  in  the 
cupola  to  admit  of  the  upward  and  downward 
pointing  of  the  guns,  and  such  apertures  would 
be  easy  targets  for  hostile  shrapnel  fire.  Gru- 
son  foresaw  this  exigency  and  mounted  his 
guns  in  close-fitting  embrasures  with  the  trun- 
ions  in  movable  bearings  controlled  by  hy- 
draulic pressure.  Instead  of  pointing  the  guns 
up  or  down  as  in  other  battery  systems,  Gruson 
made  a  departure  in  gun-laying  by  fixing  the 
guns  in  embrasures  and  moving  their  breeches 
up  and  down.  The  rotation  of  the  turret  in- 
volves not  only  the  armoured  dome  but  the  com- 
bined weight  of  the  guns,  the  gun-mountings, 
and  the  superstructures.  In  some  of  the  heavy 
coastal  installations  the  total  weight  thus  ma- 
nipulated amounts  to  2,300  tons,  or  a  greater 
bulk  than  has  ever  been  moved  before  with 
mathematical  precision  for  any  use  whatsoever. 


THE  TUEEET  FOET  187 


Steel  Forts  of  Antwerp  Are  German 

Because  the  Belgian  General  Brialmont  was 
instrumental  in  having  Gruson  turrets  installed 
in  his  plan  for  the  defence  of  Antwerp — and 
even  the  plan  proper  was  adapted  from  the 
Prussian  system — the  press  has  not  hesitated 
to  proclaim  him  as  the  inventor.  The  moderni- 
sation of  the  Antwerp  fortifications  dates  from 
1909  and  includes  nine  intrenched  sections  com- 
pletely encircling  the  inner  belt  of  forts,  built 
upon  the  German  plan  with  German  guns  in 
German  Gruson  turrets.  The  only  element  in 
those  forts  that  was  not  German  was  the  officers 
and  crew,  but  as  none  of  the  forts  mounted  ar- 
tillery heavier  than  the  6-inch  calibre  it  is  easy 
to  see  that  they  were  no  match  for  the  Krupp 
and  Skoda  siege  pieces. 

Firing  a  Gruson  Battery 

The  Gruson  batteries  employed  in  coastal 
forts  are  for  the  most  part  of  the  heavy  mortar 
type  designed  for  " high-angle' '  fire,  whereas 
those  in  land  fortifications  use  the  direct  system 


188  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

of  fire  control.  The  gunlayer  in  a  coastal  bat- 
tery cannot  see  the  target  he  is  required  to  hit. 
The  range  is  plotted  for  him  by  an  observer 
stationed,  sometimes  a  mile  away,  at  a  point 
where  he  can  figure  the  angle  undetected.  The 
lowest  elevation  of  the  gun  is  at  45  degrees  and 
the  highest  practical  range  is  marked  by  65 
degrees,  giving  a  zonal  arc  of  fire  of  20  degrees. 
The  target  is  a  war  vessel  and  usually  it  will 
be  manoeuvred  at  a  lively  pace  when  within 
range,  which  further  increases  the  difficulty  of 
making  hits.  Fired  at  the  ultimate  range  of 
65  degrees  the  projectile  will  remain  in  the  air 
somewhat  more  than  a  minute,  during  which 
time  a  swiftly  moving  vessel  will  have  covered 
a  distance  several  times  its  own  length.  This, 
then,  is  allowed  for  by  estimating  the  speed  of 
the  vessel,  but  a  vessel  thus  manoeuvring 
against  a  fort  will  take  care  to  change  its  speed 
as  often  as  desirable  to  disrupt  such  estimates. 
The  projectile,  when  it  lands,  will  not  harass 
the  heavily  armoured  sides  of  the  vessel.  Ow- 
ing to  its  high-angle  path  through  the  air  it  will 
either  penetrate  the  light  steel  decks  or  smash 
the  cupola  of  a  turret  or  the  poorest  protected 
parts  of  a  warship.    But  a  vessel  thus  attacked 


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THE  TURRET  FORT  189 

cannot  answer  with  high-angle  fire.  There  are 
no  mortars  aboardship  for  obvious  reasons. 
Naval  vessels  are  wedded  to  cannon  only,  and 
utilise  what  is  known  as  the  direct-fire  system, 
which  has  the  advantage  of  much  greater  veloc- 
ity and  penetration  than  the  mortar  shell,  but 
also  a  much  harder  task  in  that  the  projectile  is 
supposed  to  hole  the  armour  of  ships  and  steel 
forts.  Mainly  because  war  vessels  are  practi- 
cally helpless  against  the  high-angle  fire  of 
modern  steel  forts,  which  in  themselves  are  very 
poor  targets  for  a  gunner  on  a  floating  plat- 
form, it  has  become  an  axiom  among  naval  com- 
manders not  to  enter  into  combat  with  land 
forts,  at  least  not  forts  of  the  Gruson  type. 

Bigger  than  the  42-Centimetre  €t  Brummers  ** 

Germany  has  about  two  hundred  miles  of 
coast  line  on  the  North  Sea  defended  by  the 
most  complete  system  of  fortification  in  exist- 
ence. Jahde  Bay  alone  is  guarded  by  no  less 
than  thirteen  detached  forts  and  batteries  of 
the  very  heaviest  class.  Some  of  the  Gruson 
turrets  installed  there,  and  at  other  points,  con- 
tain the  most  formidable  coast  artillery  ever 


190  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

built,  the  calibres  running  from  13.9-inch  and 
14.3-inch  to  15.7-inch  and  17.7-inch  ordnance, 
more  ponderous  than  even  the  famous  42-centi- 
metre siege  guns.  Of  course,  these  giant  cali- 
bres are  installed  in  the  turrets  proper  while 
the  cupolas  mount  the  lighter  8.2-inch  and  9.4- 
inch  pieces.  The  average  main  armament  is 
represented  by  10.2-inch,  11-inch  and  13.9-inch 
batteries.  From  the  extreme  southwestern 
island  of  Borkum,  guarding  the  approach  to  the 
Ems  river,  running  eastward  and  northward 
to  the  island  of  Sylt  in  the  North  Frisian  lit- 
toral, the  German  coast  is  defended  by  forti- 
fications of  this  type.  The  fact  that  no  attack 
has  been  ventured  against  them  by  the  greatest 
and  most  powerful  navy  in  the  world,  and  that 
their  mere  presence  has  discouraged  the  enemy 
from  enforcing  his  time-honoured  strategy  to 
establish  the  first  line  of  naval  defence  on  the 
hostile  coast,  is  certainly  a  practical  argument 
upholding  the  defensive  efficacy  of  Gruson  bar- 
betted  fortifications.  Moreover,  the  presence  of 
the  latter  has  compelled  the  British  navy  to  con- 
tent itself  with  an  offshore  blockade  in  greatly 
extended  formation,  no  squadron  venturing 
more  than  two  hundred  miles  from  its  assigned 


THE  TUREET  FORT  191 

base  on  regular  patrol  duty.  This  offshore  dis- 
position of  blockading  units  has  given  the  Ger- 
man torpedo  and  submarine  flotillas  plenty  of 
sea  room  for  assaults  on  the  British  lines  and 
bases,  an  opportunity  of  which  they  have 
availed  themselves  freely.  In  the  celebrated 
Spezzia  tests  when  the  heaviest  cannon  pro- 
duced by  England — a  100-ton  Armstrong  piece 
— hurled  its  2,200-pound  projectile  against  the 
heaviest  Gruson  plate  produced  by  Germany 
without  breaching  it,  though  three  shots  were 
fired  at  close  range  at  the  same  plate,  there 
is  not  the  ghost  of  a  chance  that  British  battle- 
ships mounting  guns  of  inferior  smashing 
power,  being  compelled  to  fire  at  long  range, 
could  seriously  damage  the  Gruson  barbettes 
of  the  German  coast  defence. 

Helgoland — The  Fort  Impregnable 

If  the  pressure  of  the  British  blockade  could 
be  brought  to  bear  on  the  Kiel  canal,  the  British, 
and  not  the  German,  navy  would  be  in  control 
of  Helgoland  Bight.  The  control  would  extend 
in  a  line  running  across  the  bight  from  the 
mouth  of  the  river  Eider  to  Wangeroog  in  the 


192  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

East  Frisian  littoral,  and  a  close-in  blockade 
would  then  be  possible,  checkmating  the  slight- 
est attempt  at  a  German  offensive.  But  the 
island  fortress  of  Helgoland  stands  in  the  way 
spiked  to  the  crags  with  enough  heavy  ordnance 
to  fight  the  entire  British  fleet,  and  whatever 
ships  might  break  through  would  court  certain 
destruction  by  the  German  Hochseeflotte. 

In  the  centre  of  the  island  fortress  is  a  mortar 
battery,  mounting  11-inch  and  16-inch  pieces, 
capable  of  smashing  through  the  decks  of  battle- 
ships at  from  five  to  eight  miles'  range.  The 
direct-fire  batteries  are  placed  in  tiers  one  over 
the  other  to  a  height  of  176  feet  above  sea-level. 
The  heavy  pieces  are  placed  below  and  range  in 
calibre  from  13.9-inch  to  17.7-inch;  the  lighter 
ordnance  is  emplaced  in  the  upper  tiers  and 
consists  of  8.2-inch,  9.4-inch,  10.2-inch  and  11- 
inch  rifles.  Here  is  an  argument  for  the  defence 
offered  by  Gruson  barbetted  forts  that  is  not 
even  partially  answered  by  the  fate  of  the 
inland  forts  in  France  and  Belgium. 


THE  TURRET  FORT  193 


Shooting  Across  the  Channel — in  Print 

Be  it  said  right  here  that  the  reiterated  news- 
paper rumours  anent  the  emplacement  of  51-  and 
65-centimetre  guns  in  German  coast  batteries, 
ostensibly  on  a  line  approaching  Calais  from 
Ostend,  with  a  view  of  bombarding  the  English 
coast  and  knocking  the  British  fleet  off  its  base, 
are  nothing  short  of  balderdash  and  poppy- 
cock. Even  though  Calais  were  captured  for  a 
base  it  would  be  a  physical  impossibility  to  aim 
cannon  across  the  Channel,  even  if  cannon  ac- 
tually existed  that  could  cover  the  distance  of 
22  miles.  Such  scaremongers  usually  forget 
something,  in  this  instance  that  the  earth  is  not 
flat  but  round,  and  that  the  resultant  curvature 
beyond  a  radius  of  eleven  miles  does  not  lend 
itself  to  calculation  by  the  range-finding  ap- 
paratus nor  to  observation.  Batteries  em- 
placed  on  coastal  points  along  the  Channel  are 
intended  only  as  a  defence  against  a  close-in 
blockade  of  the  British  fleet,  but  certainly  not 
as  a  means  of  attacking  the  British  coast,  and 
for  such  a  defence  it  is  not  necessary  to  con- 
jure forth  artillery  of  fabled  capacity  when 


194  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

42-centimetre  mortars  are  more  than  formidable 
enough  to  keep  the  enemy  beyond  the  offshore 
radius  of  sea  pressure.  At  10,000  yards  or 
about  six  miles  these  giant  mortars  can  be  de- 
pended on  to  achieve  the  very  remarkable  score 
of  3  hits  out  of  every  4  shots  fired,  which 
corresponds  to  their  average  hitting  percent- 
age of  75  in  target  practice.  Much  larger 
ranges  have  been  covered,  and  record  targets  of 
90  per  cent,  have  been  achieved,  but  the  above 
represents  the  average  effectively  offensive 
power  of  such  batteries,  which  is  more  than 
sufficient  for  any  emergency. 

t 

Rifle  Against  Turret  Fort 

Strange  as  it  may  appear  to  the  laity,  the  only 
available  weapon  against  a  Gruson  battery  is 
the  infantry  rifle!  If  the  Germans  should  be 
able  to  oppose  the  French  with  much  superior 
numbers  of  infantry  on  the  present  intrenched 
lines,  the  attack  against  the  barrier  forts — rifle 
against  turret  cannon — would  probably  be  con- 
ducted as  follows :  A  night  raid  en  masse  would 
be  made  with  a  view  of  carrying  the  French 
trenches.    During  this  manoeuvre  the  German 


THE  TURRET  FORT  195 

infantry  would  have  the  support  of  machine 
guns  and  light  field  batteries  besides  a  number 
of  searchlight  stations  to  expose  the  enemy  to 
view  and  blind  him  at  the  moment  of  his  counter- 
offensive.  The  Germans  might  have  recourse 
to  illuminating  bombs,  that  is,  a  new  type  of 
shell  which  causes  no  physical  harm,  but  ex- 
plodes a  zone  of  luminous  balls  that  descend 
very  slowly,  casting  a  vivid,  steady  light  over 
a  large  area.  As  the  gun  does  not  betray  its 
location  it  is  possible  by  this  means  to  subject 
the  enemy's  movements  to  almost  constant  ob- 
servation, for  what  the  beams  of  the  searchlight 
would  not  disclose  could  assuredly  be  ascer- 
tained by  the  explosion  of  luminous  bombs.  We 
will  assume  that  the  Germans  have  prepared 
a  long  time  for  the  attack  and  have  succeeded 
in  pushing  the  sap-head  of  their  approach 
trenches  to  a  point  within  storming  distance  of 
the  besieged  intrenchments.  These  approaches 
issue  in  a  zigzag  line  from  the  main  trenches. 
They  are  dug  by  sappers  at  night,  and  the  zig- 
zag shape  protects  such  approaches  from  cross- 
fire. In  order  to  hoodwink  the  enemy  and  make 
it  difficult  for  him  to  determine  from  which  di- 
rection the  main  attack  will  be  launched,  some 


196  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

of  the  approaches  dug  serve  merely  as  blinds 
or  they  may  be  used  in  flanking  operations. 

Although  the  attack  is  aimed  ultimately  at 
the  fortress  the  initial  phase  of  it  concerns  only 
the  intrenchments  of  the  infantry,  which  are 
sufficiently  far  advanced  to  prevent  the  Ger- 
mans from  emplacing  siege  artillery  and  getting 
the  range  on  the  fortress.  These  intrench- 
ments are  protected  by  a  maze  of  wire-entangle- 
ments. Even  where  every  man  has  been  pro- 
vided with  nippers  the  toll  of  death  has  been 
so  heavy  in  removing  such  obstacles  that  re- 
liance is  now  chiefly  placed  in  explosive  means 
of  destroying  entanglements.  The  present  war 
has  declared  as  obsolete  the  various  ingenious 
schemes  for  pulling  down  wire  fields  with  giant 
rakes  or  for  bridging  them  with  boards  or 
planking.  The  toll  of  life  is  too  enormous.  The 
pole  or  tube  system  is  much  more  efficient  and 
less  bloody.  The  pole  used  looks  very  much 
like  a  colossal  rocket:  it  is  hollow  and  loaded 
with  sections  of  some  high  explosive  based  on 
picrid  acid.  The  mast-head  is  capped  with  steel 
and  fitted  with  rollers  so  that  it  can  be  flung 
under  the  wires  and  steered  properly  into  the 
trap.    A  fuse  is  attached  to  the  near  end  of  the 


THE  TUHEET  FOET  197 

pole.  Well-placed  such  a  pole  will  explode  a 
breach  in  a  barbed  wire  trap  large  enough  for 
a  squad  of  men  to  walk  through  abreast.  An  at- 
tempt would  be  made  to  explode  the  trap  in  as 
manyplaces  as  possible  at  the  same  time  in  order 
to  force  a  general  advance  of  troops  through  the 
breeches  made.  Assuming,  then,  that  the  enemy 
would  be  routed  from  his  first-line  intrench- 
ments  by  a  combination  of  explosive  wire  poles, 
searchlights,  shell  illuminants,  and  rapid  artil- 
lery, all  subservient  to  an  advance  en  masse 
of  the  infantry,  the  figKt  is  by  no  means  won. 
If  the  distance  gained  is  sufficient  to  emplace 
siege  artillery,  and  leave  the  reduction  of  the 
fortress  to  the  care  of  the  big  "Brummers," 
the  next  general  advance  of  the  infantry  would 
be  timed  to  coincide  with  the  breaching  of  the 
armoured  turrets.  Before  this  point  could  be 
gained  the  enemy's  infantry,  unable  any  longer 
to  prevent  the  emplacement  of  superior  hostile 
artillery,  would  have  abandoned  its  positions  in 
most  instances,  and  its  sear  guard  would  be 
busy  with  sappers  and  engineers  in  securing 
new  intrenchments  for  the  retreating  divisions. 


198  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 


Mining  and  Counter-Mining 

In  case  the  Germans  had  no  siege  artillery 
heavier  and  more  efficient  than  that  in  hostile 
forts,  the  attack  would  be  pushed  home  by  re- 
peated infantry  assaults  in  connection  with 
sapping  and  mining  galleries.  The  latter  are 
virtually  tunnels  that  are  dug  and  timbered  the 
same  as  in  mine  practice,  leading  up  under  the 
base  of  the  fort.  A  heavy  explosive  charge  is 
placed  in  the  tunnel  head  and  is  detonated  by 
electricity  when  the  storming  of  the  fortress 
is  ordered.  Simultaneously  with  this  explosion, 
which  may  be  counted  on  to  open  up  the  fort, 
the  infantry  would  advance  to  the  attack  with 
bayonet  fixed  under  the  support  of  shrapnel  fire 
while  luminous  shell  and  searchlight  turn  night 
into  day.  The  danger  of  mining  is  so  apparent 
that  all  the  great  French  frontier  forts  have 
sought  to  protect  themselves  against  it  by  a 
system  of  counter-mining.  A  shaft  is  sunk 
under  the  fort  and  galleries  or  tunnels  radiate 
from  it  in  various  directions.  Some  of  the  gal- 
leries have  transverse  tunnels,  the  idea  being 
to  cover  as  much  of  the  underground  terrain  as 


THE  TURRET  FORT  199 

possible,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  driving 
home  his  mine  galleries.  Men  are  posted  in  the 
counter  tunnels  with  sound  detectors,  and  as 
soon  as  the  position  and  direction  of  the  hostile 
gallery  have  been  decided,  explosives  are  placed 
in  the  counter  gallery  and  detonated.  And  thus 
the  attack  would  be  advanced  by  degrees  until 
the  storming  party  would  be  successful  in 
carrying  the  fortress  by  assault  or  the  garrison 
is  saved  by  reinforcements.  In  either  event  the 
final  decisive  operations  would  be  intrusted  to 
the  infantry  arm,  no  matter  how  heavy  the  ar- 
tillery might  be  on  both  sides. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  WIRELESS  SIGNAL 

Nietschevo! 

It  is  night  on  the  Polish  frontier.  Toward 
the  southeast  there  is  a  line  dotted  by  the  camp- 
fires  of  the  Russians,  bivouacking  under  the  can- 
non of  Novogeorgievsk.  The  night  breeze 
wafts  the  fumes  of  the  kindly  fires  across  the 
deserted  harvest  fields  where  the  peace  of  utter 
desolation  reigns.  t  Mounted  patrols  are  posted 
in  the  distance.  Beyond  them,  scattered  over 
the  terrain  in  a  wide  arc,  are  the  pickets — lonely 
soldiers  in  long  tunics  peering  into  the  night 
with  bayonet  fixed,  alert  to  the  slightest  sound 
or  movement  behind  the  curtain  of  impenetrable 
darkness  whence  the  Prussians  are  expected. 

The  night  passes  without  disturbance.  The 
bugles  of  the  fortress  call  to  reveille.  Patrols 
are  relieved.  Pickets  are  changed.  As  the 
morning  haze  begins  to  lift  it  discloses  a 
double  screen  of  scouts  deployed  behind  cover 
in  the  distance,  but  as  far  as  the  eye  can  reach 
there  is  no  sign  of  an  approaching  enemy.  To- 
ward the  north  the  curtain  of  mist  rises  some- 
what  more   tardily,   lingering   around   a  few 

200 


THE  WIRELESS  SIGNAL  201 

scattered  haystacks.  The  quartermaster  is 
short  of  forage,  and  the  commander  details  a 
squad  of  men  to  requisition  the  fodder.  The 
men  advance  with  teams  of  wagons.  Suddenly 
the  officer  reins  in  his  horse.  He  gives  a  com- 
mand. The  men  unsling  their  rifles  and  fix 
bayonets.  The  officer  dismounts  and  leads 
them  forward  in  skirmish  line,  his  eye  intently 
fixed  on  one  of  the  haystacks  which  has  grown  a 
top-piece  overnight  in  the  shape  of  a  tall  pole 
with  a  cross-tree.  A  second  command  in  rasp- 
ing Russian  brings  the  men  up  on  the  double- 
quick.  Wires  are  now  visible,  glinting  through 
the  haze  and  stretching  from  the  cross-tree  to 
the  earth.  The  last  fifty  yards  is  covered  with 
a  rush.  The  stack  is  surrounded  by  a  cordon 
of  bayonets  with  panting  soldiers  at  the  ready. 
The  officer  draws  his  revolver  and  shoots  into 
the  stack.  There  is  no  response.  He  steps 
back  and  deploys  his  men  into  a  firing-squad. 
A  volley  is  ordered  and  fired.  Still  no  response, 
except  for  a  scurrying  rustle  of  mice.  The  squad 
pulls  up  and  begins  to  inspect  the  stack  at  close 
quarters.  A  hole  is  discovered  on  the  north 
side.  The  officer  crawls  into  it  revolver  in 
hand.  He  finds  himself  in  a  small  hollow  den 
and  stumbles  over  a  wire.  Something  clicks 
and  falls  heavily  to  the  ground  at  the  same  time. 
The  officer  withdraws,  wire  in  hand,  following 
the  direction  pointed  by  it.     With  the  frail 


202  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

metal  thread  in  his  hand  the  officer  is  led  afield 
for  several  hundred  yards  to  a  point  where  the 
little  wire  has  been  spliced  into  a  larger  wire 
running  straight  to  the  Russian  headquarters. 

The  officer  straightens  with  a  jerk.  At  last 
the  extent  of  the  damage  is  clear.  The  head- 
quarters'  field  wire  has  been  tapped,  and  the 
orders  affecting  a  whole  army  corps  have  been 
flashed  by  portable  wireless  to  the  German  field 
headquarters. 

The  officer  returns  to  the  haystack  on  the  run. 
The  Siberians  have  pitched  the  straw  with  their 
long  bayonets  and  stand  in  open-mouthed  won- 
der  around  some  strange-looking  instruments 
which  they  have  uncovered.  None  of  them 
knoiv  what  wireless  means;  none  of  them  can 
read.  But  the  officer  knows  and  he  can  read. 
He  pounces  upon  a  tag  tied  to  the  manipulating 
key  of  the  transmitter.  It  contains  a  one-word 
message,  written  in  Russian  but  in  German 
characters:  Nietschevo !  * 

* " Nietschevo "  is  Russian  for  "Never  mind." 


Intentional  Interference  Is  Practicable 

When  the  minutiae  of  this  war  are  chronicled 
the  world  will  be  astonished  to  learn  of  the 
utility  of  the  wireless  signal  in  decisive  mo- 
ments. Although  it  is  not  generally  realised 
that  Hertzian  waves  compare  with  the  waves 
of  light  in  speed,  the  popular  faith  in  wireless 
transmission  is  much  better  established  than  the 
public's  knowledge  of  the  manner  in  which  it 
is  made  use  of  on  the  field  of  battle. 

In  the  savagely  contested  struggle  for  su- 
premacy on  the  Ypres  terrain  the  success  of 
the  initial  phase  of  the  German  action  depended, 
in  a  large  measure,  on  a  wireless  message, 
which  was  intercepted  by  the  Allies.  It  re- 
vealed the  fact  that  the  Germans  had  been 
strongly  reenforced  at  the  very  point  selected 
by  the  enemy  for  a  counter-offensive.  The 
tapped  signal  prevented  a  large  Allied  force 
from  marching  into  a  carefully  baited  death- 
trap. 

This  method  of  aerial  interference  is  called 

203 


204  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

"jamming,"  and  though  military  men  have 
shown  little  credence  in  its  practical  applica- 
tion it  appears  that  there  have  been  several  in- 
stances where  jamming  succeeded,  especially 
when  the  atmosphere  was  heavily  loaded  with 
continued  communication.  Technically,  it 
should  be  well-nigh  impracticable  to  disrupt 
wireless  conversation  even  when  greatly  su- 
perior wave  motion  and  a  variable  scale  of  wave 
distance  are  employed  as  a  means  of  intentional 
interference.  Against  such  an  onslaught  there 
is  little  elemental  protection,  but  in  most  cases 
skill  in  transmission  and  cooperative  apprecia- 
tion between  the  operators  of  method  and  usage 
are  the  technical  qualifications  that  best  insure 
a  wireless  code  message  against  hostile  inter- 
ference. Sometimes  atmospheric  conditions 
cause  periods  of  unintentional  interference 
when  all  wireless  conversation  must  cease  for  a 
time.  The  experienced  commander  is  prepared 
for  such  an  emergency  with  a  subsidiary  equip- 
ment of  field  telegraph  outfits  for  long-distance, 
and  couriers  drawn  from  the  cavalry  and  the 
motorcycle  arm,  for  the  shorter  distances. 
When  the  barometric  disturbance  is  not  too 
violent  aeroplanes  are,  of  course,  always  avail- 


THE  WIRELESS  SIGNAL  205 

able  for  transmitting  messages,  and  at  night 
searchlight  signals  are  sometimes  resorted  to. 
The  main  utility  of  wireless  service  in  the 
present  war  is  divided  between  long-distance  in- 
telligence work  and  short-range  reconnoissance 
duty.  The  operation  of  the  intelligence  func- 
tion is  well-known  and  does  not  differ  essen- 
tially from  the  established  routine  of  commer- 
cial wireless  telegraphy.  The  general  staff 
keeps  in  touch  with  the  general  field  head- 
quarters by  the  same  methods,  and  under  prac- 
tically the  same  conditions,  as  govern  communi- 
cation between  commercial  stations.  The  only 
noteworthy  divergences  are  that  while  the  lat- 
ter are  chiefly  occupied  with  volume  of  business, 
the  military  stations  are  more  vitally  concerned 
with  the  accurate  and  unmistakable  dispatching 
of  relatively  few  messages  under  code  conditions 
of  comparative  secrecy. 

Secrecy  Depends  on  Skill 

Observers  at  the  front  agree  that  the  essential 
requirement  for  secret  communication,  as  far 
as  the  station  equipment  is  concerned,  lies  in  the 
skill  with  which  the  wave-length  can  be  sub- 


206  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

jected  to  rapidity  of  change  without  entailing 
the  risk  of  confusion.  This  is  the  weak  point 
in  wireless  service.  Even  temporary  confusion 
has  been  known  to  result  quite  as  disastrously 
as  intentional  interference  by  a  hostile  station. 
Only  by  the  closest  cooperation  between  opera- 
tors, and  their  intimate  understanding  of  mu- 
tual methods,  is  it  possible  to  counteract  the 
inevitable  tendency  toward  confusion  under  the 
present  system  of  transmission.  Military  men 
who  have  watched  wireless  operations  on  the 
Franco-German  battle  lines  are  of  the  opinion 
that  while  it  is  a  mistake  to  have  the  transmitter 
sharply  tuned  it  is  desirable  to  have  the  receiver 
capable  of  being  very  acutely  tuned;  also,  in 
altering  the  wave-length,  either  in  transmitter 
or  receiver,  it  is  advantageous  that  the  ap- 
paratus should  be  equipped  so  that  these  altera- 
tions can  be  made  rapidly  by  operating  a  single 
handle  controlling  all  circuits. 

In  war  practice  the  various  stations  are  syn- 
tonised to  slightly  different  wave-lengths,  mak- 
ing it  a  troublesome  matter  to  attract  attention. 
The  operators  on  the  firing-lines  use  as  few 
waves  as  possible  since  all  variations  are  not 
independent,  and  also  because  a  flat-tuned  hos- 


THE  WIRELESS  SIGNAL  207 

tile  station  will  almost  invariably  cover  an 
appreciable  range  of  these  wave-lengths  neces- 
sitating the  employment  of  a  wave-length  dif- 
fering from  that  of  the  hostile  station  by  about 
ten  per  cent. 

Field  Wireless  Equipment 

The  French  army  regulations  provide  for 
wireless  service  between  general  staff  head- 
quarters and  army  corps,  connecting  these  with 
cavalry  divisions  and  lines  of  communication. 
Unlike  the  German  organisation  there  is  no 
provision  for  wireless  service  within  the  lines 
of  army  corps  nor  within  the  lines  of  in- 
fantry divisions.  Apparently  the  chief  de- 
pendence for  intelligence  service  in  the  battle 
zone  remains  with  the  aeronautical  corps.  This 
explains,  in  a  measure,  the  paucity  of  hostile 
aerial  attacks  upon  German  bases  as  undoubt- 
edly the  French  aero  corps  have  been  engaged 
almost  exclusively  on  reconnoissance  and  com- 
munication duty  within  the  army  lines. 

The  war  strength  of  wireless  companies  in 
the  French  army  amounts  to  10  officers  and  293 
N.  C.  O.'s  and  recruits;  English  companies  com- 


208  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

prise  12  officers  and  293  N.  C.  O.'s  and  men; 
German  companies  are  a  trifle  heavier.  The 
French  organisation,  which  is  the  parent  model 
on  which  other  armies  have  planned  their  regu- 
lations, provides  for  one  general  headquarters, 
6  sections,  each  consisting  of  2  detachments,  or 
a  total  of  12  detachments  together  with  a  park. 
The  English  organisation  is  by  2  headquarters, 
7y2  detachments,  consisting  of  two  divisions 
each,  or  a  total  of  15  detachments  exclusive  of 
the  park.  A  French  wireless  company  carries 
302  miles  of  wire  and  cable,  or  fully  double  the 
material  of  an  English  company,  which  is  de- 
pendent for  its  quota  of  600  miles  of  wire  on 
the  army  transport.  A  French  company  carries 
96  sets  of  instruments  against  only  45  carried 
by  an  English  company.  The  pace  of  construc- 
tion in  both  armies  is  3  kilometres  per  hour; 
the  rate  of  operation  is  about  400  words  per 
minute. 

The  material  is  transported  by  four  classes  of 
wagons,  usually  horse-drawn.  The  office  wagon 
is  the  executive  base.  The  pole  wagon  carries 
the  sections  and  fittings  out  of  which  the  tele- 
graph pole  is  improvised.  The  other  wagons 
supply  tools,  repair  material,  cable  and  wire, 


THE  WIRELESS  SIGNAL  209 

etc.  In  field  operation  the  responsibility  is 
divided  between  an  officer  who  plots  the  route, 
a  sergeant  who  overlooks  the  work,  N.  C.  0. 
distributers  who  issue  material  and  check  the 
amount  used,  operators  for  working  the  ap- 
paratuses and  bicyclists  serving  as  orderlies  for 
breaks  in  the  line.  Besides,  there  is  a  corps  of 
pole-men  and  cable  crew  who  pay  out  the  cable, 
guide  it  over  the  terrain,  make  joints,  dig  holes 
for  the  poles,  and  raise  the  same  in  position. 
The  construction  corps  work  in  squads.  The 
first  squad  builds  the  line,  working  100  yards  in 
the  rear  of  the  wagon;  the  second  squad 
strengthens  the  line,  working  a  quarter  of  a 
mile  in  the  rear.  The  mast  sections  used  for 
the  pole  are  the  result  of  much  vigorous  experi- 
menting. Those  in  use  at  the  front  can  with- 
stand the  strain  of  a  wagon  being  driven  over 
them.  The  sections  consist  of  hollow,  wooden 
pieces,  hexagonal  in  shape,  having  a  cylindrical 
hollow  space  inside  into  which  are  inserted  con- 
necting sleeves  of  drawn  steel  tubing.  Such  a 
pole  is  very  handily  erected,  even  in  rough 
weather,  by  a  force  of  4  men  in  about  15  min- 
utes. The  pole  entire  is  carried  in  sections  on 
a  specially  made  limber  wagon.     The  largest 


210  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

portable  military  wireless  station  in  regular  use 
is  of  lJ/2~kw.  capacity,  with  a  maximum  range 
of  200  miles.  The  total  weight,  including  cart 
and  crew,  is  about  750  pounds.  It  requires  only 
20  minutes  to  pitch  such  a  station  and  get  it 
into  working  order. 

Rather  than  beguile  the  reader  with  a  disser- 
tation on  the  respective  functions  of  syntonisa- 
tion  tests,  tuning  inductance,  jigger  primaries 
and  potentiometres,  I  dare  say  an  outline  of 
the  various  types  of  wireless  outfits  now  being 
used  in  battle  action  would  be  more  useful  to 
an  understanding  of  how  wireless  service  is 
being  rendered  by  the  different  arms. 

The  Knapsack  Wireless 

What  is  known  as  the  "knapsack"  station 
is  the  most  easily  manipulated  of  portable 
wireless  outfits.  The  whole  station  is  packed 
into  4  haversacks  averaging  20  pounds  for  each 
load,  or  a  total  pack  of  80  pounds.  Thus  dis- 
posed four  soldiers  can  easily  carry  a  whole 
station  on  the  march,  but,  of  course,  the  ap- 
paratuses are  not  used  except  for  scouting  par- 
ties in  widely  deployed  formation.    When  such 


THE  WIEELESS  SIGNAL  211 

parties  are  accompanied  by  mounted  patrols 
the  station  is  carried  in  two  packs  on  horseback. 
Every  component  part  of  the  station  is  compact, 
weatherproof  and  easily  accessible.  Only  short 
wave-lengths  are  employed,  hence  elaborate 
tuning  is  obviated  and  simplicity  insured  in 
operation.  The  knapsack  outfit  has  demon- 
strated a  remarkable  degree  of  utility  in  the 
present  war.  For  replacing  mounted  orderlies, 
and  such  visual  signals  as  are  ordinarily  used 
for  patrol  duty,  there  is  nothing  like  it.  Small 
as  the  station  is  it  has  a  range  of  from  5  to  7 
miles,  and  can  dispatch  more  information  in 
ten  minutes  within  this  radius  than  a  whole 
squadron  of  orderlies  riding  at  the  gallop. 
Fitted  with  this  device  a  scouting  patrol  can 
creep  up  pretty  close  to  a  hostile  position  and 
report  its  observations  instantly  without  fear 
of  detection,  which  would  be  unavoidable  if 
visual  signalling  were  resorted  to  or  the  slow 
methods  of  mounted  orderlies  were  attempted. 
The  " marine  landing' '  station  is  thus  termed 
because  it  is  designed  for  the  use  of  such  land- 
ing parties  as  naval  vessels  may  dispatch  for 
shore  duty,  either  independently  or  in  coopera- 
tion with  a  military  force.    The  apparatus  is 


212  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

considerably  more  powerful  than  that  of  the 
knapsack  calibre  and  admits  of  conversations 
up  to  50  miles.  The  entire  outfit  is  transported 
on  two  special  carts  and  the  motive  power  is 
furnished  by  marine  soldiery. 

The  Aeroplane  Wireless 

The  most  modern  type  of  scouting  aeroplanes 
in  the  present  war  carry  specially  fitted  aerial 
wireless  stations  that  enable  them  to  keep  in 
touch  with  aerodrome  bases  and  report  observa- 
tions to  the  field  headquarters.  Most  of  the 
parts  of  this  outfit  are  distributed  in  the  hull 
of  the  aeroplane;  only  the  manipulating  key 
and  the  control  switch  are  visible.  The  receiv- 
ing station  is  very  compact  and  has  a  small 
pole  connected  with  a  trailing  wire  having  a 
safety  plug.  For  extended  reconnoissance, 
especially  in  cases  where  the  aviator  could  not 
hope  to  return  for  added  information  and  get 
away  alive,  and  when  all  the  scouting  must  be 
done  at  high  pressure,  the  aerial  outfit  appears 
to  have  scored  many  notable  successes  at  the 
front,  especially  in  the  German  lines.  Actual 
war  conditions  show  that  no  aviator  is  safe 


THE  WIRELESS  SIGNAL  213 

from  high-angle  rifle  fire  below  the  1,200-yard 
limit,  and  double  this  altitude  is  essential  to 
avoid  the  fire  of  anti-aerial  artillery.  This 
makes  accurate  observation  of  an  enemy  intent 
on  hiding  his  slightest  movement  a  matter  of 
extreme  difficulty,  and  most  of  the  aviators  who 
have  lost  their  lives  in  scouting  flights  are  those 
who  have  ventured  below  the  safety  zone  to 
improve  their  observation. 


The  Army's  "Wireless  Whiskers" 

The  cavalry  wireless,  or  as  the  troopers  say 
the  "wireless  whiskers"  of  the  army,  has  shown 
a  surprising  degree  of  efficiency  at  the  front. 
The  mounted  wireless  squad  has  been  able  to 
keep  pace  with  the  regular  cavalry  under  the 
most  strenuous  conditions.  It  can  follow  any- 
where cavalry  can  go — and  that  is  practically 
everywhere — and  in  less  than  10  minutes  es- 
tablish communication  upward  of  two  days' 
marching  distance. 

In  the  allied  armies  the  second  regiment  of 
every  cavalry  brigade  has  a  wireless  detach- 
ment consisting  of  4  troopers,  1  cyclist  and  3 


214  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

horses,  besides  a  horse-drawn  wagon  for  each 
brigade.  Each  cavalry  division  has  a  squad  of 
6  cyclists  fitted  with  tools  and  material  for 
destroying  or  repairing  lines  of  communication. 
The  wireless  detachments  of  the  German  uhlan 
and  dragoon  divisions  that  preceded  the  ad- 
vance into  Belgium  and  France  were  consider- 
ably heavier  in  equipment  as  well  as  in  men. 

The  regulation  cavalry  wireless  outfit  is  car- 
ried on  4  horses  at  an  average  load  per  saddle 
of  160  pounds,  or  a  total  weight  of  640  pounds. 
The  radius  of  communication  is  about  30  miles ; 
the  time  required  to  unpack  and  erect  the  sta- 
tion is  only  10  minutes.  The  method  of  loading 
the  pack  is  very  ingenious.  The  generating  set 
is  in  position  on  the  pack  saddle  frame,  the  rigid 
saddle  frame  being  removed  from  the  horse  and 
placed  on  the  ground  for  working.  One  horse 
carries  the  engine  strapped  on  one  side  of  the 
saddle  and  the  electric  generator  on  the  other 
side.  Distributed  on  either  side  is  a  supply  of 
2  gallons  petrol  and  l/2  gallon  lubricating  oil. 
Another  horse  transports  the  transformer  on 
the  left  and  the  receiver  with  all  accessories  on 
the  right.  A  third  horse  is  loaded  with  pole-sec- 
tions, spreaders  and  ground  nets.     A  fourth 


THE  WIRELESS  SIGNAL  215 

horse  packs  on  the  left  pole-stays,  halyards, 
anchor  pegs  and  on  the  right  side  the  aerial 
wires  and  primary  oscillating  circuit  of  the 
transmitter. 


The  Automobile  Wireless 

The  French  army  has  developed  what  is  per- 
haps the  most  extraordinary  example  of  a  prac- 
tical automobile  wireless  station  for  field  service. 
This  outfit  is  entirely  self-sustaining,  transports 
its  own  crew  of  a  dozen  men  together  with  pro- 
visions and  material,  and  has  a  travelling  radius 
of  upward  to  250  miles  before  extra  fuel  and 
provisions  are  necessary.  The  .radius  of  com- 
munication is  about  200  miles,  and  the  endu- 
rance is  5  hours  on  a  single  charge.  Not  only  is 
the  car  containing  the  station  completely  in- 
closed, but  the  walls  are  double  and  lined  with 
wadding  in  order  that  the  noise  made  by  the 
apparatus  in  action  may  not  betray  the  location 
of  the  station  to  the  enemy.  There  are  demount- 
able sleeping  quarters  within  the  car  for  the  ac- 
commodation of  the  crew.  The  motive  power  is 
supplied  by  a  4-cylinder,  16-horsepower  motor, 
having  four    speeds   forward   and   one   rear- 


216  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

ward.  The  brake  gear  is  unusually  efficient,  and 
solid  tires  on  wooden  wheels  are  used.  The  pole 
sections  are  loaded  on  the  roof  of  the  car.  To 
the  pole-head  is  attached  the  antenna,  consisting 
of  6  wires  whose  opposite  ends  are  anchored 
in  the  ground.  The  ground  connection  is  made 
by  means  of  steel  netting,  and  a  special  wire 
connects  the  pole-head  with  the  station  car. 
A  500-cycle  alternating  current  is  used  for  dis- 
patching messages.  By  means  of  a  micrometer 
screw  it  is  possible  to  gauge  the  sparking  inter- 
vals very  handily,  which  is  of  advantage  in  mod- 
ifying the  intensity  of  the  current  exciting  the 
antenna;  neither  is  it  necessary  to  retune  the 
latter  to  alter  the  wave-length.  In  fact,  the 
apparatus  is  so  flexible  that  signals  varying 
in  wave-length  from  200  to  2,500  yards  are  re- 
ceived without  difficulty,  thus  greatly  enhanc- 
ing the  adaptability  of  this  ingeniously  con- 
trived station  for  field  work. 

Portable  vs.  Permanent  Stations 

Although  the  practical  application  of  efficient 
portable  wireless  outfits  to  military  needs  is 
less  than  three  years  old,  the  advance  made  can 


THE  WIRELESS  SIGNAL  217 

best  be  appreciated  by  comparison  with  per- 
manent stations.  First-line  battleships  in  the 
United  States  navy  carry  stations  of  5  kw.  ca- 
pacity and  425  miles  wave-length.  The  New 
York  [code  letter:  N  M  I]  is  an  example 
of  this  class.  Second-line  fighters  like  the 
Kearsarge  [code  letter :  N  I  P]  cover  the  same 
wave-length  on  2-kw.  capacity.  The  Siasconsett, 
Mass.,  station  [S  C]  covers  350  miles  on  2  kw., 
while  the  Mare  Island  Navy  Yard,  Cal., 
[N  P  H]  has  a  wave-length  of  900  miles  on 
2y2  kw.  Contrast  with  these  permanently 
equipped  stations  the  200  miles'  capacity  of  the 
ll^-kw.  portable  military  outfit,  made  ready  for 
use  within  twenty  minutes,  and  the  achievement 
made  in  adapting  and  perfecting  transportable 
units  is  evident. 

''Sealed  Orders"  by  Naval  Wireless 

In  general,  wireless  service  has  benefited  mili- 
tary operations  in  the  manner  of  an  improve- 
ment over  the  field  telegraph  and  telephone, 
which  in  turn  dispense  with  mounted  couriers 
to  a  great  extent.  It  is  when  we  consider  the 
intelligence  needs  of  the  navy  that  wireless  serv- 


218  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

ice  appears  not  only  as  an  improvement  but  as 
a  revolutionary  agent.  Formerly  a  squadron 
on  the  high  seas  had  no  communication  with  its 
base  except  by  means  of  swift  cruisers,  and  even 
this  slow  and  uncertain  connection  was  subject 
to  interruption  and  delay  by  rough  weather 
and  sea  fog.  Nowadays  a  sea-going  squadron 
is  in  daily  touch  with  its  base,  or  connecting 
relays,  irrespective  of  distance  and  regardless 
of  the  elements.  Sealed  orders  have  been  made 
obsolete.  The  strategy  board  of  the  admiralty 
issues  its  orders  to  the  fleet  commander  by 
wireless  command,  whether  he  is  at  anchor  in 
the  roadstead  or  cruising  on  the  high  seas. 

In  the  matter  of  secrecy  and  speedy  delivery, 
however,  the  wireless  still  lags  behind  the  tele- 
graph and  the  submarine  cable.  Many  experi- 
enced commanders  are  frankly  opposed  to  it 
on  this  account,  and  prefer  to  rely  on  cruisers 
and  cable  connections  whenever  possible.  The 
Goeben  escape  off  Messina  has  proven  what 
such  authorities  feared  that  intentional  inter- 
ference, if  not  purloined  codal  secrets,  might 
become  an  objectionable  factor.  Adroitness  in 
manipulation,  however,  will  prevent  interfer- 
ence in  most  instances,  or,  at  least,  it  will  pre- 


THE  WIRELESS  SIGNAL  219 

elude  the  possibility  of  the  enemy  using  his 
wireless  while  engaged  in  the  noble  work  of 
"jamming"  one's  own,  but  there  is  no  known 
cure  for  credulous  and  gullible  commanders. 
Wireless  service  is  now  so  closely  wedded  to 
modern  naval  needs  that  a  commander  who 
should  venture  to  completely  dispense  with  it  in 
preference  to  cruiser  and  cable  connections 
would  soon  find  himself  outmanoeuvred  on  the 
high  seas  by  an  opponent  equipped  with  wireless. 
When  the  aerial  signal  is  finally  developed  to  a 
point  where  it  may  compare  with  the  telegraph 
in  speed  and  secrecy  of  delivery,  there  will  be 
no  need  for  any  other  messenger,  at  least  not 
in  the  navy.  If  the  wireless  telephone,  mean- 
while, is  brought  to  a  point  when  persons 
other  than  unmannerly  expert  operators  may 
attempt  to  use  it  with  some  degree  of  satisfac- 
tion, perhaps  the  future  will  reveal  intercom- 
munication between  the  vessels  of  a  fleet  on  the 
high  seas  by  wireless  telephone,  and  long-dis- 
tance shore  communication  of  the  flagships  by 
wireless  telegraph  to  the  exclusion  of  any  other 
connection.  There  have  been  several  instances 
when  naval  operators  have  conversed  by  wire- 
less telephone  over  distances  upward  of  one 


220  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

hundred  miles,  but  less  than  half  of  this  radius 
would  be  adequate  for  fleet  manoeuvre  were  the 
service  in  a  state  when  one  might  depend  on  it 
under  any  conditions,  which  it  is  not.     , 

The  Naval  Time  Signal 

There  is  one  man  aboardship  who  was  never 
known  to  say  an  unkind  word  about  the  wire- 
less, and  he  is  the  navigating  officer.  That  man 
knows  exactly  how  it  feels  to  be  responsible  for 
a  ten-million-dollar  ship  and  not  know  exactly 
his  position  on  the  chart.  The  wireless  time 
signals,  which  the  principal  shore  stations  are 
dispatching  nowadays  as  a  matter  of  routine, 
are  of  conspicuous  aid  to  navigators,  both  mer- 
chant and  naval.  By  a  system  of  pre-arranged 
rules,  simplified  to  code,  the  big  shore  stations 
issue  time  signals  at  fixed  intervals  that  enable 
navigators  on  the  high  seas  to  check  the  ac- 
curacy of  their  chronometers.  Thus  the  great 
German  station  at  Norddeich  [K  N  D]  in  the 
East  Frisian  littoral,  having  a  radius  of  no 
less  than  2,600  miles,  gives  the  12  o'clock  mid- 
day signal  by  a  3-minute  warning  to  get  ready, 
then  four  series  of  5  dots,  rhythmically  ren- 


THE  WIRELESS  SIGNAL  221 

dered,  the  final  dot  of  which  is  the  noon  hour  to 
a  dot !  Similarly  the  Eiffel  tower  at  Paris,  with 
a  radius  of  2,000  miles,  volunteers  the  midnight 
hour.  The  Poldhu  station  in  Wales  is  effective 
upward  to  2,200  miles  and  the  Clifden  station  in 
Ireland  3,000  miles.  The  largest  radius  is  cov- 
ered by  the  famous  Eilverse  station  in  Hanover 
with  4,000  miles.  The  three  most  powerful  wire- 
less stations  commanding  the  Mediterranean  are 
Cadiz  1,500  miles,  Madrid  2,000  miles,  and 
Catano  2,500  miles.  While  the  German  station 
at  Tuckerton,  N.  J.,  is  equipped  to  carry  mes- 
sages across  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  most  of  the 
British  stations  are  designed  with  a  view  of 
supporting  fleet  manoeuvres  in  the  North  Sea. 
Between  Dover  and  Lerwick  there  are  upward 
to  a  score  of  short-range  wireless  bases  in  con- 
stant operative  touch  with  the  British  navy  and 
the  admiralty  offices  in  London. 


'*<■ 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  FOUNTAIN  PEN 

The  Newspaperman's  Confessional 

First  Chronicle. — Our  left  wing  suffered  all 
day  from  a  murderous  onslaught  of  protesting 
German- American  citizens  intent  on  "both" 
sides  and  the  "real"  news  [as  if  we  knew!], 
but  toward  evening  we  fell  back  on  intrench- 
ments  prepared  by  our  indefatigable  corps  of 
foreign  correspondents.  Our  "big  guns"  es- 
tablished the  fact  that  the  Crown  Prince  Ru- 
precht  of  Bavaria  was  discovered  in  a  smart 
hotel  at  Munich  in  the  act  of  showing  his  newly 
sharpened  sabre  to  his  wife,  who  seized  the 
sabre  and  kissed  the  blade,  exclaiming — "Bring 
it  back  covered  with  blood  that  I  may  kiss  it 
once  more!"  Splendid  lead  for  editorial  on 
German  barbarity  and  cruelty.  Luckily  our 
strategic  position  is  such  that  no  one  stopped 
to  question  whether  royal  personages  are  really 
in  the  habit  of  making  "smart"  hotels  the  scene 
of  their  rendezvous.  It  developed  later  that 
since  the  Crown  Princess  died  two  years  ago  it 
was  a  tactical  error  to  use  the  story  as  news,  but 
we  were  able  to  cover  our  exposed  position  by 


THE  FOUNTAIN  PEN  223 

subsequent  screening  operations  with  a  force  of 
war  poets  and  window-cleaners. 

Second  Chronicle. — We  saved  our  centre  from 
"being  pierced  to-day  by  a  furious  advance  in  the 
price  of  beans,  and  only  the  dare-devil  courage 
of  our  composing-room  patrol  saved  a  two- 
column  advertisement  from  utter  annihilation. 
The  masterly  retreat  conducted  by  our  editorial 
department  amounts  to  a  victory  in  itself  since 
it  extricated  us  from  an  untenable  position  and 
furnished  our  forces  with  a  new  point  d'appui 
resting  firmly  on  a  non-inflammable  waste  basket 
and  the  office  cuspidor.  Thus  intrenched  we 
were  able  to  shell  the  enemy  at  leisure,  and  our 
cavalry  patrols  in  Whitehall  Street  [England] 
unearthed  a  strong  story  showing  how  the 
fumes  of  the  French  shrapnel  sometimes 
asphyxiate  the  enemy. 

In  a  drawing-room  of  a  French  chateau  a 
company  of  German  jagers  were  discovered 
in  a  state  of  absolute  petrifaction.  Some  stood 
at  the  window  in  the  act  of  taking  aim,  others 
sat  around  a  table  joined  in  a  game  of  cards, 
still  others  retained  cigarettes  between  their 
lips,  and  the  lieutenant  had  his  mouth  open  as 
if  about  to  issue  an  order.  The  life-like  ex- 
pression of  the  corpses  was  astonishing.  We 
scored  quite  a  beat  with  this  interesting  story, 
and  I  enjoyed  it  myself  until  a  military  man 
spoiled  my  taste  for  it  by  telling  me  confiden- 


224  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

tially  that  soldiers  are  not  allowed  to  smoke 
or  play  cards  in  the  presence  of  an  officer, 
nor  would  they  be  likely  to  indulge  in  that 
pastime  if  the  enemy  was  so  close  that  they 
could  actually  shoot  at  him  from  the  windows! 
As  this  information  was  confidential  I  did  not 
impart  it  to  our  readers,  of  course,  but  I  made 
up  for  it  the  next  day  by  reducing  a  German 
defeat  from  132-point  full-page  spread  to  a 
modest  3-column  head!  Our  vanguard  is  re- 
treating masterfully  despite  the  morale  of  the 
office,  and  our  rear-guard  is  advancing  inch  by 
inch  beyond  our  skirmish  line,  supported  by 
double  columns  of  worn  type  and  scare-heads. 

Third  Chronicle. — A  wounded  "constant 
reader"  was  brought  in  on  a  stretcher  during 
the  lunch  hour.  We  revived  him  with  a  drink 
of  absinthe,  but  when  the  poor  fellow  saw  the 
bottle  he  keeled  over  and  met  his  death  patriot- 
ically, being  a  German.  Sauerkraut  would 
probably  have  saved  him.  All  of  which  re- 
minds me  that  our  nation  is  in  a  "state  of 
public  peril9'  [phrase  copyrighted']  and  that  it 
behooves  us  to  maintain  "complete  neutrality." 
Strong  stuff,  this  neutrality  gag.  The  circula- 
tion manager  tells  me  it  sells  the  paper  beauti- 
fully! Our  offensive-defensive  is  now  so  solid 
with  the  readers  that  we  can  afford  to  use 
blank  cartridges  for  a  while.  When  the  interest 
begins  to  flag  we  shall  move  on  the  earthworks 


THE  FOUNTAIN  PEN  225 

of  public  opinion  with  poster  type  and  scare- 
heads,  supported  by  flying  wedges  of  facts  in 
massed  bodies,  and  electrify  our  readers  by 
showing  that  all  the  while  we  were  proclaiming 
ourselves  officially  neutral  we  maintained  a  rol- 
licking trade  in  war  munitions  to  the  allied  bel- 
ligerents. This  expose  ought  to  qualify  me  for 
the  presidency  or  something,  and  if  our  columns 
will  stand  the  strain  the  paragraphs  will  take 
care  of  themselves. 

Our  army  continues  victoriously  despite  ice 
in  the  Baltic  and  broken  type  in  the  composing- 
room.  We  remain  adamant  toward  the  in- 
truder who  was  discharged  for  spelling 
"Przymyzl"  correctly,  but  as  he  cannot  pro- 
nounce it  nothing  would  be  gained  by  taking 
the  insolent  fellow  back  on  the  force.  We  are 
crippled  by  erudition  in  all  departments.  What 
we  want  is  oratory,  especially  in  the  composing- 
room,  but  we  are  also  willing  to  engage  a  few 
military  experts  who  can  show  honourable  dis- 
charge papers  from  prominent  shoemakers  and 
fashionable  greengrocers. 

Fourth  Chronicle. — An  almost  inhuman  attack 
was  launched  at  the  ghostly  hour  of  night 
against  our  exposed  right  wing,  charging  us 
with  attempting  to  turn  the  flanks  of  veracity. 
In  this  emergency  we  have  armed  our  office  boys 
to  the  teeth  with  squirrel  guns  and  horse-pistols, 
and  expect  soon  to  hear  of  developments  in  the 


226  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

Bukhovina.  Our  outposts  debouch  magnifi- 
cently [not  in  the  literal  sense,  however]. 
Last  week  we  buried  the  old  Field  Marshal  von 
Moltke — got  kind  of  tired  seeing  his  phiz  on  the 
front  anyhow — and  this  week  we  have  scheduled 
old  man  Emmich  to  commit  suicide  for  the  sec- 
ond time  [and  this  time  we  will  see  that  it 
"takes"  even  if  our  commissariat  runs  out  of 
red  ink  and  scare  type] .  Besides,  we  have  listed 
that  goose-stepping  brother  von  Kluck  for  cap- 
ture; we  have  repeatedly  defeated  this  fellow 
with  "special  extras"  while  he  was  advancing 
through  France,  and  we  are  a  bit  tired  of  his 
antics.  Those  "dead"  ones,  von  Billow,  von 
Heeringen  and  von  Haussen,  have  no  business 
to  be  mentioned  any  longer,  but  I  am  going  to 
keep  on  declaring  the  Crown  Prince  as  dead  as 
a  door-nail  until  he  actually  dies — in  order  to 
be  the  first  man  on  deck  with  the  news! 

Our  strategy  continues  to  receive  the  plaudits 
even  of  our  enemies.  The  deployment  of  our 
scissors-squad  right  in  the  nick  of  time  to  save 
our  42-centimetre  paste-pot  ordnance  from  sum- 
mary invasion  and  capture  was  so  accurately 
timed  that  not  a  single  subscriber  was  lost  in 
the  carnage,  though  at  one  time  it  seemed  as 
though  nothing  could  prevent  the  enemy's 
trumpeters  from  sweeping  our  counterscarps 
with  listerated  gum  and  peanut-shell.  Led  by 
the  janitor  our  cavalry  screen  made  a  historic 


THE  FOUNTAIN  PEN  227 

attach  on  Lille,  turning  off  the  gas  in  that  city 
and  plunging  the  enemy  into  utter  darkness. 
Next  to  the  exploit  of  our  blind  compositor,  who 
defeated  a  whole  regiment  of  German  jdgers 
with  a  French  prize  bull  that  had  been  unneces- 
sarily goaded  by  sticks  of  Limburger  cheese, 
we  can  recollect  no  front  page  victory  that  can 
compare  with  it. 

Fifth  Chronicle. — We  have  indorsed  the  stand 
taken  by  our  Secretary  of  State  that  United 
States  does  not  need  a  large  army  because  the 
efficacy  of  chewing  gum  and  grape  juice  is  such 
that  a  million  armed  men  can  be  stamped  out 
of  the  ground  in  twenty-four  hours.  We  do  not 
see  how  this  is  possible  but  we  take  the  Secre- 
tary's word  for  it,  as  he  was  once  a  colonel  and 
ought  to  know.  We  are  also  boosting  the  plan  to 
turn  the  United  States  Navy  into  a  sort  of  toy- 
land  for  tin  marines  and  wooden  sailormen,  as 
this  would  enable  us  to  save  the  huge  expense  of 
building  modern  vessels  and  permit  the  gradual 
adoption  of  old  wooden  hulls.  If  the  Swiss  re- 
public can  get  along  without  a  navy,  the  vastly 
more  powerful  American  republic  certainly 
ought  to  be  able  to  defend  itself  with  fishing 
smacks  and  garbage  scows.  We  are  not  posted 
on  the  technical  questions  involved,  but  are  quite 
content  to  take  the  word  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  as  he  was  once  a  farmer  and  ought  to 
know. 


Blundering  Correspondents 

The  theatre  of  war  on  both  fronts  is  so  im- 
mense, and  the  theatre  of  operations  is  so  com- 
plex and  multiform,  that  it  is  not  feasible  to 
furnish  even  a  meagre  outline  of  the  events. 
Some  day  a  whole  library  will  be  written  in 
detailed  analysis  of  the  latter.  In  the  brief 
space  allotted  I  shall  limit  myself  to  the  cor- 
rective task  of  pointing  out  some  of  the  blunders 
that  have  been  made  by  correspondents  in  re- 
porting military  operations  and  events,  espe- 
cially such  as  appear  to  have  made  an  impres- 
sion on  the  American  public. 

While  I  was  writing  editorial  analyses  on  the 
war  for  some  New  York  newspapers  I  was 
repeatedly  asked  to  define  words  like  "  counter- 
scarp," " point  d'appui,"  etc.,  and  one  daunt- 
less correspondent  dispatched  a  bundle  of  clip- 
pings in  which  he  had  marked  the  word  ' '  strat- 
egy," which  appeared  frequently  and  in  the 
most  surprising  connections,  requesting  a  defi- 
nition to  "fit  all  cases"!  In  a  land  gasping 
under  the  weight  of  ponderous  dictionaries,  and 

228 


THE  FOUNTAIN  PEN  229 

at  the  same  time  harrowed  by  weird  and  un- 
familiar pronunciation,  one  becomes  inured  to 
surprise.  Indeed,  the  word  strategy  has  been 
used  to  denote  the  movements  of  patrols,  of 
aeroplanes,  of  signalmen,  of  individual  com- 
mands, anything,  apparently,  from  pistols  to 
carrier  pigeons. 

Newspaper  Tactics 

It  has  been  said  that  there  are  no  surprises 
in  this  war,  but  it  seems  to  me  there  has  been 
nothing  but  surprises.  How  otherwise  is  one 
to  account  for  the  Allies  winning  all  the  " vic- 
tories" while  the  Germans  were  chasing  them 
through  Belgium  and  France  to  the  very  bor- 
ders of  the  Marne!  The  censored  reports 
showed  very  plainly  that  the  German  advance 
was  of  no  strategic  importance,  and  that  the 
"masterful  retreats"  of  the  Allies  would  event- 
ually solve  the  situation.  The  American  news- 
papers allowed  themselves  to  become  hypno- 
tised by  the  censored  accounts  from  London  to 
such  an  extent  that  the  most  brilliantly  con- 
ducted offensive  campaign  in  modern  warfare 
was  distorted  into  a  series  of  German  defeats. 


230  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

In  their  eagerness  to  follow  the  hint  from  Lon- 
don, whence  they  are  accustomed  to  go  in  quest 
for  every  scrap  of  foreign  news,  they  even  out- 
Englished  the  censor  and  "forgot"  to  report 
the  actual  dates  of  the  German  occupation  of 
strategic  points.  There  is  one  New  York  paper 
in  undeservedly  good  standing,  which  has  not 
even  at  this  date  admitted  the  fall  of  Liege, 
while  there  is  not  one  who  has  not  reported,  on 
several  occasions,  the  capture  or  death  of  men 
like  von  Moltke,  von  Kluck,  von  Emmich  and 
even  the  Kronprinz! 

In  fact,  the  American  press,  in  utter  igno- 
rance of  the  magnitude  of  the  task  involved,  and 
as  nonplused  as  a  boy  on  beholding  his  first 
elephant,  did  the  very  thing  it  should  not  have 
done,  and  dispatched  a  gang  of  men  to  the 
front,  thinly  disguised  as  "war"  correspond- 
ents, who  were  about  as  fit  to  record  the 
operations  of  modern  armies  as  an  American 
cowboy  would  be  to  report  a  sitting  of  the 
naval  board.  With  one  or  two  exceptions  these 
men  must  be  classed  as  incompetents.  Some 
of  them  had  served  in  previous  campaigns  by 
disclosing  their  utter  lack  of  military  training 
and  knowledge — which  did  not  matter  so  much 


THE  FOUNTAIN  PEN  231 

with  a  non-military  audience  and  editors  intent 
on  "stories"  rather  than  fact — and  most  of 
them  could  not  tell  the  difference  between  a 
sword  and  a  sabre.  To  this  corps  of  "rocking- 
chair"  civilians,  trained  in  the  gentle  art  of 
turning  molehills  into  mountains,  the  Ameri- 
can people  is  indebted  for  the  harebrained  and 
amateurish  manner  in  which  this  war  has  been 
reported.  The  logical  thing  to  do,  it  seems  to 
me,  since  press  censorships  were  established 
abroad  with  the  obvious  intent  of  passing  only 
favourable  news,  would  have  been  to  establish  a 
board  of  analysts  on  this  side,  composed  of 
authorities  skilled  in  military  and  naval  war- 
fare, and  let  this  board  sift  the  censored  re- 
ports before  the  press  would  turn  their  staffs 
loose  on  the  material.  A  military  censorship  is 
only  the  strategy  of  the  intelligence  service  in 
condensed  and  emendated  form  for  popular  con- 
sumption. It  cannot  be  gotten  around  by  de- 
tachments of  newspapermen — even  if  they  are 
competent — because  first-class  powers  do  not 
allow  them  at  the  front,  as  I  pointed  out  at  the 
outbreak  of  this  war.  But  this  is  not  the  first 
war  which  has  been  misreported.  Any  one 
who  is  anxious  to  convince  himself  on  this  point 


232  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

should  compare  the  war  correspondence  of  the 
British-Boer  conflict  and  the  Russo-Japanese 
campaign  with  the  military  reports  of  the  con- 
testants on  both  sides.  The  former  is  largely 
fiction,  the  latter  are  based  on  fact.  The  space 
allotted  here  is  too  brief  to  admit  of  even  par- 
tial exposition  of  the  woeful  mistakes  made  by 
correspondents  in  this  war.  I  shall  limit  my- 
self to  a  few  examples  that  must  be  fresh  in  the 
mind  of  the  readers,  and  which  plainly  show 
that  the  correspondents  are  ignorant  of  even 
elementary  knowledge  of  warfare. 

Newspaper  Cavalry 

German  cavalry  has  been  referred  to  as  "uh- 
lans," as  if  it  consisted  exclusively  of  this  arm. 
It  is  true  that  les  uhlans  of  Frederick  the  Great 
impressed  themselves  so  indelibly  upon  the  Gal- 
lic mind  that  the  term  became  synonymous,  in  a 
popular  sense,  with  Prussian  cavalry,  but  no 
military  man  would  employ  such  a  misleading 
phrase.  There  are  no  less  than  four  classes 
of  cavalry — hussars,  uhlans,  dragoons,  and 
cuirassiers — and  all  of  them  were  engaged,  the 
hussars  and  uhlans  forming  the  light  arm  of 


THE  FOUNTAIN  PEN  233 

the  cavalry.  Some  correspondents  have  per- 
sisted in  using  the  phrase  "lancers,"  evidently 
taking  their  cue  from  the  British  field  scribes, 
but  as  all  four  classes  of  German  cavalry  are 
armed  with  the  lance,  this  term  is  even  less  de- 
scriptive, as  well  say  " horsemen"  and  frankly 
own  up  to  ignorance. 

Fake  "Field"  Reporting 

A  deployment  of  skirmishers  is  glibly  re- 
ported as  an  "invasion."  An  encounter  be- 
tween advance  guards  becomes  a  "battle." 
The  masking  of  a  fortress  is  exaggerated  into 
a  "siege."  The  operations  of  a  corps  are  mag- 
nified into  that  of  an  army.  If  it  advances  it  is 
"victory,"  if  it  retreats  it  is  "defeat."  Be- 
tween these  extremes  there  can  be  no  distinc- 
tions, at  least  not  in  a  mind  innocent  of  the 
tactical  operations  whereby  an  army  disposes 
its  forces  for  concerted  action.  When  the 
heavy  German  and  Austrian  siege  artillery  ap- 
peared at  the  front  it  was  described  in  the  hys- 
terical phrase  of  a  fugitive  vainly  trying  to 
picture  a  bombardment.  A  train  of  denials  and 
counter-denials    followed,    but    the    big   guns, 


234  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

which  constitute  a  surprise  and  a  good  " story" 
in  themselves,  were  not  adequately  described. 
The  judgment  passed  on  prowess  and  discipline 
is  unintentionally  amusing.  Again  and  again 
German  soldiers  have  been  berated  for  their 
"cowardly"  action  in  "running  away"  when 
their  officers  were  shot  by  aspirants  for  "best- 
sellers" fame  who  do  not  know  that  a  standing 
order  [vorschrift]  in  the  German  army  is  that 
troops  finding  themselves  without  commanders 
under  action  must  fall  back  and  place  them- 
selves under  orders  immediately.  In  the  same 
breath  the  correspondents  would  refute  them- 
selves by  stating  that  the  German  infantry 
charges  were  so  fierce  that  the  men  chopped 
their  way  through  barbed  wire  traps  and  con- 
tinued to  charge  against  the  glacis  of  the  forts, 
in  the  face  of  a  withering  fire,  until  they  were 
stretched  low  on  the  very  parapets ! 

Fake  "War"  Photographs 

The  inscriptive  skill  displayed  on  "war" 
photographs  shows  that  though  modern  guns 
will  carry  far,  bluff  will  carry  still  farther. 
For  about  three  months  this  country  was  flooded 


THE  FOUNTAIN  PEN  235 

by  printed  reproductions  of  photographs  taken 
at  least  one  year  ago  at  French,  German  and 
British  field  manoeuvres.  The  old  inscriptions 
were  crossed  out,  and  new  ones  were  concocted 
to  fit  present  needs.  In  his  famous  hurry  the 
" head-line' '  artist  would  sometimes  confuse 
the  nations  a  bit,  as  when  he  would  label  French 
infantry  in  skirmish  line  as  "Austrians  Mov- 
ing to  the  Attack!"  and  French  troops  have 
frequently  been  ticketed  Belgian.  However, 
these  are  mild  offences  when  compared  to 
photos  of  the  Karlsruhe,  described  as  a  German 
"battle  cruiser,"  squadrons  of  Belgian  lancers 
masquerading  as  "German  uhlans,"  and  those 
memorable  prints  of  French  cuirassiers  digni- 
fied to  posterity  under  this  delicious  inscription 
— "Armour  Plated  Suits  for  Kaiser's  Men!" 

Under  the  caption,  ' '  Terrible  French  Cannon 
Aims  and  Destroys  Itself,"  a  newspaper  syndi- 
cate scattered  broadcast  a  narrative  so  entirely 
improbable  as  to  be  unintentionally  amusing. 
The  illustration  embellishing  this  chef  d'ceuvre 
of  anticipatory  reporting  was  nothing  more  or 
less  than  the  standard  155-millimetre  field  gun 
of  the  French  army.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  its 
inventor,  Colonel  Bimailho,  would  be  the  last 


236  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

person  to  approve  the  startling  claims  of  this 
intrepid"  story.' ' 


Some  Typical  Yarns 

Another  "find"  was  the  noble  series  of  "saw- 
bayonet"  lore,  with  which  a  tremendously  fa- 
mous ' i  double-star  * '  war  correspondent  burdened 
the  cable  at  great  cost  to  his  unsuspecting  paper. 
This  happened  at  the  time  when  the  world  had 
practically  decided,  aided  ominously  by  the 
British  press  censor,  to  single  out  the  Germans 
for  barbarous  methods  of  warfare.  There  was 
not  the  ghost  of  a  doubt  but  what  Prussian  sol- 
diers had  been  caught  in  the  act  of  severing  the 
heads  of  perfectly  well-behaved  French  soldiers 
with  "saw-bayonets,"  a  fiendish  weapon  spe- 
cially made  for  this  purpose.  The  mere  fact 
that  the  correspondent  succeeded  in  finding  two 
specimens  of  this  weapon  in  trenches  formerly 
held  by  the  Germans  was  considered  ample 
proof  of  unpardonable  barbarity !  No  one  even 
inquired  why  it  should  be  considered  advan- 
tageous for  a  soldier  to  engage  in  the  slow  and 
tedious  process  of  sawing  his  enemy  in  two 
when  a  well-placed  jab  would  finish  him,  entirely 


THE  FOUNTAIN  PEN  237 

aside  from  the  fact  that  he  who  would  attempt 
to  do  the  sawing  would  certainly  be  jabbed  to 
death  before  he  could  finish  the  job!  If  that 
double-starred  manipulator  of  mistakes  had  but 
known  that  the  corporals  of  a  German  company- 
carry  so-called  "saw  bayonets,"  for  engaging 
wire  entanglements  and  cutting  away  the  under- 
brush, and  that  the  saw  blade  is  affixed  to  the 
rifle  to  gain  added  leverage,  but  certainly  not 
for  decapitating  human  members,  it  is  possible 
his  readers  would  have  lost  a  "beat"  and  cap- 
tured a  fact. 

The  dum-dum  bullet  thrillers  owe  their  origin 
to  similar  misconceptions.  None  of  the  nations 
engaged  are  in  the  manufacture  of  dum-dum 
bullets.  Personally,  I  do  not  believe  that  a 
single  bullet  of  this  description  has  been  issued 
to  a  single  soldier  in  this  war.  What  the  sol- 
diers themselves  may  have  done  in  the  way  of 
denting  or  filing  their  bullets  is  quite  another 
matter,  but  if  this  has  actually  been  done,  to 
any  noticeable  extent,  even  a  layman  must  admit 
that  the  soft-nosed  French  bullet  lends  itself  to 
being  tampered  with  a  good  deal  easier  than  the 
steel-jacketed  German  bullet!  Besides,  the 
standard  type  of  bullet  cannot  in  all  cases  be 


238  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

depended  upon  to  make  only  cleanly-perforated 
wounds.  When  fired  at  long  range  the  bullet 
may  deviate  slightly  before  it  strikes  the  body, 
or  the  soldier's  clothing  and  accoutrements  may 
cause  it  to  swerve  and  "keyhole"  after  striking; 
in  either  case  the  wound  caused  will  resemble  the 
mushroom  exit  of  a  dum-dum  missile.  But,  per- 
haps, data  of  this  sort  would  not  constitute  a 
"  story." 

When  Ought  Counts  Naught 

If  all  the  errors  and  mistakes  were  collected 
and  collated  with  such  material  as  would  be 
afforded  by  the  misrepresentation,  wilful  as 
well  as  unintentional,  as  appertaining  to  the 
issues  of  this  war,  we  should  have  a  volume  that 
no  man  who  has  ever  borne  arms  could  resist* 

Especially  is  this  so  if  the  volume  would  in- 
clude a  comparative  statistical  survey  of  the 
estimates  of  casualties  and  losses  furnished  by 
correspondents.  Imagination  is  a  tame  term  to 
describe  the  activity  exhibited  in  this  field  by 
knights  of  the  scissors  and  paste  pot,  capable  of 
creating  six-cipher  earthquakes  and  four-cipher 
conflagrations  on  the  hint  of  a  night  wire.    A 


THE  FOUNTAIN  PEN  239 

statistician  who  kept  count  from  August  4th  to 
September  4th,  1914,  states  that  the  Germans 
alone  lost  about  1,500,000  in  wounded,  missing, 
and  killed  troops  in  this  interim,  according  to 
the  dispatches  printed!  That  there  are  any 
Germans  left  at  all  at  this  writing  encourages 
me  to  say  that  the  suggested  demise  of  that 
nation  is  somewhat  precocious,  but  I  shudder 
when  I  think  what  the  grand  total  fatalities  of 
all  the  armies  must  be  by  this  time. 

The  Fountain  Pen  Duel 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  reportorial  fountain 
pen  is  a  weapon  of  modern  warfare  capable  of 
inflicting  a  good  deal  of  damage.  It  does  not 
slay,  neither  does  the  wireless  signal,  but  its 
potency  is  nevertheless  so  considerable  that 
governments  at  war  protect  themselves  against 
it  by  the  iron-rule  of  censorship.  A  skilfully 
manipulated  corps  of  fountain  pens  can  turn  a 
foe  into  a  friend,  remove  or  engender  a  preju- 
diced opinion,  and  generally  mould  and  coach 
the  opinions  and  sympathies  of  non-combatant 
nations  in  a  war  of  this  kind.  The  German 
scribes  are  bidding  for  American  sympathy, 


240  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

not  because  Germany  cares  a  hoot  what 
America  thinks,  but  because  it  is  the  only  great 
power  left  that  has  not  declared  war  against 
Germany,  and  it  has  the  only  navy  that  could 
insure  German  supremacy  on  the  sea.  The 
Allied  scribes  are  bidding  for  American  sym- 
pathy also,  to  prevent  it  from  being  diverted 
to  Germany,  and  with  their  control  of  the  cables 
they  have  been  able  to  defeat  the  German 
scribes  in  every  decisive  encounter  of  the 
"fountain  pen"  duel.  The  United  States  is 
nine-tenths  prejudiced  against  the  German 
cause  to-day — thanks  to  the  superior  equip- 
ment of  the  Allied  scribes — and  there  is  not  the 
slightest  prospect  of  an  improved  sentiment. 
And  this  is  the  crux  of  the  matter:  Had  the 
cables  remained  open,  and  had  it  been  possible 
for  the  German  scribes  to  enter  the  fight 
against  the  Allied  scribes  with  equal  means  of 
propaganda,  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  Ameri- 
can feeling  would  be  favourable  to  Germany  or 
at  least  divided  equally  between  the  contest- 
ants. From  this  to  actual  aid  in  a  financial 
and  commissary  way  is  not  such  a  long  step 
in  a  nation  that  recognises  no  government  ex- 
cept that  which  may,  and  may  not,  lie  in  public 


THE  FOUNTAIN  PEN  241 

opinion,  and  once  America  had  committed  her- 
self as  a  covert  ally  it  would  not  be  difficult  to 
embroil  her  as  a  belligerent. 

The  Kusso-Japanese  war  was  likewise 
"handled"  by  the  British  cable  and  corre- 
spondence monopoly.  So  adroitly  was  the 
fountain  pen  manipulated  that  the  American 
people  became  enamoured  of  the  Japanese 
[England's  allies],  and  entirely  ignored  Eus- 
sia's  claim  to  some  return  for  her  very  val- 
uable friendship  to  the  United  States  in  times 
past.  This  perverted  sentiment  found  practical 
expression  at  the  peace  of  Portsmouth,  N.  H., 
when  an  American  president,  acting,  perhaps 
unconsciously,  as  England's  tool,  compelled 
Eussia  to  terms  that  would  not  have  been  quite 
so  humiliating  to  her,  and  perhaps  not  disas- 
trous, had  the  popular  sentiment  in  America 
been  favourable  to  her  at  the  time. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  SUPER-COMMISSARIAT 

It  happened  during  the  storm-march  of  the 
German  right  wing  under  General  von  Kluck 
against  the  armoured  forts  of  La  Fere.  The 
most  advanced  position  was  held  by  a  detach- 
ment  of  Prussian  fusileers,  who  withstood  the 
onslaught  during  a  whole  day  of  incessant  en- 
gagement without  food.  The  men  had  dug  them- 
selves into  flat  trenches  hastily  prepared  with 
hand-spades.  They  were  practically  isolated. 
Two  companies  had  been  hurled  forward  to 
reenforce  them,  but  the  distance  was  too  great 
and  the  French  and  English  machine  guns 
mowed  the  men  down  as  a  scythe  cuts  grass. 
The  German  rapid-fire  artillery  kept  up  a  con- 
tinual stream  of  bursting  shrapnel  against  the 
British  left,  which  threatened  any  moment  to 
take  the  isolated  German  position  by  storm. 
Of  the  two  regiments  gambling  their  lives  away 
in  that  position  there  was  not  one  man  who  did 
not  have  a  dead  comrade  beside  him.  Most  of 
the  men  had  been  shot  in  the  head.  The  shal- 
low trenches  afforded  but  little  shelter  against 
the  galling  fire  of  the  British,  which  clipped 

242 


THE  SUPER-COMMISSARIAT       243 

the  crest  of  the  earth-screen  with  the  precision 
of  scissors  wherever  a  spike  helmet  peeped 
forth.  Not  only  were  the  Germans  exhausted 
for  want  of  food,  but  their  ammunition  belts 
were  getting  to  be  as  empty  as  their  stomachs, 
and  they  were  using  the  belts  of  slain  comrades. 
Of  the  six  thousand  fusileers  in  that  fire-swept 
position  only  two  thousand  remained,  and  they 
were  facing  what  seemed  like  utter  annihilation. 
Then  something  happened  that  no  one  will 
forget  who  saw  it.  A  big,  fat  Prussian  army 
cook  bobbed  up  behind  a  boulder  a  few  hundred 
yards  behind  the  German  position  and  fired  a 
rocket  with  a  line  attached.  A  stray  bullet 
bowled  the  big  felloiv  over  like  a  rabbit  at  pre- 
cisely the  same  moment.  That  bullet  deflected 
the  aim  of  the  ambitious  chef  and  caused  the 
rocket  to  land  exactly  in  the  German  trench. 
Quickly  the  line  was  pulled  in  and  an  enor- 
mous projectile  followed.  A  hail  of  bullets 
greeted  the  advance  of  the  gliding  missile,  but 
its  armoured  sides  turned  every  shot  very 
smartly  and  it  was  finally  hauled  into  the  trench. 
A  tap  on  the  shell,  which  was  of  the  Skoda  30.2- 
centimetre  calibre,  showed  that  it  was  not 
loaded.  A  wooden  cover  had  been  inserted  in 
the  blunt  end  where  the  priming  charge  is  sup- 
posed to  be.  The  cover  was  dug  out,  and  be- 
hold! there  was  the  most  appropriate  form  of 
ammunition  for  that  exigency,  in  the  shape  of 


244  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

sausages — sausages  packed  like  sardines — the 
famous  u erbswurst"  of  the  Prussian  army 
that  makes  dying  men  stand  up  and  goose-step! 
With  a  sausage  in  his  left  and  a  rifle  in  his  right 
it  is  no  wonder  that  the  German  fusileers  were 
not  routed.  Toward  night  heavy  reinforce- 
ments reached  the  position  they  had  so  valor- 
ously  defended. 

The  fat  cook  was  discovered  in  the  lazaret, 
where  the  commander  went  and  saluted  him. 
An  Iron  Cross  now  dangles  on  his  proud  bosom, 
but  he  is  not  the  only  cook  in  the  German  army 
who  has  received  and  earned  it. 


"Fighting  on  the  Belly  and  Marching  on  the 

Stomach" 

■ 

The  commissariat  of  the  German  army  is 
the  most  complete  and  efficient  organisation  of 
its  kind  in  the  world.  It  towers  head  and  shoul- 
ders above  the  French^  Japanese,  English  and 
Russian  organisations  despite  the  fact  that 
these  bodies  have  achieved  a  very  notable  and 
genuine  progress,  especially  during  the  last 
decade.  While  her  opponents  seem  to  have 
realised  that  an  "army  travels  on  its  stomach,' ' 
Germany  has  applied  the  twofold  lesson  that 
a  modern  army  fights  on  its  belly  and  marches 
on  its  stomach.  In  the  German  commissariat 
honours  are  equally  divided  between  transpor- 
tation, rapid  and  adequate,  to  deploy  an  army 
to  its  destination ;  provisions,  ample  and  acces- 
sible, to  feed  the  fighters ;  defence  by  means  of 
pick  and  shovel,  and  offence  by  ammunition  and 
rifle.  Not  the  slightest  detail  in  any  one  of 
these  departments  has  been  overlooked  or 
scanted  at  the  expense  of  the  service  as  a  whole. 

245 


246  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

A  volume  could  be  written  on  tlie  operation  of 
each  department.  Suffice  to  say  that  the  watch- 
word for  each  of  them  has  been :  service,  more 
service,  better  service.  Every  possible,  and  ap- 
parently impossible,  exigency  has  been  pro- 
vided for  to  secure  and  maintain  maximum 
efficiency  in  feeding  the  imperial  troops  on  the 
battlefield  under  every  conceivable  and  incon- 
ceivable condition  of  warfare. 

The  " heavy  artillery"  of  this  branch  of  the 
service  is  represented  by  formidable  field 
kitchens  and  bake  ovens  mounted  on  four- 
wheeled  trucks  and  drawn  by  horses  or  motor- 
propelled.  In  fact,  the  work  of  baking  and 
cooking  is  not  disturbed  or  retarded  by  the 
march  of  the  troops,  but  goes  on  uninterrupt- 
edly as  the  kitchens  and  ovens  follow  in  the 
rear  of  the  marching  columns.  It  was  largely 
due  to  the  perfection  of  the  provisioning 
branch  of  the  commissariat  that  the  German 
storm-drive  through  Belgium  and  Northern 
France  was  made  possible. 

The  commanding  officers'  mess  is  supplied 
by  specially  contrived  automobile  field  kitchens, 
complete  to  the  smallest  implement.  It  is  part 
of  German  field  strategy  to  maintain  the  great- 


THE  SUPER-COMMISSARIAT      247 

est  possible  degree  of  mobility  in  the  officers' 
corps.  The  commanding  officers  proceed  by 
automobile  and  are  required  ,to  precede  the 
troops  and  select  the  battle-ground;  hence, 
motor-kitchens  are  necessary  to  follow  and 
feed  them.  The  first  Prussian  soldiers  to  break 
into  Belgium  were  not  troops  on  the  march,  but 
a  flying  detachment  of  superior  officers  in  high- 
power  motor  cars.  Then  followed  squads  of 
armoured  motor  cars,  paving  the  way  for  the 
advance  guard,  consisting  chiefly  of  cavalry,  be- 
fore the  infantry  marched  across  the  border. 

The  most  completely  equipped  of  officers' 
motor-kitchens  are  those  in  personal  attend- 
ance on  the  Kaiser,  the  Kronprinz  and  the 
Kronprinzen  of  Bavaria  and  Wurttemburg, 
commonly  styled  grand  dukes.  The  motor- 
kitchen  of  the  Kronprinz  Friedrich  Wilhelm  is 
typical  of  the  field  service  de  luxe.  It  is  almost 
the  size  of  a  London  bus  and  contains  a  com- 
plete kitchen,  with  cook  range,  bake-oven,  pan- 
try, water  cistern,  ice-box,  china  closet,  buffet 
service  and  what  not.  Sometimes  the  Kron- 
prinz motors  from  the  firing-line  to  the  kitchen 
for  his  meals  in  his  private  field  automobile, 
which  is  operated  by  a  chauffeur  who  has  the 


248  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

coolness  and  skill  of  a  professional  racer.  At 
other  times  the  kitchen  motors  after  him  and 
his  staff  as  far  as  the  terrain  and  the  range 
of  hostile  artillery  permit.  Besides  the  chauf- 
feur there  is  a  cook  and  a  butler  stationed  in 
the  motor-kitchen,  to  which  one  or  two  orderlies 
are  attached  in  addition. 

"Fleisch,  Brot  und  Wasser!" 

The  three  big  items  in  feeding  an  army  on 
the  march  are  meat,  bread  and  water.  A  com- 
missariat which  can  supply  these  main  essen- 
tials in  uniform  and  adequate  quantities,  and 
warrant  the  quality  pure,  even  though  many 
other  " necessaries"  may  be  lacking,  can  keep 
an  army  in  good  physical  fighting  condition  on 
the  firing-line.  If  the  rigours  of  a  winter  cam- 
paign must  be  encountered,  as  in  the  present 
war,  special  equipment  in  the  shape  of  helmet 
hoods,  mufflers,  mittens  and  socks,  all  of  the 
very  best  quality,  are  issued  to  the  troops  in  ad- 
dition to  their  regular  winter  equipment  as 
otherwise  they  would  not  live  to  eat  the  pro- 
visions. The  general  staff  of  the  commissariat 
has  carefully  gathered  data,  based  on  practical 


THE  SUPER-COMMISSARIAT       249 

experience,  demonstrating  that  the  most  effi- 
ciently equipped  soldiers,  whether  for  summer 
or  winter  campaigning,  will  invariably  prove 
superior  to  soldiers  inefficiently  equipped 
though  inured  to  the  climate.  On  this  theory 
the  German  commissariat  is  fitting  out  the  im- 
perial armies  on  the  Russian  frontier  for 
winter-campaigning  in  such  a  thoroughgoing 
manner  that  the  troops  may  be  expected  to 
withstand  the  severe  climate  there  at  least 
as  well  if  not  better  than  the  native  Russian 
troops. 

In  a  campaign  like  that  waged  by  Germany 
in  its  storm-drive  into  France,  every  part  of  the 
commissariat  was  sacrificed  to  mobility  and 
speed.  This  requirement  had  a  peculiar  bear- 
ing on  the  chief  anxiety  of  the  provision  branch, 
that  of  meat.  Ordinarily  a  strong  effort  is  made 
to  supply  the  troops  with  beef  on  the  hoof,  at 
least  the  advanced  divisions  that  are  engaged 
on  the  firing-line.  Fresh  beef  broth  does  keep 
up  the  strength  and  courage  of  soldiers  fighting 
in  the  trenches  when  nothing  else  will.  Two 
hours  of  uncomfortable  sleep  out  of  sixteen  spent 
on  heavy  duty  in  all  kinds  of  weather,  under 
withering  rifle-  and  shrapnel-fire,  with  sudden, 


250  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

forced  marching  in  the  dead  of  night,  only  to 
face  worse  hardships  at  the  break  of  dawn,  is 
a  combination  of  evil  times  that  goads  the  ani- 
mal instincts  of  fighting  men  to  a  point  when 
their  ravenous  appetite  resembles  that  of  the 
wild  beasts  of  the  jungle.  Nutritive  capsules  and 
tablets  will  no  more  cure  hunger  of  this  sort 
than  any  of  the  so-called  "health"  foods,  nor 
"physical  culture"  alternatives,  nor  any  of  the 
ingeniously  contrived  and  scientifically  con- 
cocted dietaries  that  do  so  much  on  paper  and 
perform  so  beautifully  in  private  tests.  A  pill 
can  be  produced  that  will  contain  as  much  nutri- 
tive value  as  four  ounces  of  meat,  but  the  meat 
will  put  more  strength  in  the  soldier  than  the 
pill.  Laboratory  experts  are  in  the  regrettable 
habit  of  forgetting  that  man  is  endowed  with  a 
stomach  that  must  be  filled  as  well  as  fed. 
Mere  nutritive  value  is  not  enough;  volume  is 
quite  as  necessary.  It  is  the  alimentary  value 
and  volume  of  the  food  that  still  hunger  and 
make  proper  digestion  possible.  Pill  schemes 
and  capsule  tricks  may  be  all  right  for  anaemic 
people,  but  when  it  comes  to  feeding  a  super- 
army  of  well-nigh  four  million  men,  disposed  on 
two  hostile  fronts,  in  which  every  man  is  under  a 


THE  SUPER-COMMISSARIAT       251 

harrowing,  crushing  strain,  physically  and  men- 
tally, the  stomach  of  man  demands  the  food  that 
Nature  has  provided  for  it  since  the  beginning 
of  time.  The  German  commissariat  has  acted 
on  this  basis.  It  is  the  soup  meat  and  roast 
meat  made  from  freshly  slaughtered  cattle,  and 
served  from  properly  attended  field  kitchens, 
that  have  filled  the  stomach,  quenched  the  hun- 
ger and  revived  the  strength  of  the  exhausted 
German  soldiers,  enabling  them  to  do  a  great 
deal  more  fighting  in  the  aggregate,  man  for 
man,  than  the  equally  brave  but  less  skilfully 
provisioned  hostile  troops. 

'^Kriegskonserven" 

To  obtain  fresh  food  in  adequate  quantities 
means  that  the  commissariat  must  do  a  great 
deal  of  foraging  and  for  greatly  advanced  posi- 
tions maintain  a  herd  of  cattle  on  the  heels  of 
the  rear  guard.  In  the  initial  German  dash  into 
France,  which  is  unparalleled  for  speed  in  the 
annals  of  military  history,  there  was  no  time  to 
forage  or  stop  for  anything  beyond  supplies  by 
rail.  No  attempt  w^as  made  to  establish  a  cattle 
corral.    The  main  supply  of  meat  came  in  car- 


252  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

loads,  freshly  slaughtered,  and  was  loaded,  on 
arriving  at  the  various  railheads,  into  motor- 
vans,  transporting  the  supplies  further  to  the 
field  encampments.  Only  when  an  army  corps 
would  make  a  halt  to  reduce  a  fortification  or 
invest  a  town  was  there  an  attempt  made  to 
forage  and  supply  beef  on  the  hoof. 

To  meet  the  exigency  occasioned  by  the  Ger- 
man storm  advance,  the  commissariat  fell  back 
on  its  carefully  conditioned,  immense  store  of 
hermetically  sealed  beef,  soup  and  vegetables. 
This  branch  of  the  service  has  been  built  up  by 
food  experts  and  physiologists  attached  to  the 
government  service.  The  "Kriegskonserven," 
as  the  Germans  call  them,  are  prepared  in  fac- 
tories controlled  by  commissary  officials.  The 
strictest  inspection  of  the  products  used  is  oblig- 
atory, and  the  finished  products  include  every- 
thing imaginable  from  goulash  to  potted  fowl, 
all  kinds  of  roasts,  stews,  soups  and  even  des- 
serts. This  food  is  not  ordinary  tinned  stuff, 
but  the  very  best  products  the  market  affords 
scientifically  inspected  and  prepared  with  a  view 
of  not  only  stilling  hunger  and  giving  strength, 
but  also  appealing  to  the  palate.  It  has  been 
found  that  an  appetising  fare,  capable  of  con- 


THE  SUPER-COMMISSARIAT       253 

siderable  variation,  will  keep  troops  in  much 
better  shape  and  spirits  than  the  same  alimen- 
tary value  and  volume  without  the  palatable  ele- 
ment. Every  can  and  box  is  sealed  and  labelled 
with  the  nature  of  contents  and  date  of  making. 
After  a  certain  time  the  conserves  are  confis- 
cated and  new  supplies  take  their  place,  the  idea 
being  to  keep  the  stock  on  hand  in  a  perpetual 
state  of  absolute  freshness.  Sample  rations  of 
Kriegskonserven  have  been  dispatched  to  the 
German  colonies  in  China  and  Africa  and  sub- 
jected while  there  to  the  extreme  conditions  of 
tropical  climate  for  long  periods  of  years  with- 
out the  slightest  deterioration.  During  the  ad- 
vance of  the  seven  big  armies  into  France,  of 
which  General  von  Kluck  commanded  the  right 
wing,  enormous  quantities  of  Kriegskonserven 
were  forwarded  by  rail  to  the  farthest  safe  point 
in  the  rear  of  these  armies.  A  temporary  base 
would  then  and  there  be  established  at  each 
point,  which  would  accumulate  a  large  stock  of 
provisions.  The  various  army  divisions  would 
draw  on  the  nearest  available  base  for  supplies, 
and  these  were  forwarded  by  motor  truck  until 
the  steadily  advancing  army  made  the  distances 
to  be  covered  by  motor  transport  large  enough 


254  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

to  warrant  the  establishment  of  new  depots  and 
bases. 

The  water  supply  of  a  modern  army  is  no 
longer  by  way  of  the  old-fashioned  barrel  wagon 
or  the  well-bucket.  Large  motor  vans  loaded 
with  steel  cisterns  do  the  work  of  allaying  the 
soldiers'  thirst.  One  such  truck  holds  enough 
drinking  water  to  insure  a  liberal  swig  for  every 
man  in  an  army  corps,  or  a  force  approximating 
45,000  men.  This  means  a  daily  continuous 
service  of  twelve  big  cistern  trucks  to  allay  the 
parched  throats  of  a  half -million  men.  As  there 
are  at  least  four  million  German  troops  in  the 
field  it  would  require  about  one  thousand  motor- 
cistern  trucks  to  supply  them  with  water  were  it 
not  for  the  system  of  sterilising  and  purifying 
river  water  by  a  radio-active  process,  of  com- 
paratively recent  invention,  which  has  obviated 
the  use  of  the  " water-wagon' '  trains  to  a  very 
considerable  extent. 

The  baking  arrangements  in  the  French  and 
English  armies  differ  a  good  deal  from  those 
adopted  by  Germany,  not  only  in  the  kind  of 
bread  made,  but  also  in  the  manner  of  baking. 
The  British  commissariat  sticks  to  the  earth- 
oven  method,  which  is  perhaps  better  suited  to 


THE  SUPER-COMMISSARIAT       255 

the  kind  of  loaves  favoured  by  Tommy  Atkins, 
whereas  the  German  commissariat  provides 
very  capacious  field  bakeries  on  four-wheeled 
trucks,  drawn  by  teams  of  horses.  Despite 
various  economies  that  have  been  introduced 
from  time  to  time  the  expense  of  the  rations 
necessary  to  maintain  a  modern  army  in  the 
field  is  well-nigh  staggering.  A  military  statis- 
tician has  computed  the  total  commissary  cost 
of  supplies  and  rations  to  all  the  troops  of  all 
the  armies  opposing  one  another  in  the  field  at 
this  writing  at  more  than  twenty  million  dollars 
per  day ! 

The  Wonderful  Field  Kitchens 

About  ten  years  ago  the  German  commissariat 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  a  mistake 
to  issue  rations  in  a  raw  and  unprepared  state 
to  troops  in  the  field.  It  was  argued  that  sol- 
diers that  have  been  subjected  to  heavy  march- 
ing or  trench  duty  during  the  day  are  quite 
naturally  tired  out  toward  evening,  and  tired 
men  make  bad  cooks.  At  best  the  rations  issued 
to  the  soldiers  are  cooked  by  them  over  im- 
provised camp-fires  in  a  hasty  and  slovenly 


256  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

manner,  resulting  in  meals  causing  intestinal 
disorders,  which  put  many  of  them  on  the  sick- 
list.  A  large  proportion  of  the  soldiers  are  too 
tired  to  even  attempt  cooking  and  eat  their 
rations  raw,  thus  adding  still  further  to  the 
surgeon's  roster.  If  the  soldier  could  be  cer- 
tain of  three  substantial  meals,  at  dawn,  at  noon 
and  at  night,  properly  prepared  by  skilled 
cooks,  not  only  would  his  resistive  strength  be 
greatly  improved,  but  also  his  morale  and  fight- 
ing spirit. 

This  very  logical  view  led  to  the  introduction 
of  a  new  type  of  military  field  kitchen,  the  final 
evolution  of  which  remains  to-day  the  pride  and 
boast  of  the  German  commissariat.  No  army 
has  anything  like  it.  No  kitchen  anywhere  is 
better  equipped  to  perform  the  service  expected 
of  it.  To  show  how  thoroughgoing  the  Ger- 
mans are  once  they  make  up  their  minds  to 
do  something,  I  will  attempt  a  description  of 
how  they  evolved  the  best  portable  military 
kitchen  for  feeding  an  army  on  the  march: 

Out  of  forty  different  models  submitted  to 
the  German  general-staff,  which  opened  the 
initial  public  competition  in  1905,  only  two 
specimen  kitchens  approached  the  official  re- 


THE  SUPER-COMMISSARIAT       257 

quirements.  A  second  competition  was  started 
containing  no  less  than  fourteen  separate  speci- 
fications with  a  multitude  of  subdivisions,  cov- 
ering every  conceivable  requirement  from  ca- 
pacity and  safety  appliances  to  noiselessness, 
freedom  from  explosion,  and  even  "invisible" 
appearance !  The  final  choice  fell  upon  an  out- 
fit of  the  following  description.  A  four-wheeled 
vehicle  for  two  horses,  the  front  carriage  being 
detachable  from  the  rear  when  necessary,  and 
both  parts  capable  of  being  drawn  by  the  same 
team.  On  this  truck  the  kitchen  proper  is 
mounted,  containing  an  explosion-proof  copper 
holding  200  quarts  in  a  boiling  vat,  an  explo- 
sion-proof 70-quart  coffee  tank,  both  receptacles 
having  separate  fireboxes  and  ash-pits.  The 
front  carriage  contains  200  extra-rations  for 
the  men,  the  daily  quota  of  provisions,  3  extra 
rations  for  the  horses,  folding  canvas  water 
pails,  driver's  and  cook's  baggage,  and  besides 
a  saw,  pick-axe,  hatchet,  carriage  tools  and 
fittings,  stores  and  stable  material.  The  rear 
carriage  holds  the  fuel  box  and  the  cooking 
contrivances,  such  as  meat-chopper,  coffee  mill, 
strainers,  knives  and  other  utensils.  The  boil- 
ing vat  surrounds  the  copper  and  prevents  the 


258  WAB'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

food  from  being  burned  and  facilitates  self- 
cooking;  also,  it  serves  as  a  hot-water  heater. 
Because  of  this  hot-water  immersion  method 
the  food  in  the  copper  continues  to  cook  as  in 
a  steam-kitchen,  and  is  ready  for  serving  at  end 
of  normal  cooking  time.  Even  after  twelve 
hours  the  food  is  found  to  have  a  temperature 
of  148°  Fahr.,  and  should  the  necessity  arise 
for  keeping  the  food  untouched  even  longer,  a 
new  fire  is  made  every  twelve  hours  and  in  this 
way  the  contents  can  be  kept  fresK  and  pala- 
table up  to  within  72  hours  or  three  days  and 
nights.  The  copper  is  aluminum-lined  and  easy 
to  keep  clean.  The  preliminary  cooking  is  done 
at  night  and  early  dawn.  After  the  cooking  is 
completed  the  men  can  draw  on  the  kitchen  for 
hot  water,  and  have  their  canteens  replenished 
with  steaming  hot  coffee.  An  ingenious  ar- 
rangement of  multiform  spigot  makes  it  pos- 
sible to  fill  six  flasks  simultaneously,  and  as 
these  flasks  are  fitted  on  the  thermo  plan  the  men 
detailed  for  sentry  duty  are  able  to  carry  with 
them  the  satisfying  hot  beverage  to  their  post. 
The  total  weight  of  such  a  "feldkiiche"  is 
about  3,000  pounds,  and  it  can  follow  even  cav- 
alry on  the  march  almost  anywhere.   It  does  not 


THE  SUPER-COMMISSARIAT       259 

smoke,  it  is  noiseless  in  cooking  and  operation, 
and  the  fire-box  has  a  marvellous  capacity  for  all 
kinds  of  fuels,  from  coal  and  wood  to  peat  and 
briquettes.  Owing  to  the  constant  heat  main- 
tained by  the  boiling  vat  the  consumption  of  fuel 
is  very  small.  The  coffee  tank  and  the  copper 
are  fitted  with  strong  covers  capable  of  being 
hermetically  locked,  and  all  the  drawers  and 
compartments  in  the  front  and  rear  parts  of 
the  vehicle  have  locks  and  are  entirely  weather- 
proof. In  an  emergency  sucli  a  kitchen  can  be 
taken  across  rough  country,  and  in  rough 
weather,  at  a  gallop  without  spilling  a  drop  or 
wasting  a  particle  of  food.  As  the  rear  section 
can  be  driven  independently  it  is  possible  even 
at  night  to  venture  forward  to  the  firing-line 
and  feed  the  exhausted  troops  in  the  trenches 
direct  from  the  kitchen.  In  the  daytime  such  a 
manoeuvre  is  usually  limited  to  the  second  and 
third  line  trenches  for  obvious  causes.  While 
the  men  are  being  fed  from  the  kitchen  the 
front  section  of  the  vehicle  is  sent  back  to  the 
rear  for  fresh  provisions. 

These  horse-drawn  field-kitchens,  then,  to- 
gether with  the  motor-propelled  mess-kitchens 
for  the  commanding  officers,  and  the  automobile 


260  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

kitchen  cars  for  army  and  corps  commanders, 
constitute  the  piece  de  resistance  of  mobile 
culinary  science  on  the  firing-line.  It  is  by  per- 
fected and  complete  arrangements  of  this  cali- 
bre that  the  German  commissariat  has  suc- 
ceeded in  making  one  soldier  do  the  work  of  two 
at  times,  whenever  the  trenches  in  the  Western 
theatre  of  war  were  depleted  of  men  wanted 
to  stem  the  tide  of  the  Russian  invasion. 


CHAPTER  IX 
SUPEE-STEATEGY 

General  "Vorwartz"! 

A  big,  square-set  man  is  sitting  at  a  table 
lighted  by  ornate  silver  candlesticks.  A  detail 
map  of  the  East  Prussian  boundary  is  in  his 
lap.  Other  maps  are  spread  on  the  table  to- 
gether with  calipers,  ferrules  and  other  instru*- 
ments. 

In  the  room  adjoining  are  a  number  of  adju- 
tants and  staff -officers.  Some  of  them  are 
gathered  about  a  large  dining-table  entirely  cov- 
ered by  a  scale  map,  showing  the  minutest  vari- 
ation in  the  terrain  under  study.  The  posi- 
tions of  the  armies  are  marked  on  the  map  by 
tape  fastened  with  stickers.  Reenf  or  cements 
under  way  are  identified  by  arrows.  There  is 
a  portfolio  in  which  every  move  made  by  any 
and  all  of  the  armies  is  written  down  with 
scrupulous  exactitude.  An  ordonnanz  is  in 
charge  of  the  big  chart  and  marks  with  tape 
any  change  made  in  the  positions. 

At  a  small  table  is  the  telephone  exchange, 
operated  by  a  N.  C.  0.  The  wire  connects  di- 
rectly with  all  the  army  field  headquarters.    If 

261 


262  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

a  general  commanding  an  army  has  anything  to 
report  it  must  go  over  this  wire,  but  generals 
in  command  of  army  corps  and  divisions  must 
first  telephone  the  army  commander,  and  if  he 
thinks  the  report  is  of  importance  also  to  the 
commander-in-chief  he  orders  it  relayed  over 
the  direct  wire. 

In  a  corner  is  a  portable  wireless  station. 
Through  the  window  the  mast  and  the  antennce 
can  be  seen.  The  operators  are  in  constant  at- 
tendance. Messages  received  are  instantly 
typewritten  in  triplicate  and  brought  to  the 
commander-in-chief  before  any  one  else  is  per- 
mitted to  see  them. 

The  other  rooms  of  the  little  chateau  are  used 
as  living  and  sleeping  quarters  for  the  staff 
members.  The  garden  lawn  has  been  con- 
verted into  a  military  garage,  where  several 
high-power  automobiles,  some  of  them  ar- 
moured, are  kept  ready  for  instant  use.  Sen- 
tries are  posted  at  all  exits  and  approaches.  A 
mounted  patrol  is  stabled  in  the  barn. 

For  several  days  messages  have  been  pour- 
ing into  the  headquarters  exciting  the  buzzers 
on  the  telephone  and  the  wireless  outfits,  send- 
ing ordonnanzen  scurrying  from  room  to  room, 
dispatching  couriers  by  automobile,  and  add- 
ing tape  and  stickers  on  the  big  war  map  until 
it  resembles  a  crazy-quilt.  Gradually  corps 
after  corps  have  swung  into  line,  and  army  after 


SUPER-STRATEGY  263 

army  has  debouched,  under  incessant  fighting, 
until  they  occupy  the  strategic  positions  selected 
for  them  in  advance  by  the  big,  square-set  man 
sitting  alone  in  the  little  room. 

An  anxious  moment  is  approaching.  The 
right  wing,  which  was  badly  mauled  by  an  over- 
whelming  force  of  Cossacks,  has  suffered  a  set- 
back from  which  it  must  recover  before  the 
entire  field  army  can  operate  as  a  unit.  The 
map  shows  that  reenf  or  cements  have  reached 
the  right  wing  in  the  nick  of  time,  but  it  has  not 
been  able  to  advance  as  yet  and  is  merely  hold- 
ing its  own.  The  whole  campaign,  involving 
more  than  a  million  troops,  hinges  on  the  fate 
of  the  hard-fighting  right.  Every  time  the  re- 
ceiver clicks  and  buzzes  the  officers  look  up 
from  the  map  and  cease  talking,  but  the  expected 
message  does  not  arrive.  The  big,  square-set 
man  is  pacing  the  room  with  his  hands  on  his 
back.  A  frown  has  settled  over  his  strong,  mar- 
tial face,  but  he  controls  himself  well  and  gives 
no  vent  to  his  emotions.  For  two  days  he  has 
spoken  only  in  monosyllables,  and  only  in  an- 
swer to  the  deferential  inquiries  of  his  staff! 
A  lesser  man  would  have  been  elated  at  the 
general  advance  made  by  the  troops,  but  this 
man  is  aiming  for  a  decisive  victory  to  crush 
the  enemy.  Every  hour  lost  by  the  right  wing 
in  re-forming  and  joining  his  plan  of  attack  may 
cost  him  the  battle. 


264  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

Once  more  the  wireless  buzzer  raps.  The 
operator  does  not  wait  to  type  the  message  but 
dashes  it  off  on  a  blank,  and  the  ordonnanz 
takes  it  to  the  commander-in-chief.  The  big 
man  scowls,  for  the  right  is  not  advancing. 
Suddenly  his  face  brightens  with  a  daring  idea. 
He  pens  an  order  commanding  the  right  wing 
to  feign  retreat  until  it  appuys  on  the  centre, 
then  to  advance  en  masse! 

The  ordonnanz  opens  the  door  and  steps 
aside.  The  commander-in-chief  enters.  The 
officers  in  the  staff-room  stand  at  attention. 

"Gentlemen,"  he  says, "  I  leave  for  the  front. 
The  battle  will  be  at  Tannenberg." 

Soon  after  a  high-power  motor-car  sweeps 
out  from  the  terrace  of  the  chateau  carrying  an 
ordonnanz  beside  the  chauffeur  and  an  adjutant 
sitting  beside  a  big,  square-set  man  in  a  blue- 
gray  mantle.  The  sentries  present  arms  with 
a  snap,  and  the  big  man  begins  to  plan  the  psy- 
chological moment  of  the  battle  action.  At 
the  very  juncture  when  the  feigned  retreat  shall 
have  led  the  enemy  into  a  trap,  and  the  grand 
advance  of  his  armies  will  commence,  he,  the 
commander-in-chief,  shall  be  there  to  lend  spirit 
and  dash  by  his  presence,  ready  to  correct  a 
possible  error  in  strategy,  and  insure  the  fullest 
measure  of  efficient  generalship  in  every  divi- 
sion, in  every  corps,  in  every  army,  and  as  be- 
tween army  and  army. 


German  Strategy  Vindicated 

No  matter  what  one's  sympathies  may  be, 
any  fair-minded  person  with  some  comprehen- 
sion of  military  matters  must  admit  that  in 
point  of  strategy  and  tactical  efficiency  the 
German  army  has  proven  itself  distinctly  su- 
perior to  the  allied  armies.  After  a  study  of 
the  various  campaigns  on  the  Russian  and  the 
Franco-Belgian  borders  I  dare  venture  the 
assertion  that  had  the  operations  been  reversed 
and  the  allied  commanders  been  forced  to  step 
into  the  shoes  of  the  German  commanders,  to 
fight  against  numerically  stronger  enemies  on 
two  fronts  simultaneously,  they  would  have  suf- 
fered defeat  by  this  time.  I  do  not  mean  to  sug- 
gest by  this  that  the  allied  commanders  are  de- 
ficient in  strategy;  on  the  contrary,  they  are 
very  competent.  The  French,  especially,  have 
demonstrated  a  high  degree  of  skill  in  tactical 
manoeuvres ;  the  Russians  are  much  better  offi- 
cered and  led  than  in  former  campaigns;  the 
British  closely  rival  the  French  in  tactics  and 

265 


266  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

outrival  them  in  technical  qualifications ;  at  least 
the  expeditionary  regulars  do,  whatever  the 
mobilised  mercenaries  may  amount  to.  Even 
if  Germany  were  to  be  defeated  before  this 
book  can  appear  the  strategy  displayed  by  her 
Grosser  Generalstab  [Grand  General  Staff], 
and  the  tactical  results  obtained  by  army,  corps, 
and  division  commanders,  as  directed  by  this 
staff,  constitute  a  measure  of  preeminence  in 
warfare  so  decidedly  superior  to  the  achieve- 
ments of  allied  commanders  that  the  latter 
would  have  more  to  learn  from  the  defeat  of 
the  enemy  than  he  could  possibly  learn  from 
their  victory.  To  bring  home  the  essence  of 
this  situation  to  the  commercially  trained 
American  mind  suffice  it  to  liken  the  German 
plan  to  a  highly  trained  and  completely 
equipped  organisation  pitted  against  an  enter- 
prise in  which  several  decisive  elements  have 
been  left  to  the  initiative  of  circumstance.  It 
is  the  difference  between  the  department  store 
method  of  conducting  business  and  the  shop- 
keeper's plan  of  resistance.  The  only  arm  of 
the  allied  forces  that  was  up  to  the  standard 
of  maximum  efficiency  at  the  outbreak  of  war 
was  the  British  navy,  but  there  is  no  arm  in 


SUPER-STRATEGY  267 

the  German  service  that  is  not  up  to  the  re- 
quirements of  the  standard. 


The  Steel  Ring  Around  Germany 

The  factors  that  have  induced  Germany  dur- 
ing more  than  four  decades  to  maintain  a  state 
of  military  readiness  were  of  the  downright 
compelling  nature  dictated  by  her  geographical 
and  industrial  position,  whereas  the  circum- 
stances that  induced  her  enemies  to  ally  them- 
selves against  her  were  promoted  by  a  com- 
bination of  political  and  diplomatic  aspirations. 
Germany  is  the  only  great  power  in  the  world 
that  is  surrounded  by  enemies.  Russia  has  no 
frontiers  in  the  sense  that  she  does  not  fear  an 
invasion  threatening  her  existence.  France  has 
only  one  frontier  to  defend.  England  remains 
in  a  state  of  "splendid"  isolation,  leaving  her 
frontier  to  the  care  of  her  navy. 

On  the  other  hand,  consider  Germany's  ex- 
tremely perplexing  position.  Toward  the  East 
she  is  confronted  with  the  greatest  land  power 
on  earth,  whose  main  present  ambition  is  to 
become  mistress  of  the  Baltic,  a  power  that  can 
put  upward  of  ten  million  troops  in  the  field 


268  WAB'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

out  of  a  total  population  of  170,000,000  inhabi- 
tants. Toward  the  West  the  German  eagle  is 
threatened  by  a  power  once  dominant  on  the 
Continent,  and  while  dominant  always  as 
brutally  aggressive  toward  Germany  as  she  be- 
came secretly  jealous  and  vindictive  after  fall- 
ing from  her  high  estate.  The  campaigns  of 
conquest  waged  on  Germany  by  Napoleon  and 
Louis  XIV  inflicted  a  much  heavier  blow  at 
Prussia  than  the  capture  of  Alsace-Lorraine  at 
France.  Toward  the  North,  threatening  her 
entire  coast  and  her  shipping,  is  the  greatest 
maritime  power  in  the  world,  with  a  record  of 
always  having  opposed,  for  something  like 
three  centuries,  whichever  power,  friend  or  foe 
alike,  might  happen  to  achieve  dominance  on 
the  Continent.  No  single  fact  in  the  politi- 
cal history  of  Europe  has  been  more  thoroughly 
amplified  than  that,  but  it  is  not  to  be  found 
in  English  text-books  and  readers.  The  na- 
tional history  of  France,  the  Netherlands, 
Spain,  Denmark,  etc.,  are  in  evidence,  however. 
The  manner  of  waging  war  by  England  follows 
the  precedent  of  utilising  her  vast  political  in- 
fluence, based  chiefly  on  her  weight  as  a  mari- 
time power,  to  obtain  an  ally  on  the  Continent 


SUPER-STKATEGY  269 

and  incite  the  same  against  the  dominant  nation 
at  the  time.  There  has  never  been  a  time  when 
England  failed  to  procure  a1  cat's-paw  on  the 
Continent,  but  of  the  nations  who  allowed  them- 
selves to  be  inveigled  it  is  quite  singular  that 
not  one  has  commemorated  the  event!  Unless 
Belgium  erects  a  monument  in  gratitude  for 
that  handful  of  British  marines  that  conducted 
such  a  "masterful  retreat"  before  Antwerp, 
the  precedent  of  history  will  remain  intact, 
and  the  Belgians  have  bought  their  status  as 
cat's-paw  with  the  loss  of  their  country.  On 
the  South,  Germany  has  one  measurably  de- 
pendable neutral  "buffer"  in  the  Swiss  re- 
public, which  is  fairly  coining  money  in  its 
role  as  middleman  in  munitions  of  war,  and  may 
be  depended  on  to  remain  serenely  neutral  un- 
der these  conditions.  Historically,  the  status 
of  Italy  as  an  ally  has  earned  the  simile  of  a 
"man  on  the  fence,"  and  present  events  show 
that  she  means  to  pursue  the  glory  attaching 
thereto. 

A  Pertinent  Parallel 

Such  are  the  main  outlines  with  which  the 
strategy  of  German  diplomacy  has  had  to  deal, 


270  WAE'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

and  which  have  induced  and  made  necessary 
the  unusually  high  degree  of  military  prepared- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  German  Grand  General 
Staff.  I  am  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  the 
average  American  reader  is  not  impressed  by 
these  conditions  because  he  stands  apart  in  a 
country  separated  from  the  human  sources  and 
basis  of  its  being  by  an  ocean  of  some  three 
thousand  miles.  A  parallel  may,  therefore,  be 
quite  opportune.  The  single  state  of  Texas  is 
big  enough  to  accommodate  Germany  and 
France  within  its  borders.  Imagine,  then,  ap- 
proximately half  of  this  area  peopled  by  sixty- 
five  million  people,  adding  to  their  number  by 
one  million  babies  annually.  This  was  the 
population  of  the  United  States  at  the  time  of 
the  war  with  Spain,  and  it  is  the  population  of 
Germany  to-day.  With  this  in  mind  let  us 
transfer  the  United  States  population  of  anno 
1900  to  Europe  and  confine  it  to  an  area  only 
half  as  large  as  Texas,  within  the  constitutional 
boundaries  of  Germany,  and  let  us  surround 
it  on  all  sides,  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  power- 
ful enemies,  the  same  that  Germany  now  is 
dealing  with,  does  any  sane  person  believe  that 
the  sixty-five  million  Americans  thus  confined 


SUPER-STRATEGY  271 

within  Germany's  borders  would  remain  there 
under  a  negative,  submissive  national  policy, 
permitting  Eussia  and  France  to  conspire 
against  their  safety,  unchecked,  standing  idly 
by  while  England  bullied  their  shipping  off  the 
high  seas,  counteracting  their  every  move  for 
colonial  expansion?  Would  the  affirmative  be 
plausible  if  at  the  same  time  these  expatriated 
American  millions  succeeded  by  dint  of  thor- 
oughgoing application,  aided  by  an  orderly  and 
efficient  government,  in  becoming  the  leading 
progressive  nation  on  the  Continent  not  only 
in  commerce  and  industry,  but  in  science  and 
invention,  rivalling  France  in  art,  music  and 
literature,  and  defeating  England  in  foreign 
trade,  even  at  her  very  doorstep  in  the 
colonies?  Would  it  be  wrong  for  an  American 
population  thus  disposed  behind  German  fron- 
tiers to  contest  for  a  share  of  the  world's  trade 
just  because  England  has  amassed  to  her- 
self a  world  monopoly  in  foreign  trade  and 
shipping — because  46,000,000  Britons  rule  over 
one-fifth  of  the  habitable  globe?  Would  it 
be  criminal  to  arm  against  the  possible  on- 
slaught of  a  state  like  Russia,  still  modelling  her 
foreign  policy  on  the  prescript  of  Tsar  Peter 


272  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

the  Great,  and  already  glutted  with  land  to  the 
extent  of  owning  one-sixth  of  the  habitable 
globe?  Would  it  be  "barbarous"  to  be  simi- 
larly prepared  against  the  French  constantly 
nursing  their  historic  case  of  injured  vanity, 
conspiring  secretly  with  Eussia  for  revenge, 
though  their  decreasing  birth-rate  does  not  call 
for  added  territory,  which  they  have  acquired, 
nevertheless,  in  a  very  presentable  colonial 
empire,  considerably  larger  than  the  area  of  the 
United  States?  Add  to  these  comparisons  the 
fact  that  the  American  millions  thus  placed 
under  the  Prussian  eagle  would  be  required  to 
suffer  the  additional  mortification  of  standing 
by  while  the  surrounding  enemies  would  annex 
or  capture  valuable  colonial  possessions  in  all 
parts  of  the  world,  while  preventing  the  Ameri- 
cans from  getting  even  a  decent  foothold,  and 
keep  up  this  policy  of  estranging  and  isolating 
American  interests  for  more  than  forty  years ! 
It  is  all  very  well  to  criticise  Germany  for  at- 
tacking before  she  was  herself  attacked,  for 
anticipating  the  ambuscade,  so  to  speak.  But 
it  is  dangerous  to  base  a  personal  conviction  on 
the  data  supplied  by  official  press  censors  in 
the  hire  of  the  British  Government  whose  con- 


SUPER-STRATEGY  273 

trol  of  the  cables  and  the  correspondents  drawn 
on  by  the  American  press  has  gradually  led, 
during  the  last  four  decades,  to  the  dominance 
of  American  public  opinion  on  political  subjects 
abroad. 

How  Strategy  Operates 

The  commander-in-chief  conceives  a  general 
plan  of  action  either  for  a  defensive  or  an  of- 
fensive campaign.  He  elaborates  this  plan  with 
a  view  of  disposing  the  various  armies  under 
his  baton,  in  positions  where  it  will  be  possible 
for  them  to  operate  against  the  enemy  on  the 
most  favourable  terms.  He  conceives  the  plan 
of  campaign  in  its  entirety,  ignoring  detail. 
He  gives  definite  instructions  to  the  command- 
ers of  the  various  armies,  only.  He  imposes 
upon  each  commander  a  definite  task,  the  ob- 
jective, which  is  correlated  to  the  tasks  saddled 
on  the  commanders  as  a  whole  so  as  to  insure 
uniformity  of  operation.  He  is  in  constant 
rapport  with  the  army  commanders.  As  their 
reports  begin  to  come  in  over  the  wires  he  is 
in  a  position  to  determine  the  value  of  a  cer- 
tain progress  made  or  gauge  the  setback  caused 


274  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

by  a  retreat.  In  the  latter  case,  if  the  retreat 
is  serious  and  continued,  the  commander-in- 
chief  draws  on  his  reserves  to  prevent  a  rout. 
Strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  reserves  are  the 
only  soldiers  who  are  under  the  personal  com- 
mand of  the  commander-in-chief.  He  follows 
the  movements  of  the  various  armies  on  the 
map  and  does  not  accompany  them  in  the  field. 
As  the  campaign  progresses  he  is  able  to  fore- 
see where  and  when  a  decisive  action  is  going 
to  be  fought;  at  least,  this  is  possible  so  long  as 
his  armies  are  on  the  offensive.  A  first-rate 
C.  I.  C.  does  not  suffer  a  chance  like  that  to 
go  by  without  inspiring  his  army  chiefs  by  his 
presence.  A  high-powered  automobile,  pre- 
ceded sometimes  by  a  pilot  car,  takes  him  to  the 
scene  of  action  at  racing  speed.  He  takes  no 
hand  in  the  action,  however,  merely  observes 
that  his  instructions,  as  given  by  wire,  are 
properly  carried  out  by  the  army  commanders. 
If  a  reverse  overtakes  the  embattled  troops  that 
could  not  be  foreseen  at  the  time  of  his  issuing 
the  instructions,  on  which  the  battle  plan  is 
based,  the  C.  I.  C.  is  right  there  on  the  spot  to 
grasp  the  situation  and  issue  remedial  orders. 
The  army  commander,  even  if  he  has  a  quarter 


SUPER-STRATEGY  275 

of  a  million  men  under  his  baton,  is  powerless 
to  issue  strategical  commands  affecting  the 
army  as  a  body,  even  if  he  knows  what  to  do 
and  realises  that  not  to  do  it  may  mean  defeat. 
Such  orders  must  come  only  from  the  C.  I.  C, 
and  he  alone  is  ultimately  responsible.  This, 
then,  is  the  function  of  strategy  as  affecting 
military  operations. 

How  Tactics  Operate 

Strategy  is  very  frequently  confounded  with 
tactics,  especially  by  the  horde  of  novelists, 
humourists,  star-reporters  and  funny  men, 
which  a  resourceful  press  forthwith  dispatched 
to  the  front  and  generously  labelled  "  war-cor- 
respondents.' '  Tactics  may  be  said  to  begin 
where  strategy  leaves  off.  Sometimes  they 
overlap.  The  strategic  work  of  the  C.  I.  C.  is 
translated  into  tactical  orders  by  the  army  com- 
mander, who  is  concerned  with  the  movements 
of  his  particular  army  only.  These  orders  are 
further  specialised  by  the  corps  commanders, 
responsible  for  army  corps  only,  and  detailed 
to  the  division  commanders  in  charge  of  divi- 
sions   only,   until   they   reach   their   ultimate 


276  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

crystallised  shape  as  regimental  orders  de- 
tailed on  colonels  in  charge  of  regiments. 
Tactics,  therefore,  prescribe  the  operations  of 
an  army  on  the  battlefield  together  with  every 
unit  of  which  the  army  is  composed.  The  zone 
of  tactics  is  confined,  therefore,  to  the  move- 
ment of  troops  upon  the  field  of  battle.  The 
zone  of  strategy  extends  from  the  military  base 
to  the  battle-lines  governing  the  disposition  and 
placing  of  troops  in  the  hands  of  the  tactical 
commanders  at  points  selected  for  them.  Thus, 
the  work  involved  in  placing  seven  armies  in 
the  field  on  the  western  frontier  and  coordinat- 
ing their  operations  was  strategy  performed 
by  Field-Marshal  von  Moltke,  while  the  task  of 
operating  the  right  wing,  for  example,  and 
fighting  it  against  the  allied  left,  was  the  tacti- 
cal problem  intrusted  to  General  von  Kluck. 
The  field  of  strategic  execution  is  the  war  map ; 
the  field  of  tactical  operation  is  the  battle-line. 
A  presentable  volume  could  be  written  on  the 
changes  in  tactics  alone.  In  the  present  war 
the  fatal  zone  of  infantry  and  artillery  fire  is 
more  than  three  times  as  large  as  it  was  in  1870, 
and  the  flattening  of  trajectories  has  made  the 
fire  so  tremendously  effective  as  to  compel  the 


SUPER-STRATEGY  277 

modern  soldier  to  fight  on  his  belly  and  advance 
like  a  mole  digging  its  way  in  the  earth.  Add 
to  this  the  fact  that  the  rate  of  fire  has  been 
quadrupled — and  in  some  arms  even  quintupled 
— which  means  that  every  man  and  every  gun 
can  fire  at  least  four  shots  for  every  one  that 
could  be  fired  in  the  war  of  1870,  and  it  is  no 
longer  difficult  to  understand  why  shock  action 
is  not  attempted  to  any  extent.  The  only  time 
soldiers  expose  their  bodies  in  this  war  is  at 
the  moment  when  storming  a  trench,  but  even 
this  is  never  attempted  until  the  trench  has  been 
"singed"  with  shrapnel  and  made  untenable. 
Hundreds  of  trenches  have  been  taken  by  both 
sides  in  this  manner  only  to  be  given  up  and 
evacuated  owing  to  the  enfilading  fire  of  the 
flanking  or  supporting  trenches. 

During  the  first  four  months  of  the  war  the 
Germans  were  repeatedly  criticised  for  "at- 
tacking in  massed  formation" — at  least,  this  is 
how  it  looked  to  war  correspondents  posted 
some  twenty  miles  to  the  rear!  Undoubtedly 
these  reports  originated  from  the  fact  that 
whenever  the  Germans  ordered  an  advance 
en  masse  it  was  made  from  behind  cover,  usually 
a  shallow  trench,  during  the  storm-march  into 


278  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

France,  and  the  men  would  attack,  on  the  run, 
in  open  line  of  skirmishers,  until  close  enough 
for  shock  action,  when  they  would  concentrate 
and  lunge  forward  for  the  final  assault.  This 
plan  of  attack  appears  to  have  been  quite  suc- 
cessful in  storming  forts  and  intrenched  camps, 
necessarily  at  an  extraordinary  loss  of  life,  and 
while  less  suited  to  breaching  permanent 
trenches  it  has  proven  to  be  about  the  only 
effective  action  for  an  army  constantly  march- 
ing forward  and  constantly  urged  to  attack  to 
keep  up  the  pace.  During  the  later  phases  of 
the  campaign,  when  the  Allies  took  the  offen- 
sive, they  were  compelled  to  risk  the  same 
method,  and  only  when  they  get  so  strong  in 
men  and  material  that  they  "can  afford  to  risk 
three  lives  in  storming  to  one  in  the  German 
trenches  will  they  be  able  to  assume  a  general 
offensive  with  a  view  of  routing  the  enemy  from 
his  present  solid  line  of  intrenchments. 

In  this  trench  warfare  it  has  been  reported 
that  both  sides  have  availed  themselves  of  old- 
fashioned  weapons,  like  catapults,  arrows,  and 
old-style  mortars.  It  is  possible  that  individual 
detachments  may  have  improvised  something  of 
this  sort  in  the  field,  but  there  is  no  regular 


SUPER-STRATEGY  279 

equipment  of  this  description.  The  German 
army  has  a  special  machine  for  heavy  trench 
work,  called  Minenwerfer,  which  is  in  reality 
a  small  mortar  capable  of  tossing  quite  a  heavy 
explosive  shell  into  the  opposing  trenches. 
These  mortars  have  given  a  good  account  of 
themselves,  but  the  favourite  weapon  of  close-in 
trench  fighting  is  the  'hand  grenade,  which  is 
sometimes  launched  with  a  sling;  perhaps  here 
we  have  the  mystery  of i '  catapults. ' ' 

Why  Paris  Was  Not  Taken 

The  intrenchment  tactics  of  the  Germans 
have  been  described  as  a  "rout"  since  they  fell 
back  from  the  Marne  on  previously  selected 
positions  beyond  the  Aisne.  Subsequent  events 
have  shown  that  von  Moltke's  strategy  was  jus- 
tified, for  even  if  the  Germans  had  pushed  on  to 
the  very  walls  of  Paris — and  the  French  army 
was  not,  at  the  time,  able  to  prevent  it — they 
could  have  gained  no  permanent  advantage  by 
that,  and  they  would  then  have  committed 
themselves  to  a  lengthy  campaign  of  pursuit, 
which  would  have  made  it  impossible  for  them 
to  speedily  reenforce  their  menaced  Russian 


280  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

frontier.  By  retreating  to  the  Aisne  and  set- 
tling down  to  siege  tactics  in  admirably  con- 
structed trenches  the  Germans  were  able  to 
strip  their  forces  of  first-line  troops  and  rush 
them  to  the  Eastern  frontier,  making  it  pos- 
sible for  General  von  Hindenburg  to  achieve 
two  clean-cut  decisive  victories,  resulting  in  the 
capture  and  loss  of  nearly  a  quarter  of  million 
Russian  troops.  The  check  thus  administered 
sufficed  at  least  to  delay  the  active  resumption 
of  the  Russian  advance  by  something  like  two 
months,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  a  result  of  this 
magnitude  could  have  been  accomplished  in 
France.  On  the  other  hand,  had  von  Hinden- 
burg failed — and  he  certainly  would  have  failed 
without  adequate  reenforcement — the  Russians 
might  have  been  before  Berlin  at  this  writing, 
and  at  such  heavy  cost  a  decisive  victory  over 
the  French  could  not  be  bought.  Meanwhile,  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  Germany  had  vir- 
tually conquered  Belgium  together  with  the 
only  part  of  Northern  France  of  which  she 
could  hope  to  retain  a  piece  eventually.  Even 
if  the  German  army  had  succeeded  in  investing 
Paris  and  driven  the  French  army  beyond  the 
Loire   and  the   Garonne,  France  would  have 


SUPER-STRATEGY  281 

refused  to  capitulate  so  long  as  England  and 
Russia  remained  her  allies,  depending  quite 
naturally  upon  them  to  relieve  the  military 
pressure  upon  her,  as  they  did.  In  other  words, 
to  have  permitted  the  continued  advance  of  the 
Imperial  army  would  have  been  a  great  error 
of  strategy  and  tantamount  to  sending  it  on  a 
fool's  errand.  By  stretching  a  solid  line  of 
trenches  across  her  conquered  territory  in 
France  and  Belgium,  based  in  the  southeast  on 
the  Swiss  Alps  and  in  the  northeast  on  the 
Channel  coast,  the  German  C.  I.  C.  accomplished 
a  master-stroke  for  by  this  plan  of  strategy  he 
enabled  his  armies  in  the  West  to  hold  the  main 
advantage  gained  by  them,  while  he  empowered 
his  armies  in  the  East  to  deliver  a  telling  blow 
and  preserve  the  frontier  intact. 

It  is  quite  true  that  the  Germans  have  made 
no  advance  of  importance  since  this  plan  was 
carried  into  effect,  that  is,  when  we  dispose  of  the 
capture  of  Antwerp  and  the  march  along  the  sea- 
board toward  the  Ypres  terrain  as  relatively 
unimportant.  But  this  much  may  be  prophesied 
with  certainty  that  should  the  Allies,  who  have 
entirely  failed  to  pierce  the  German  intrenched 
lines  during  several  months  of  incessant  field 


282  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

operations,  succeed  in  rolling  the  Germans  back 
from  the  Ypres  canal  and  retake  Antwerp,  this 
event  would  be  heralded  as  something  in  the 
nature  of  a  colossal  and  decisive  victory.  The 
Germans  have  no  strategic  motive  in  changing 
their  plan  of  action  on  the  French  frontier 
until  they  can  administer  another  blow  at 
Russia  that  shall  relieve  their  rear  once  more. 
The  struggle  for  a  base  at  Calais  is  purely 
tactical  and  of  value  principally  to  naval 
operations. 

If  the  Germans  can  hold  what  they  have 
gained  on  both  frontiers  they  are  quite  safe 
from  defeat,  but  they  cannot  hold  it  by  simply 
holding  on  indefinitely.  They  have  less  to  gain 
by  purely  defensive  operations  than  their 
enemies.  That  the  German  C.  I.  C.  fully  real- 
ises this  point  is  evident  by  the  fact  that  since 
the  German  armies  went  into  intrenchments 
along  the  Aisne  they  have  assumed  an  offensive- 
defensive  rather  than  a  flat  defence.  That  they 
are  outnumbered  has  not  prevented  them  from 
forcing  such  fighting  as  there  has  been;  they 
have  given  the  enemy  no  rest;  tactically  they 
are  on  the  defensive,  but  their  operations  par- 
take of  the  offensive. 


SUPER-STRATEGY  283 


Grand  Scale  Super-Strategy 

With  about  four  million  troops  disposed  on 
a  battle-line  of  two  fronts  covering  about  five 
hundred  miles,  and  opposed  by  certainly  not 
less  than  five  million  allied  troops,  the  military 
problem  confronting  the  German  C.  I.  C.  is  so 
much  vaster  in  extent  and  so  much  more  difficult 
of  solution  as  compared  to  even  the  mightiest 
wars  of  history  that  it  has  called  into  play  a 
kind  of  super-strategy  hitherto  unapproached 
in  warfare.  When  the  war  is  over  and  the 
truth  is  ferreted  out  to  the  last  button  and 
bayonet,  the  well-nigh  superhuman  achievement 
of  the  Grand  General  Staff  in  expeditiously 
manipulating  vast  masses  of  troops  on  in- 
terior lines,  flinging  them  from  the  Western 
frontier  across  Germany  to  the  Eastern  frontier 
to  deliver  a  blow  and  back  again  to  hold  the 
Western  intrenchments  by  the  skin  of  their 
teeth,  while  all  the  time  new  troops  are  being 
fitted  out  at  the  barracks  by  the  army  corps  and 
green  recruits  are  drilled  to  a  point  of  efficiency 
in  a  few  weeks,  is  an  exhibition  of  strategy  on 
the  grand  scale  that  makes  Napoleon's  opera- 


284  WAK'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

tions  look  like  a  pastime  with  toy  soldiers.  To 
frustrate  the  objects  of  the  Prussian  super- 
strategy  the  Allies  have  seized  upon  a  plan  of 
counter-operation,  which  has  caused  more  dam- 
aging effect  to  the  German  arms  than  any  tacti- 
cal offensive  by  the  Allies.  Every  time  the 
Germans  strip  a  line  of  intrenchments  to  reen- 
force  their  offensive  on  the  Eussian  border  the 
Allies  answer  by  a  counter-offensive  on  the 
French  border,  and  vice  versa  a  German  ad- 
vance on  the  Western  frontier  is  retarded  by 
a  Eussian  advance  on  the  Eastern  frontier. 
No  better  plan  of  counter-strategy  could  be 
conceived.  It  put  a  stop  to  the  German  storm- 
march  through  France,  and  if  it  could  be  in- 
definitely continued  on  present  terms  the  Allies 
would  not  have  to  win  a  decisive  victory  on  the 
grand  scale  for  the  utter  exhaustion  and  gradual 
decimation  of  the  German  forces  would  make  it 
unnecessary.  After  almost  six  months  of  the 
most  savagely  contested  battle  action  the  Ger- 
man C.  I.  C.  still  holds  the  upper  hand.  He 
retains  the  advantages  and  territory  gained  in 
the  initial  advance.  What  he  lost  he  has  made 
up,  meanwhile,  in  fresh  acquisitions.  His  posi- 
tion is  sound  to  the  core  and  his  armies  are  not 


SUPER-STRATEGY  285 

shaken.  In  the  main  he  has  had  to  take  a  good 
deal  more  punishment  than  he  has  inflicted,  as  a 
premium  for  assuming  and  maintaining  the  of- 
fensive for  so  long.  He  is  still  operating  on 
interior  lines — a  huge  advantage — and  he  has 
prevented  the  concerted  efforts  of  allied  ene- 
mies from  invading  his  military  borders.  Even 
if  he  were  driven  by  superior  weight  of  num- 
bers to  take  a  defensive  stand  behind  the  Vis- 
tula on  the  East  and  the  Rhine  on  the  West, 
even  if  he  lost  all  that  had  been  gained  in 
France  and  Belgium,  the  position  of  Germany 
would  not  be  desperate,  not  even  as  serious  as 
the  status  of  France  when  the  Prussian  "pickel- 
hauben"  spiked  the  borders  of  the  Marne. 

In  many  ways  the  strategy  pursued  by  the 
French  C.  I.  C.  is  reminiscent  of  the  Fabian 
policy  of  the  Romans  in  dealing  with  the  vic- 
torious armies  of  Hannibal,  the  Carthaginian 
conqueror.  Every  time  the  Roman  senate  dis- 
patched an  army  against  the  invader  it  was  de- 
feated by  Hannibal  in  open  combat.  The  forces 
of  Hannibal  were  as  distinctly  superior  in  mili- 
tary efficiency  over  the  Roman  legions  as  the 
German  soldier  to-day  is  superior  to  his  allied 
opponents.    For  years  Hannibal  remained  vie- 


286  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

torioub.  He  was  by  far  the  greatest  military 
genius  since  Alexander  the  Great.  Step  by  step 
he  laid  the  possessions  of  Eome  under  his 
sceptre.  Nothing,  apparently,  could  save  the 
city  of  Rome  from  conquest  and  sack.  It  was 
not  until  the  Romans,  after  trying  several  make- 
shifts, adopted  a  consistent  defensive  and  ceased 
to  openly  fight  the  army  of  Hannibal  that  they 
could  devote  themselves  to  the  task  of  harassing 
its  flanks  and  cutting  off  its  lines  of  communica- 
tions, which  finally  sapped  the  strength  of  the 
Carthaginians.  The  Romans  skilfully  avoided 
open  battle  during  this  campaign  when  they 
were  steadily  accumulating  strength,  and  Han- 
nibal was  slowly  petering  out.  Instead  of  mov- 
ing upon  Hannibal  even  at  this  auspicious  junc- 
ture they  dispatched  Scipio  with  an  army  to 
Spain  to  fight  Hasdrubal,  the  brother  of  Han- 
nibal, on  whom  the  latter  depended  for  reinforce- 
ments. Scipio  won.  Then,  and  not  until  then, 
when  Hannibal  had  forfeited  his  reserves,  did  the 
Roman  legions  move  upon  the  isolated  Cartha- 
ginian army,  scoring  a  victory  upon  which  the 
course  of  civilisation  hinges  as  upon  a  pivot. 

For  six  months  the  allied  armies  have  emu- 
lated the  Romans  in  defensive  tactics  as  cer- 


SUPER-STRATEGY  287 

tainly  as  the  German  forces  have  followed  the 
offensive  of  Hannibal.  By  attacking  alternately 
on  the  eastern  and  western  borders,  though 
nominally  remaining  on  the  defensive,  and  leav- 
ing the  task  of  forcing  the  fighting  to  the  enemy, 
the  Allies  have  gained  in  strength  perceptibly 
more  than  they  have  suffered  in  punishment. 
Had  they  moved  upon  the  Germans  in  a  general 
offensive  action  the  chances  are  that  they  would 
have  suffered  a  decisive  defeat.  Should  the 
Austrian  army  cease  to  be  of  practical  aid  to 
Germany,  however,  and  become  a  burden,  the 
strategic  moment  would  have  arrived  when  the 
Allies  by  simultaneously  assuming  a  grand  of- 
fensive action  on  both  borders  might  place  Ger- 
many in  a  position  where  she  will  have  to  fight 
a  good  deal  harder  than  did  Hannibal  at  Zama, 
to  escape  defeat. 

The  Strategic  Status  Quo 

As  matters  stand  at  this  writing  the  German  C. 
I.  C.  has  failed  to  complete  the  offensive  planned 
on  Calais,  but  he  has  managed  to  score  two  most 
decisive  victories  over  the  Russians  in  East 
Prussia  and  Poland,  both  of  which  were  her- 
alded as  Muscovite  triumphs  by  the  romancing 


288  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

censor  of  Petrograd.  Despite  these  successes, 
which  abundantly  demonstrated  the  superiority 
of  the  Germans  over  the  Russians  on  the  battle- 
field, notwithstanding  a  noticeable  improvement 
in  the  latter  as  compared  with  their  showing  in 
previous  campaigns,  ever  so  much  more  is  re- 
quired of  the  German  soldier  to  win  out  in  the 
long  run  because  the  Russian  soldier,  fighting 
on  one. front  only,  will  be  able  to  outnumber 
him  in  the  proportion  of  three  to  one.  It  has 
been  said  and  repeated  that  German  statecraft 
has  set  a  task  for  German  strategy  in  a  war  on 
two  fronts  entirely  beyond  the  capacity  of  the 
German  army.  Relatively  speaking,  this  is 
true,  but  it  still  remains  to  be  proven  conclu- 
sively true.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  a 
German  C.  I.  C.  once  upset  the  calculated  strat- 
egy of  almost  entire  Europe  in  an  attempt  to 
crush  Prussia,  when  she  was  not  so  well  pre- 
pared as  at  present,  and  came  out  a  victor 
under  the  historical  title  of  Frederick  the  Great. 
The  splendid  resistance  offered  by  the  Servian 
and  the  Belgian  armies  in  the  face  of  over- 
powering odds  remains  as  a  present-day  ex- 
ample of  the  latent  and  recuperative  power  of 
an  army  pushed  to  the  extreme  of  its  fighting 


SUPER-STRATEGY  289 

capacity  when  actuated  by  the  undying  courage 
of  invincible  valour  and  love  of  country.  Never 
before  in  history  has  the  German  vaterland 
been  so  solidly  united  as  at  present.  Never  be- 
fore have  German  troops  gone  into  battle  with 
a  more  formidable  spirit  of  valour  and  self- 
sacrifice  in  order  that  the  vaterland  may  be 
saved  and  its  enemies  may  be  vanquished.  Ir- 
respective of  whether  one  likes  or  dislikes  the 
Germans  this  much  we  must  concede  to  them  in 
all  fairness.  Should  the  German  armies  go 
down  to  defeat  ultimately,  snowed  under  by 
overpowering  numbers,  they  may  be  depended 
on  to  battle  heroically  to  the  last,  like  the  Ger- 
man cruisers  scattered  upon  the  high  seas, 
every  one  of  which  knew  that  she  was  facing 
ultimate  destruction  and  none  of  which  surren- 
dered to  the  enemy. 

In  general,  the  science  of  strategy  has  been 
less  influenced  by  modern  weapons  and  equip- 
ments than  the  tactical  branches.  If  the  elder 
Field-Marshal  von  Moltke  were  alive  to-day  he 
would  probably  be  the  first  to  reverse  his  tacti- 
cal dictum,  made  famous  in  the  Franco-Prus- 
sian war  of  70-71,  to  wit,  "  March  divided, 
fight  united.'' 


i* 


EPILOGUE 

A  Weapon  Against  War 

To  try  to  stop  war  by  peaceful  means  is 
about  as  futile  as  to  lecture  a  cat  for  stealing 
milk.  Peace  is  the  cause  of  war.  No  matter 
how  well  and  how  long  the  human  family  may 
manage  to  live  together  peacefully,  history 
shows  with  painful  clearness  that  the  longer  a 
condition  of  peace  endures  the  more  certain  it 
is  to  develop  causes  for  war  and  to  finally  pre- 
cipitate a  condition  of  war.  Mankind  is  en- 
gaged in  perpetual  warfare.  Sometimes  it 
pauses  to  catch  its  breath,  and  that  is  peace. 
There  is  no  real  and  final  peace.  What  we 
dignify  by  the  term  peace  is  only  a  sort  of 
truce.  History  proves  it,  every  page  of  it. 
Mankind  ignores  the  lesson.  Every  genera- 
tion thinks  it  is  somehow  better  than  the  pre- 
ceding. Imaginary  betterment  of  this  kind  is 
supposed  to  bring  about  the  disarmament  of  the 
nations  if  not  the  millennium.  One  only  has 
to  wait  patiently  and  be  good  and  the  miracle 

290 


EPILOGUE  291 

will  happen  of  itself.  But  history  never  fails 
to  apply  its  stringent  lesson,  and  Europe  is  now 
smarting  under  it,  showing  that  we  are  as  far 
from  the  millennium  as  we  ever  were. 

Mankind  has  never  learnt  anything  of  itself. 
It  has  been  forced  at  every  turn  to  learn,  it  has 
been  kicked  forward  on  the  road  to  knowledge, 
it  has  been  frightened  into  progress.  War  is 
a  condition  of  mankind  that  cannot  be  abated 
by  arguments.  War  will  not  cease  until  a 
weapon  is  found  against  it.  Peace  propaganda 
is  about  as  effective  as  rotten  oranges  against 
a  battleship.  The  pacifists  make  the  mistake 
of  assuming  that  public  opinion  is  sufficient  in 
itself  as  a  compelling  force.  Public  opinion  is 
stronger  in  the  United  States  than  in  any  other 
country — in  fact,  it  is  the  basic  force  for  all 
governmental  power — but  if  American  public 
opinion  decided  in  favour  of  disarmament  to- 
day and  determined  upon  a  career  of  national 
peace,  war  would  be  forced  upon  the  American 
nation,  nevertheless. 

There  is  nothing  the  matter  with  the  peace 
proposition  in  itself,  but  it  needs  the  backing  of 
armed  force.  If  we  could  bring  the  leading 
powers  of  the  world  together  in  a  mutually  pro- 


292  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

tective  association  of  interests  aiming  at  peace 
everlasting,  backed  by  their  armed  strength, 
we  should  be  advancing  on  the  proper  path  to 
a  solution.  Entirely  aside  from  the  present  war 
if  the  Entente  Cordiale  and  the  Triple  Alliance 
could  be  persuaded  to  reduce  their  armaments 
on  a  scale  commensurate  with  native  popula- 
tion and  colonial  interests,  and  if  this  reduc- 
tion were  to  be  radical,  a  heavy  burden  would 
be  lifted  from  the  shoulders  of  Europe.  But 
comparative  disarmament  would  offer  no  prac- 
tical guarantee  of  peace.  It  is  the  first  step,  but 
much  more  remains  to  be  done.  If  the  nations 
involved  could  agree  to  abolish  the  means  of 
mobilisation,  secret  armaments,  strategic  bases 
and  railways,  concentration  centres,  etc.,  and 
would  content  themselves  with  lining  their 
mutual  borders  with  a  policing  force  of  soldiery, 
subject  to  the  call  of  the  mutually  protective 
association  to  enforce  a  state  of  peace  in  any 
serious  emergency  arising,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  make  war,  and  if  war  ensued,  neverthe- 
less, it  would  involve  only  the  policing  sol- 
diery. In  time,  one  might  proceed  further 
and  provide  that  the  soldiery  lining  the  Franco- 
German  borders,  instead  of  guarding  oppos- 


EPILOGUE  293 

ing  sides  of  the  same  line,  should  be  fused 
into  a  Franco-German  soldiery  guarding  the 
same  border  together.  If  all  other  borders 
in  Europe  were  to  be  similarly  protected 
against  aggression,  and  the  concentration  and 
mobilisation  of  troops  other  than  those  actually 
stationed  on  the  borders  were  made  impossible, 
war  could  still  be  declared,  but  the  chance  of 
gaining  anything  by  it  would  be  so  remote  that 
no  nation  would  care  to  declare  war.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  incentive  to  maintain  a  state  of 
peace  would  be  so  strong  as  to  constitute  the 
first  and  foremost  consideration  of  the  powers 
involved.  In  such  a  scheme  the  demands  of 
peace  would  have  the  backing  of  an  armed  force 
supported  by  the  leading  nations  of  the  world, 
and  the  nation  that  would  dare  to  break  such  a 
covenant  would  soon  be  subjugated  by  the  other 
nations. 

The  meanest  nation  on  earth  will  always  in- 
sist on  its  right  to  defend  itself  by  armed  force, 
hence,  absolute  and  unconditional  disarmament 
is  impracticable.  Neither  is  it  desirable,  for  a 
nation  undefended  is  like  a  city  unpoliced  and 
soon  becomes  a  burden  or  a  prey  to  its  neigh- 
bours.  A  border  constabulary,  however,  even  if 


294  WAR'S  NEW  WEAPONS 

it  amounts  to  an  army  in  itself,  is  not  danger- 
ous to  the  world  at  large  so  long  as  it  is  deprived 
of  means  to  mobilise  and  concentrate,  and  if 
the  same  agreement  is  entered  into  by  the  lead- 
ing powers  there  should  be  no  loss  of  dignity 
on  the  part  of  any  one  power. 

The  only  serious  obstacle  to  a  practical  real- 
isation of  this  plan  is  the  semi-feudal  manner 
in  which  diplomacy  is  conducted,  which  makes 
the  foreign  policy  of  a  nation  a  thing  entirely 
foreign  to  the  real  desires  and  interests  of  the 
nation.  This  present  war  did  not  grow  out  of 
hatred  between  the  citizens  of  the  powers  en- 
gaged; in  fact,  the  citizens  were  most  peace- 
fully engaged  in  mutual,  international  rela- 
tions requiring  no  resort  to  arms.  Had  the 
people  been  left  to  themselves  there  would  have 
been  no  war.  There  was  no  serious  clash  of 
interests  between  them,  only  competitive  rival- 
ries in  tradal  and  industrial  fields.  The  clash 
came  between  the  foreign  and  diplomatic  poli- 
cies of  the  governments  ruling  the  peoples. 
These  policies  are  the  trouble-making  tools  of 
governments.  The  house  of  Romanoff  has  one 
originated  by  Tsar  Peter  the  Great,  the  Haps- 
burgs  have  another,  the  Hohenzollerns  have  a 


EPILOGUE  295 

third,  and  the  policies  pursued  by  the  British 
Parliament,  the  French  Conseil  and  the  Ameri- 
can Congress,  are  just  as  prolific  in  trouble- 
making  potency  as  any  subscribed  to  under  the 
imperial  sceptre.  They  may  cause  war  at  any 
time,  even  though  the  peoples  committed  to 
them  by  birth  and  habitat  are  not  in  any  sense 
inclined  to  war.  Consequently,  there  can  be  no 
real  and  abiding  progress  toward  lasting  peace 
until  the  elements  entering  into  the  foreign  poli- 
cies of  the  nations  have  been  substituted  by 
elements  in  harmony  with  the  natural  life  of  the 
peoples.  That  such  a  time  may  arrive  is  con- 
ceivable, but  it  is  so  far  off  in  the  reckoning  of 
space  as  to  leave  no  immediate  hope  of  a 
solution. 


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